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MCDONALD, HAROLD L., JR., Ph.D. Toward a Triadic Theory of 
Walker Percy: A Semiotic Reading of the Novels. (1992) 
Directed by Dr. Charles Davis. 246 pp. 
The purpose of this study was to explore the 
relationship between Walker Percy's work in linguistic 
theory and his fiction. An investigative apparatus was 
distilled from Percy's essay "Toward a Triadic Theory of 
Meaning" and applied to the language behavior of important 
characters from each of his novels. 
This procedure revealed a significant progression 
thoughout Percy's fiction in his awareness of language as an 
overt, distinctly human behavior. In his first published 
novel, The Moviegoer. Percy's characters certainly engage in 
verbal behavior, but it does not dramatically call attention 
to itself as rule-governed normative behavior. In each 
succeeding novel, however, Percy shows a growing awareness 
of the verbal behavior of his characters, and manipulates 
this behavior to illuminate various psychological and 
spiritual aspects of the characters and the communities in 
which they live. This manipulation reaches a climax in 
Percy's penultimate novel, The Second Coming, which focuses 
on the relationship between the relative unconventionality 
of one character's verbal behavior and her community's 
consequent perception of her as mentally ill. Percy uses 
this relationship to demonstrate, as he does to some degree 
in all of his novels, that language in the postmodern world 
is bankrupt, and that the only way for a speaker to escape 
this bankruptcy is to deviate from what this world considers 
"normal" verbal behavior. 
The application of Percy's language theory to his 
fiction demonstrates a mutually beneficial relationship 
between Percy's two abiding interests. More importantly, it 
provides a means of articulating the precise nature of this 
relationship. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In an unpublished letter written in 1977 to Shelby 
Foote, Walker Percy outlined some of the writing projects he 
had in mind for the future. Among these was an attempt 
to devise a semiotic experiment (a regular scientific 
article) in which I actually demonstrate that Peirce-
Percyan semiotic is true. At present the various 
theorists who have read Message in Bottle simply shrug 
and say it ain't so (a few exceptions). A proper 
Galileo-Einstein hypothesis: say a semiotic study of 
Faulkner: if such an [sic] such a set of theorems are 
true and such an hypothesis can be induced from 
Faulkner's life-and-writings at stage A, then facts a, 
b,...n, will hold true at a later stage B. (Letters) 
Unfortunately, Percy never got around to conducting this 
ambitious experiment before his death in 1990. (Indeed, in 
the same letter to Foote he suspected such might be the 
case—that Faulkner might be "too hard to get a holt of"— 
and proposed as an alternative "a pop field like TV or print 
media.") The student of Percy, familiar with his long-term 
interest in language and semiotics, wishes that he had at 
least had a go at this project. The concept of applying this 
novelist's semiotic theories to the fiction of a fellow 
novelist is quite intriguing. 
Equally intriguing, however, is the concept of applying 
Percy's theories to his own works of fiction in order to see 
iv 
what sort of light might be shed by each upon the other. 
While a study of the sheer scope of that proposed by Percy, 
with its heavy dependence upon minute, accurate biographical 
information about the author, is as untenable for Percy as 
it would be for Faulkner, a more purely literary study is 
both possible and promising. Such a study would regard the 
fiction as a world within itself, and concentrate upon the 
characters who people this world, or more specifically their 
use of language, as the proper subject of its investigation. 
The more salient features of Percy's semiotic theories would 
be extracted from the numerous essays on language to form a 
concise, coherent investigative apparatus, which could in 
turn be applied to the linguistic behavior of the fictional 
characters in order to determine the significance of this 
behavior, on a semiotic level, to the fictional world in 
which it occurs. 
Such a study is precisely what will be attempted within 
this dissertation, in which it will be demonstrated that 
Percy's semiotic theory does inform the language behavior of 
his characters, and that viewing this behavior in light of 
the theory provides a whole new dimension to our 
understanding of Percy's fictional concerns. Before we 
undertake a semiotic analysis of Percy's fiction, however, 
we must begin where Percy began—with his interest in 
language. 
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Long before Walker Percy published his first novel, The 
Moviegoer, he began writing essays on the nature of 
language. This interest in language grew out of Percy's 
extensive self-conducted study of philosophy during his 
recuperation from the bout with pulmonary tuberculosis that 
ended his medical career before it began. After discovering 
that no one actually reads the types of essays he was 
writing (Lawson and Kramer 89), he decided to try his hand 
at fiction "as a vehicle for incarnating ideas, as did Jean 
Paul Sartre and Gabriel Marcel" (Lawson and Kramer 9). 
Despite the enormous success brought him by this felicitous 
marriage of fiction and philosophy, Percy continued to write 
essays on language to the very end of his life. 
Throughout these essays, certain key concepts on the 
nature of man and language recur with great regularity. At 
the very heart of all of his reflections on language is the 
concept of the inseparability of the notions of man and 
language. Man is that creature on earth who uses language. 
He is "Homo loquens, man the talker," or even more 
accurately, "Homo symbolificus, man the symbol-monger" 
(Message in the Bottle 17). In Lost in the Cosmos Percy 
recreates the moment in evolutionary history at which man 
made his qualitative split from the other species, and 
describes the nature of this split: 
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Extremely recently in the history of the Cosmos, 
at least on the earth—perhaps less than 100,000 years 
ago, perhaps more—there occurred an event different in 
kind from all preceding events in the Cosmos. It cannot 
be understood as a dyadic interaction or a complex of 
dyadic interactions. 
It has been called variously triadic behavior, 
thirdness, the Delta factor, man's discovery of the 
sign (including symbols, language, art). (94) 
For his distinction between "dyadic" and "triadic" behavior, 
which lies at the heart of Peirce-Percyan semiotic theory, 
Percy is indebted to Charles Peirce's isolation of two and 
only two types of interactions that take place between 
objects/organisms in the Cosmos: 
All dynamical action, or action of brute force, 
physical or psychical, either takes place between two 
subj ects... or at any rate is a resultant of such action 
between pairs. But by "semiosis" I mean, on the 
contrary, an action, or influence, which is, or 
involves, a cooperation of three subjects, such as a 
sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-
relative influence not being in any way resolvable into 
actions between pairs. (MB 161). 
The first of these types of interaction, the "six-billion-
year-old chain of causal relations, the energy exchanges... 
from the earliest collision of hydrogen atoms to the 
responses of amoeba and dogs and chimps" (MB 38), is 
labelled by Peirce "dyadic" because it takes place betweeen 
two subjects and can be understood in terms of a strict 
stimulus-response relationship. For example, chlorine and 
sodium, each highly toxic to human beings, come together 
vii 
under the right circumstances and become table salt. Or, to 
give an example from the animal kingdom, a dog in a 
laboratory hears a bell every time he is fed. Before long he 
begins to salivate at the sound of the bell, even when food 
does not accompany the sound. Each of these examples 
involves a simple, two-way cause and effect interaction, or 
a sequence of such interactions. The other kind of 
interaction described by Peirce, however, involves a third 
dimension, a third subject, and is hence labelled "triadic." 
Triadic interactions "characteristically involve symbols and 
symbol users" (MB 162), with the term "symbol" being 
understood here as "something which stands to somebody for 
something in some respect or capacity" (MB 161-2). The dog 
in our laboratory experiment is conditioned to associate the 
bell he hears with the food he eats, but the bell does not 
symbolize food for him as, say, the word "food" or a picture 
of a steak symbolizes food for a human being. For the dog, a 
dyadic creature, the sound of the bell is merely a signal 
that alerts him to the possible presence of food. For the 
human being, a triadic creature, the word "food" or the 
picture of a steak is food. The triadic creature's world is 
named in a way that the dyadic creature's world is not, and 
is thus communicable in a way that the dyadic creature's 
world is not. 
Indeed, this very communicability of his world most 
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substantively distinguishes the triadic creature man from 
the dyadic creatures from which he evolved some 100,000 
years ago. Triadic creatures are uniquely capable of sharing 
their world with one another: 
...all such triadic behavior is social in origin. A 
signal received by an organism is like other signals of 
stimuli from its environment. But a sign requires a 
sign-giver. Thus, every triad of sign-reception 
requires another triad of sign-utterance. (LC 96) 
The vehicle through which this sharing of the world, this 
uttering and receiving of signs, takes place is, of course, 
language. It is thus his capacity for language which most 
definitively separates man from the other species on the 
earth—which makes man Man (between a dyadic and triadic 
mammal there is "semiotically speaking, more difference 
between the two than there is between the dyadic animal and 
the planet Saturn"). 
Given its fundamental role in man's very identity as a 
species, language would seem to be the proper subject of 
study for him. Unfortunately, this very quality that makes 
language such a natural subject of study for man also makes 
it a very difficult subject of study for him. Since language 
is virtually synonymous with both the faculty with which he 
would undertake such a study, and the medium through which 
he would articulate his findings, or in other words, since 
language is what he knows with and talks with, it is an 
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extremely difficult subject for him to know or say anything 
about. As Percy puts it: 
The difficulty with it [the study of language] is that 
it is under our noses; it is too close and too 
familiar. Language, symbolization, is the stuff of 
which our knowledge and awareness of the world are 
made, the medium through which we see the world. Trying 
to see it is like trying to see the mirror by which we 
see everything else. (MB 151) 
Elsewhere, using a slightly different analogy, Percy writes: 
The truth is that man's capacity for symbol-mongering 
in general and language in particular is so intimately 
part and parcel of his being human, of his perceiving 
and knowing, that it is all but impossible for him to 
focus on the magic prism through which he sees 
everything else. (MB 29) 
With the problem thus stated, how does one go about studying 
this mysterious entity called language? Or, for that matter, 
from what vantage point does one even attempt to observe it? 
Percy answers these questions, with his tongue only partly 
in his cheek: "In order to see it, one must either be a 
Martian, or, if an earthling, sufficiently detached, 
marooned, bemused, wounded, crazy, one-eyed, and lucky 
enough to become a Martian for a second and catch a glimpse 
of it" (MB 29). As we shall see, the above prescription for 
"seeing" language reads like a catalogue of maladies 
suffered by Percy's major fictional characters. It is 
through these characters' personality flaws, with their 
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concomitant disruptions of language, that Percy distorts 
this mirror or prism so that we, the readers, may "catch a 
glimpse of it." 
Just being able to see language, however, does not 
carry us very far toward an understanding of its 
significance for either Percy or his characters, any more 
than, say, just looking at an X-ray can tell us what is 
going on inside a tuberculosis patient's chest. One needs 
some sort of theoretical apparatus for describing what one 
sees. Using Peirce's notion of man as a triadic creature as 
a starting point, Percy provides us with just such an 
apparatus. 
Percy's indebtedness to Peirce's work is evident 
throughout his essays on language, but nowhere is this 
influence more cogently realized than in the essay "Toward a 
Triadic Theory of Meaning." In this essay, ostensibly aimed 
at psychiatrists, but relevant wherever language is used, 
Percy expresses amazement at the fact that, even though 
psychiatrists "traffic in words," there does not currently 
exist "a basic science of listening and talking, as 
indispensible to psychiatrists as anatomy to surgeons" (MB 
159). He then proposes to build upon the foundation laid by 
Peirce "a theory of language as behavior" (MB 159), with 
which psychiatrists may fill in the enormous gaps left by 
both classical behaviorism and classical psychoanalysis. 
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From Peirce's notion of man as a triadic creature, from 
his "triadic theory of signs," Percy distills a "loose list 
of postulates" implied by Peirce's theory. Of these 
postulates, the one that is of greatest practical value to 
the psychiatrist's study of his patients' verbal behavior, 
as to our own study of the verbal behavior of Percy's 
characters, is postulate 1.5: 
When one studies dyadic behavior, i.e., the learned 
response of an organism to stimuli, it is proper to 
isolate certain parameters and variables. These 
include: amplitude of response, frequency of stimulus, 
reinforcement, extinction, discrimination, and so on. 
But if one considers triadic behavior, i.e., the 
coupling of a sentence by a coupler, a different set of 
parameters and variables must be considered. (171-2) 
Percy then lists a series of such parameters and variables 
designed to enable the psychiatrist to analyze those aspects 
of a patient's behavior heretofore not covered by either 
behaviorism or psychoanalysis. These parameters and 
variables are as follows: 
1.51. Every sentence is uttered in a community. The 
community of discourse is a necessary and nontrivial 
parameter of triadic behavior.... 
1.511. In triadic behavior, the dimension of 
community can act as either parameter or variable.... 
1.52. A signal is received by an organism in an 
environment. A sentence is received and uttered in a 
world. 
1.521. An environment has gaps for an organism, but 
the world is global, that is, it is totally accounted 
for, one way or another, rightly or wrongly, by names 
and sentences.... 
1.522. Sentences refer to different worlds [e.g. 
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"present world," "future world," "fictional past 
world," etc.]. 
1.523. Since a sentence entails a world for both 
utterer and receiver, both utterer and receiver 
necessarily see themselves as being placed vis-a-vis 
the world. A sentence utterer cannot not be placed vis­
a-vis the world of the sentence. If he is not placed, 
then his relation to the world of the sentence is the 
relation of not being placed.... 
1.53. Every sentence is uttered and received in a 
medium. 
The medium is a nontrivial parameter or 
variable in every transaction in which sentences are 
used. The medium is not necessarily the message, but 
the message can be strongly influenced by the medium. 
1.54. Every sentence has a normative dimension 
[e,g. "true-false, stale-fresh, appropriate-
inappropriate, crazy-sane, etc."]. 
After listing the parameters and variables involved in 
Peirce-Percyan semiotic theory, Percy concludes the essay by 
applying the theory to a verbal exchange between a 
psychiatrist and his patient: 
THERAPIST (after a long silence): "What comes to mind?" 
PATIENT (seeing the curtain at the window stir in the 
breeze): "There's a rat behind the arras." 
THERAPIST: "Who's the rat?" 
PATIENT: "Polonius." 
THERAPIST: "Don't forget that Hamlet mistook Polonius 
for the king." 
PATIENT (agitated): "You mean—it's oedipal? Hm. No. 
Yes. It is!" (184) 
Percy's semiotic analysis of this exchange may be summarized 
as follows: since it is clear that the patient is not 
referring to a literal rodent, the normative mode of true-
false does not apply. If the therapist mistakes the 
normative parameter of the patient's sentence and gets up to 
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look behind the curtain, he will completely miss the 
pathological cues offered by his patient's verbal behavior. 
Furthermore, if the therapist reads his patient's agitation 
at the disclosure of his oedipal feelings from a dyadic 
standpoint, he will fail to perceive the true nature of this 
agitation. A dyadic theory would trace it to "repression" of 
and "resistance" to "the disclosure of unconscious contents" 
(185). Triadic theory, however, views this agitation, not as 
misery, but rather as delight, at exhibiting "the proper 
pathology, in this case the central pathology of the Master 
himself [Freud]" (185). It is 
...a naming delight which derives from the patient's 
discovery that his own behavior, which until now he had 
taken to be the unformulable, literally unspeakable, 
vagary of one's self, has turned out not merely to be 
formulable, that is to say, namable by a theory to 
which both patient and therapist subscribe, but to be 
namable with a name which is above all names: oedipal! 
(187-8). 
When the normative dimension of this delight is examined, it 
turns out to have both "authentic and inauthentic 
components." It is good that the patient confronts his 
pathology, but his delight at the perceived prestige of the 
pathology indicates "a certain loss of sovereignty by the 
patient," a "falling prey to valid theory" (185). 
Such is Percy's "basic science of listening and 
talking." By applying this list of "parameters and 
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variables" to his patients' verbal behavior, a psychiatrist 
can add a whole new dimension to his treatment of them that 
psychoanalysis and behaviorism both ignore, for while these 
two "classical" branches of psychiatry focus solely upon the 
content of a patient's utterances, Peirce-Percyan semiotic 
theory unlocks the very act of uttering itself, and reveals 
important psychological information about a patient that is 
completely inaccessible to either a Freudian or a Skinnerian 
approach. As valuable a tool as Percy's "basic science of 
listening and talking" may be for psychiatrists, however, we 
might reasonably wonder what it has to offer the reader of 
his fiction. Certainly Percy's characters engage in 
listening and talking just as a psychiatrists' patients do, 
but beyond this most general of similarities between real 
people and fictional characters, is there any meaningful 
connection between Percy's semiotic theories and his 
fiction? 
According to Percy, no such connection exists. In an 
interview conducted in 1975, when asked, "Has your interest 
in language theory affected your practice as a novelist?" 
Percy replied: "I think they have very little to do with 
each other. Maybe it's just as well. God help us if a 
novelist was thinking in terms of theoretical linguistics 
when he was writing. It'd be pretty bad" (Lawson and Kramer 
138). While this contention has a good deal of truth to it, 
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one tends to be skeptical about the claim that his language 
theory and novel writing "have very little to do with one 
another." When a writer devotes as much time and energy to 
the theoretical study of language as Percy has, and then 
sits down at his desk to create a fictional world out of 
language, it is difficult to believe that this interest will 
not manifest itself in the writer's fiction, whether with or 
without his conscious awareness. 
Many critics, however, take Percy at his word on this 
point and treat his linguistic work and his fiction as two 
completely unrelated, or at least only obliquely related, 
entities. Those few who do acknowledge a meaningful 
connection between the two, and attempt to elucidate it 
(e.g. Howland, Telotte) tend to do so in only the most 
general, abstract manner, focusing their attention on the 
union between two characters, or between the author and his 
reader, that results from the shared experience of "naming" 
various aspects of the world, or as Telotte sums it up, "the 
creation of intersubjective relationships through human 
communication" ("Walker Percy's Language of Creation" 116). 
No one has yet focused on the verbal behavior of Percy's 
characters as a behavior, and analyzed it for evidence of 
the relative soundness of these characters' inner selves 
(i.e. their psychological and spiritual well-being). This 
critical neglect of the semiotic aspects of Percy's fiction 
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is difficult to understand because, regardless of what he 
says to the contrary, his characters' verbal behavior quite 
regularly calls attention to itself as a behavior, and hence 
invites semiotic analysis. 
While reading Percy's fiction, one is often struck by 
instances of verbal behavior, by speech acts (e.g. 
statements, stray bits of dialogue, whole conversations) 
which somehow stand out from those dialogues that merely 
move the story along. Whether they be utterances that seem 
somehow to stray from the norm, or conversely, that adhere 
too closely to the norm, such semiotic flags alert the 
reader to pay more attention (e.g. to the values held by the 
speaker, to the values held by those around him, to the 
effect of his speech upon those around him), for which he is 
rewarded by insight into a rhetoric of tonal variation more 
subtle, yet more effective, than more obvious devices. When 
it is working for him, Percy uses this ineffable rhetoric to 
support and even develop the major thematical concerns of 
the novels, in ways that are often contradictory to their 
more apparent thematic concerns, a fact which is at times 
one of the main points Percy is trying to get across. 
As abstract and intangible as this strategy may seem, 
when it is examined in conjunction with Peirce-Percyan 
semiotic theory, a coherent pattern emerges. Within the 
notion of language as triadic behavior, and the parameters 
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and variables formulated by Percy for studying this 
behavior, is implied the concept of language as rule-
governed normative behavior. Governing language behavior is 
a regulatory structure which inhabits the third dimension of 
the Peirce-Percy triad, the same dimension that 
distinguishes man from the lower, dyadic creatures in the 
world around him. Within Percy's fiction, this regulatory 
system is synonymous with the social realm in which man 
lives, breathes, eats, sleeps, and, of course, talks. Given 
this synonymy, since man's language behavior is more or less 
rigidly governed by this regulatory structure, any aberrant 
use of language automatically places a speaker at odds with 
the social world around him. In other words, deviant 
language behavior is ipso facto deviant behavior, period. 
It is this very condition that Percy manipulates so 
very effectively in his fiction. The extent of a character's 
integration into the society in which he lives can be 
inferred from the degree to which his language behavior 
"follows the rules." Through verbal behavior alone, 
therefore, Percy is able to depict a character's relative 
integration or alienation, as well as to explore the merits 
or drawbacks of such integration or alienation. (Given 
society as it is portrayed in Percy's fiction, alienation is 
not always a bad thing.) 
With each succeeding novel, Percy's manipulation of the 
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relationship between language behavior and society becomes 
bolder and more self-conscious until reaching an apex in his 
next to last novel, The Second Coming. So central are 
Percy's semiotic interests to the overall theme of this 
novel, in fact, that in his last novel he all but abandons 
these interests, having in The Second Coming taken semiotic 
fiction about as far as it is capable of being taken. With 
the aid of Peirce-Percyan semiotic theory, we will trace 
this progression toward semiotic awareness throughout 
Percy's fictional career, and demonstrate how this semiotic 
awareness enriches his more overt thematic concerns. By 
examining the verbal behavior of Percy's characters in 
conjunction with the parameters and variables that he sets 
forth in "Toward a Triadic Theory of Meaning"—by stretching 
it out on the psychiatrist's couch, so to speak—we will be 
able to diagnose precisely what is wrong, and on rare 
occasions right, with Percy's speakers, with their auditors, 
and with the world in which they all live. 
xix 
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CHAPTER I 
"SUNK IN THE EVERYDAYNESS": 
The Moviegoer 
Thirty years after its initial publication, The 
Moviegoer remains Percy's most popular book. Indeed, Harold 
Bloom sees it as Percy's one and only "permanent American 
book" (3). The enduring popularity of the book results from 
the particularly responsive chord that it strikes in the 
minds of its readers. That younger readers in particular 
have a strong sense of recognition of, and sympathy with, 
the central thematic concerns of the book is not surprising 
considering the fact that it deals with a universally 
youth-oriented subject—alienation (Henisey 208). 
In an early interview, Percy described The Moviegoer 
as "an attempt to portray the rebellion of two young people 
against the shallowness and tastelessness of modern life" 
(Lawson and Kramer 3). Accurate as far as it goes, this 
description belies the complexity of the philosophical 
framework around which the novel is constructed. Drawing 
from the ideas of such philosophers as Heidegger and, most 
importantly, Kierkegaard, Percy depicts a modern world that 
is absolutely permeated with despair, of which, 
incidentally, it is wholly unaware, and toward which the 
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only healthy relationship is one of alienation. Specific 
components of this despair are "everydayness," a term 
borrowed from Heidegger and used to describe a phenomenon 
"which is almost omnipresent in The Moviegoer." and 
"malaise," a "postwar mood" which "threatens the psychic 
annihilation of us all" (Luschei 21, 17). The Moviegoer 
thus diagnoses these societal ills, and while it may not 
offer a cure (Tharpe 63), the very awareness that it 
promotes at least helps to rescue man from the sort of 
despair described by Kierkegaard in the novel's epigraph: 
"...the specific character of despair is precisely this: it 
is unaware of being despair." 
Now, this general theme of The Moviegoer does not 
dramatically differ from that of The Gramercv Winner or, 
presumably, of The Charterhouse. the two very bad novels 
that Percy wrote and shelved before finally getting it right 
with The Moviegoer. Why, then, the failure of the first two 
efforts, and the success of the third? A large part of the 
answer lies in what Percy learned to do with language itself 
during the interim. Martin Luschei comments that, in writing 
The Moviegoer, "what [Percy] stumbled onto, by his own 
account, was a close relation between style and content" 
(15-16). Luschei refers specifically here to Percy's 
"laconic tone which allowed him to treat his recurring 
themes without Faulknerian or Wolfean excesses," but another 
aspect of this felicitous marriage between style and content 
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is what Percy does with the dialogue, with the actual speech 
acts, of his characters. 
In his treatment of dialogue in The Moviegoer. Percy is 
clearly thinking in terms of triadic theory. When 
"listening" to Percy's characters talk to one another, the 
reader is acutely aware, not only of what they are saying, 
but of the very medium through which they express 
themselves. The reader quickly comes to see speech, not only 
as a means of advancing the story line from point A to point 
B, but as a distinct human behavior that is as worthy of 
close scrutiny as overt physical activity and just as 
revealing. We may learn a lot about a character like Kate by 
observing her booze-drinking, pill-taking, and 
thumb-chewing, but we can learn still more about her by 
paying close attention to her language behavior. Indeed, 
all of Percy's major characters reveal themselves through 
their language behavior. Just as important, however, is what 
this language behavior reveals about the world in which the 
characters live. In The Moviegoer. Percy consciously and 
effectively manipulates verbal behavior to undergird, and 
even to develop, the novel's central themes: the malaise and 
everydayness which permeate modern society, and the 
alienation from this society of those who would escape its 
pernicious influences. 
Behind this effective use of dialogue is the notion of 
language as rule-governed normative behavior, as indigenous 
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to a particular culture as, say, table etiquette, and just 
as strictly regulated. Or, in terms of Percy's "loose list 
of postulates:" "Every sentence is uttered in a community. 
The comunity of discourse is a necessary and nontrivial 
parameter of triadic behavior" (MB 172). Language behavior 
only has meaning in relation to a particular community. Each 
community has its own elaborate system of rules governing 
language behavior, and each of its members must learn these 
rules in order to participate in its social/verbal life. 
Failure to master these rules, or to abide by them once 
mastered, results in a member's alienation from the 
community at large, which is not necessarily a bad thing, 
considering the communities in which Percy's characters 
live. 
The New Orleans and environs that surround Binx 
Boiling, narrator/protagonist of The Moviegoer, is one such 
community. Early in the novel, Binx first mentions the 
"search" on which he has embarked and describes the 
community around him that has made him aware of the need for 
such a quest: "The search is what anyone would undertake if 
he were not sunk in the everydayness of his own life" (13). 
Binx's New Orleans, and the modern America which it 
represents, are "sunk in the everydayness," and desperately 
riddled with malaise. Given Percy's assertion of the 
inseparability of language behavior and the notion of 
community, it is no surprise that the language of his 
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characters very clearly reflects these societal ills. The 
language of this community is bankrupt, completely without 
substance. The rules that govern it, however, are still very 
much intact, and followed religiously by the majority of its 
members, who fail to see anything wrong with society. These 
are the characters described in Kierkegaard's definition of 
despair. 
Before Percy can effectively use this concept of 
linguistic conformity to reflect the prevailing everydayness 
of society, he must first demonstrate the very fact of 
language as rule-governed normative behavior; he must show 
that there are, in fact, rules which must be learned before 
one can participate in the language-using community. A few 
examples will illustrate how Percy makes his reader aware of 
this aspect of language. 
Early in the novel, Binx Boiling pays a visit to his 
Aunt Emily's house, where he is greeted at the door by 
Mercer, the family's black retainer. Discussing Mercer, 
Percy once stated that "if you have ever known many 
middle-class Negroes, nobody in the world is more 
middle-class or conventional than the middle-class Negro" 
(Lawson and Kramer 21). Mercer's extreme conventionality is 
reflected in his acute awareness of the rules by which the 
game of language must be played: 
Mercer lets me in. "Look out now! Uh oh." He carries on 
in mock astonishment and falls back limberkneed. Today 
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he does not say "Mister Jack" and I know that the 
omission is deliberate, the consequence of a careful 
weighing of pros and cons. Tomorrow the scales might 
tip the other way (today's omission will go into the 
balance) and it will be "Mister Jack...." 
"Didn't nobody tell me you was coming!" cries 
Mercer, feeling the balance tip against me. "I was just 
commencing to make a fire." 
Mercer is a chesty sand-colored Negro with a 
shaved head and a dignified Adolph Menjou mustache, his 
face, I notice, is not at all devoted but is as sulky 
as a Pullman porter's. My aunt brought him down from 
Feliciana, but he has changed much since then. Not only 
is he a city man now; he is also Mrs. Cutrer's butler 
and as such presides over a shifting menage of New 
Orleans Negresses, Jamaicans and lately Hondurans. He 
is conscious of his position and affects a clipped 
speech, pronouncing his R's and ings and diphthonging 
his I's Harlem-style.... 
m—but they still hasn't the factories and 
the—ah—producing set-up we has." (21-3) 
Mercer desires more than anything to fit in, to be a member 
of the extraordinarily conventional community of middle-
class America. Appropriately, Mercer's efforts to conform 
have a linguistic component. He has carefully studied the 
rules governing proper language behavior, and tries to 
follow them to the letter. The rules are complex, however, 
and in watching Mercer play the language game, Binx 
questions his mastery of them: "My main emotion around 
Mercer is unease that in threading his way between servility 
and presumption, his foot might slip" (22). 
Like Mercer, other characters in the novel try to catch 
on to the complicated rules governing language behavior, but 
are frequently frustrated in their attempts. Walter Wade, 
for instance, fiance of Kate Cutrer and all-around good guy, 
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finds himself struggling to master the language rules of the 
community-within-a-community of the Boiling family. Seated 
at the lunch table with Binx, Binx's Uncle Jules and Aunt 
Emily, and Kate, Walter effortlessly talks football with 
Uncle Jules. Then Binx mentions seeing Eddie Lovell, his 
cousin Nell's husband, and the conversation takes an odd 
turn: 
"Poor Eddie," my aunt sighs as she always does, 
and as always she adds: "What a sad thing that 
integrity, of itself, should fetch such a low price in 
the market place." 
"Has she gone to Natchez again?" asks Uncle Jules, 
making his lip long and droll. 
Walter Wade cocks an ear and listens intently. He 
has not yet caught on to the Boilings' elliptical way 
of talking. (31) 
This conversation is obviously a language game that has been 
played many times in the Boiling family, and on this 
occasion it is being played by the same rules "as always." 
Walter is a neophyte in the community of Boilings, however, 
and he has not yet mastered the rules. Because the reader is 
an outsider just like Walter, Binx thoughtfully translates 
Uncle Jules' cryptic comment: 
"She" is Eddie's sister Didi, and "going to Natchez" is 
our way of referring to one of Didi's escapades. 
Several years ago, while Didi was married to her first 
husband, she is said to have attended the Natchez 
Pilgrimage with several other couples and "swapped 
husbands." (31-2) 
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Walter follows along with the conversation as well as 
possible, making occasional unsuccessful attempts to join 
in, until finally a familiar part comes up and he is able to 
play once again. Aunt Emily is good-naturedly chastizing 
Binx for not wanting to ride on the Neptune float in the 
Mardis Gras parade: 
"What a depraved and dissolute specimen," she says 
as usual. She speaks absently. It is Kate who occupies 
her. "Grown fat-witted from drinking of old sack." 
"What I am, Hal, I owe to thee," I say as usual 
and drink my soup. 
Kate eats mechanically, gazing about the room 
vacantly like someone at the automat. Walter is certain 
of himself now. He gets a raffish gleam in the eye. 
"I don't think we ought to let him ride, do you, 
Mrs. Cutrer? Here we are doing the work of the economy 
and there he is skimming off his five percent like a 
pawnbroker on Dryades Street." (32) 
Conversation is thus a complicated affair. Until a speaker 
learns the language rules of the community within which he 
finds himself, he must be content to sit on the sidelines, 
listening and waiting for a part to come up that is easy or 
familiar enough for him to join in. Otherwise, he may 
attract the disfavor of the community by breaking one or 
more of its rules. 
Such is the case with another of Binx's relatives, 
Uncle Oscar Boiling. Oscar and his wife Edna are in town for 
Carnival and the Spring Pilgrimage, "an annual tour of old 
houses and patios" (173). At dinner, the Boiling table is 
also graced by the loquacious presence of Sam Yerger, in 
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town at Aunt Emily's request to deliver a speech at the 
Forum, where she is president. Even though he is not yet at 
the Forum, he is "on" nevertheless, speaking "down the table 
to [Binx's] aunt but with a consciousness of the others as 
listeners-in" (176). One of "Em's people," who are "persons 
of the most advanced views on every subject and of the most 
exquisite sensitivity to minorities (except Catholics...)," 
Sam will no doubt say something contrary to the Boilings' 
aristocratic sensibilities, but most of the family takes 
such comments in stride, merely accepting them as normal 
behavior for "Em's people." Long ago, the Boilings 
discovered that, for all their strange world views, these 
guests of Aunt Emily's nonetheless "observe the same taboos 
and celebrate the same rites" as they themselves do (176-
77). Uncle Oscar, however, has never caught on to this fact: 
Sitting there rared back and gazing up at the 
chandelier, he too is aware that he has fallen in with 
some pretty high-flown company, but he will discover no 
such thing; any moment now he will violate a taboo and 
blaspheme a rite by getting off on niggers, Mrs. 
Roosevelt, dagos and Jews, and all in the same breath. 
(177) 
Even though Oscar's basic world view is much more in line 
with that of the other Boilings than is Sam Yerger's, Oscar 
will inevitably embarrass everyone present by expressing 
this view at an inappropriate time. He will, in other words, 
violate the rules of language behavior, and alienate the 
community in which these rules hold sway. 
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Now while an Uncle Oscar may violate language taboos 
left and right and never realize what he has done, never 
feel the semiotic strain of trying to abide by a set of 
rules the existence of which he does not even acknowledge, 
other characters are acutely aware of the sometimes enormous 
effort involved in playing by a community's language rules. 
Sam Yerger, for instance, recalls an incident from a few 
years back in which the pressure to perform appropriately 
became so severe that physical pain was pleasant in 
comparison: 
"It was 1951—you were in the army. Father and I were 
warring over politics. Come to think of it, I might 
actually have been kicked out of the house. Anyhow 
Mother suggested it might be a good thing if I went to 
visit an old classmate of hers in Memphis, a lady named 
Mrs. Boykin Lamar. She was really quite a person, had 
sung in the Civic Opera in New York and wrote quite a 
funny book about her travels in Europe as a girl. They 
were as kind to me as anyone could be. But no one could 
think of anything to say. Night after night we sat 
there playing operas on the phonograph and dreading the 
moment when the end came and someone had to say 
something. I became so nervous that one night I slipped 
on the hearth and fell into the fire. Can you believe 
it was a relief to suffer extreme physical pain? Hell 
couldn't be fire—There are worse things than fire." 
(179-80) 
This anecdote illustrates that not all violations of a 
community's language rules are active violations like those 
of Uncle Oscar. In some situations silence itself violates 
the rules, particularly when unfamiliarity requires the 
maintenance of a certain degree of politeness. Sam Yerger's 
evenings with Mrs. Boykin Lamar call for such politeness, 
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the verbal component of which demands, not brilliant 
oratory, but small talk, or any talk for that matter. While 
Sam has no difficulty whatsoever delivering a speech to an 
audience, he is at a loss when it comes to filling in the 
dread silences between phonograph records with chit-chat. 
The pressure eventually becomes so great that Sam falls into 
the fire to escape it, actually feeling "relief" in extreme 
physical pain. 
The dread and nervousness which Sam experiences when 
trying to stay within the bounds of normal verbal behavior 
are not at all uncommon in Percy's world. In fact, Binx and 
Kate both refer to acceptable language behavior as a 
"tightrope," precariously spanning the horrible chasm 
beneath it. While Binx has been aware of this precariousness 
for some time (see p. 36), Kate has discovered it 
relatively recently: 
"Tight rope" is an expression Kate used when she was 
sick the first time. When she was a child and her 
mother was alive, she said, it used to seem to her that 
people laughed and talked in an easy and familiar way 
and stood on solid ground, but now it seemed that they 
(not just she but everybody) had become aware of the 
abyss that yawned at their feet even on the most 
ordinary occasions. Thus, she would a thousand times 
rather find herself in the middle of no man's land than 
at a family party or luncheon club. (110-11) 
Percy hopes to bring this tight rope, and the abyss that 
yawns beneath it, to our attention in passages such as those 
just cited. Language is rule-governed normative behavior, 
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the tight rope is the system of regulatory rules, and the 
abyss is the metaphysical void into which man plunges if he 
violates them. The metaphor of the tight rope illustrates 
the dread people commonly feel at the thought of straying 
beyond the bounds of what a community considers "acceptable" 
behavior, but it also, more importantly, hints at the 
relative flimsiness of the grounds upon which such 
regulatory systems are established. As prescriptive and even 
dictatorial as a given community may be in regard to 
language behavior, often going so far as to ostracize or 
even banish those who do not fit in, it would be hard-
pressed to provide an objective defense of the validity of 
its definition of "normal" behavior. Most people, of course, 
do not require such explanations, are not even, in fact, 
aware of the tightrope upon which they walk, or of the abyss 
which yawns at their feet. They are, with every fiber of 
their being, "members" of the community, well-adjusted and 
normal in every respect. 
But what if the community is both morally and 
spiritually bankrupt? Because of its members' blind 
adherence to its regulatory structures, chances are that no 
one will even be aware of this bankruptcy, which is 
precisely the condition in which Percy perceives modern man 
to live. It is "despair" in the true Kierkegaardian sense of 
the word. In The Moviegoer Percy portrays a representative 
community saturated with despair and "sunk in the 
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everydayness." Because language is virtually synonymous with 
humanity (man is, after all, "homo loquens" or "homo 
symbolificus") Percy gives a distinctly linguistic component 
to this despair. By so clearly establishing the regulatory 
aspect of language in passages such as those just discussed, 
Percy illustrates this synonymy between language behavior 
and humanity, and prepares us to see in the language 
behavior of his characters signs of a community- wide human 
sickness. 
One of the most vivid verbal manifestations of the 
societal sickness depicted in The Moviegoer is the 
compulsion that characters feel to somehow certify the 
validity of their own lives. Society, in the form of TV, 
radio, books, and the like has provided its members with 
criteria by which to gauge the value, or even reality, of 
their own meaningful experiences. Depending upon how closely 
these experiences match up with the criteria, established by 
society and embedded in the consciousness of the individual, 
for meaningful behavior, a character can determine right 
away whether or not he has achieved anything worthwhile. 
For instance, Binx recalls the weekends which he, 
Walter Wade, and some Korean War veterans used to spend on a 
houseboat on Vermilion Bay near Tigre au Chenier (the 
weekends still go on as usual, but without Binx, who found 
them "boring"): 
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Walter liked nothing better than getting out in that 
old swamp on weekends with five or six fellows, quit 
shaving and play poker around the clock. He would get 
up groaning from the table at three o'clock in the 
morning and pour himself a drink and, rubbing his 
beard, stand looking out into the darkness. "Goddamn, 
this is alright, isn't it? Isn't this a terrific 
set-up, Binx? Tomorrow we're going to have duck 
Rochambeau right here. Tell me honestly, have you ever 
tasted better food at Galatoire's?" "No, it's very 
good, Walter." "Give me your honest opinion, Binx." 
"It's very good." (39-40) 
Walter thinks he is having fun, but must have this fact 
officially certified before he can know for sure. He holds 
the experience up to the light, as it were, for Binx's 
approval. It is "all right"; in fact, it is "terrific." In 
other words, our behavior on this particular occasion meets 
all of the necessary criteria to officially qualify as what 
society labels "fun," doesn't it? This certification process 
obviously diminishes the experience. By isolating the 
weekend in the swamp, the all-night poker game, and the 
anticipation of duck Rochambeau "right here," and attempting 
to place them in the abstract category of "things that are 
fun," Walter has removed himself from direct contact with 
the experience and relinquished whatever real pleasure might 
have been found there. 
This same certification process, and the diminishment 
that results, can be seen in Binx's memory of some friends 
he had eight years ago. After returning from the Korean War, 
and recovering from a wound he received there, Binx "took up 
with two fellows [he] thought [he] should like." 
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They were good fellows both. One was an ex-Lieutenant 
like me, a University of Cal man, a skinny impoverished 
fellow who liked poetry and roaming around the 
countryside. The other was a mad eccentric from 
Valdosta, a regular young Burl Ives with beard and 
guitar. (41) 
The trio thought hiking might be fun and set out on the 
Appalachian Trail toward Maine from Gatlinburg, Tennessee. 
Binx enjoyed himself for a while but then, in the midst of 
all their fun, became unaccountably depressed. 
The times we did have fun, like sitting around a fire 
or having a time with some girls, I had the feeling 
they were saying to me: "How about this, Binx? This is 
really it, isn't it, boy?", that they were practically 
looking up from their girls to say this. For some 
reason I sank into a deep melancholy. What good fellows 
they were, I thought, and how much they deserved to be 
happy. If only I could make them happy. But the beauty 
of the smoky blue valleys, instead of giving us joy, 
became heartbreaking. (41) 
This compulsion to certify the validity of one's meaningful 
experiences inevitably places a barrier between the person 
and the experience itself, so that immediate enjoyment, or 
"fun," is replaced by a sort of detached aesthetic approval. 
The hikers, like the hunters on Vermilion Bay, thus 
sacrifice their pleasure by distancing themselves from their 
pleasurable experiences before they are even over. 
In terms of Peirce-Percyan semiotic theory, the 
diminishment of pleasure or meaning in these examples 
results from a problem with the participants' view of their 
placement in the world. Postulate 1.523 states that, "Since 
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a sentence entails a world for both utterer and receiver, 
both utterer and recieiver necessarily see themselves as 
being placed vis-a-vis the world. A sentence utterer cannot 
not be placed vis-a-vis the world of the sentence" (MB 174). 
By simply watching the overt physical behavior of the 
hunters and the hikers, we might very well conclude that 
they are having "fun," as they themselves believe. Their 
linguistic behavior, however, their verbal insistence that 
they are, indeed, having fun, shows that they have 
relinquished sovereignty over the experiences in question. 
In his essay, "The Loss of the Creature," Percy 
presents a hypothetical account of an American couple's 
visit to Mexico. Disappointed because they find themselves 
"surrounded by a dozen other couples from the Midwest," they 
rent a car in Guanajuato and set out for Mexico City by 
themselves. On the way, they get lost and finally wind up in 
a tiny Indian village not even marked on the map. Some sort 
of religious festival is going on, and the couple spends 
several days observing and enjoying life in this quaint, 
unspoiled community. They feel some uneasiness in the midst 
of their pleasure, however, the source of which they are at 
a loss to discover. Percy finds a clue to the nature of 
their restiveness in their remarks to an ethnologist friend 
when they return home: "How we wished you had been there 
with us! What a perfect goldmine of folkways! Every minute 
we would say to each other, if only you were here! You must 
17 
return with us" (IJg 53) . Percy explains that, for all the 
generosity of feeling apparent in these remarks, the 
couple's desire for the presence of the ethnologist is 
actually motivated by a need "to certify their experience as 
genuine." 
"This is it" and "Now we are really living" do not 
necessarily refer to the sovereign encounter of the 
person with the sight that enlivens the mind and 
gladdens the heart. It means that now at least we are 
having the acceptable experience. The present 
experience is always measured by a prototype, the "it" 
of their dreams. "Now I am really living" means that 
now I am filling the role of sightseer and the sight is 
living up to the prototype of sights. This quaint and 
picturesque village is measured by a Platonic ideal of 
the Quaint and the Picturesque. (53) 
This compulsion to certify the validity of their experience 
produces "a radical loss of sovereignty over that which is 
as much theirs as as it is the ethnologist's" (54). The 
couple's "basic placement in the world is such that they 
recognize a priority of title of the expert over his 
particular department of being. The whole horizon of being 
is staked out by *them,' the experts. The highest 
satisfaction of the sightseer...is that his sight should be 
certified as genuine." 
This couple's experience in Mexico corresponds directly 
with that of the hunters on Vermilion Bay and the hikers on 
the Appalachian Trail. Binx's friends feel that they are 
finally experiencing "it"; they are having an experience 
that matches in every way the Platonic ideal of Fun. Their 
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assertion of this fact to Binx indicates that, like the 
couple in Mexico, their "basic placement in the world is 
such that they recognize a priority of title of the expert 
over his particular department of being." The "experts" in 
this case are society in general and Binx in particular, 
and Binx's friends appeal to their judgment for 
certification of their experience. They suffer the same 
"radical loss of sovereignty" over their experience that the 
couple suffers. In his discussion of the couple, Percy goes 
on to say that the "worst of this impoverishment is that 
there is no sense of impoverishment" (54). This is likewise 
the case with Binx's friends, who are completely blind to 
their own impoverishment. The unacknowledged impoverishment 
and loss of sovereignty exhibited in the verbal behavior of 
Binx's hunter and hiker friends effectively demonstrate the 
sort of despair (which "is unaware of being despair") that 
plagues the modern world and permeates the fictional world 
of The Moviegoer. 
The impoverishment and lack of authenticity exhibited 
by these two examples pale in comparison with the utter 
vacuity that characterizes the verbal behavior of two other 
of Binx's acquaintances—Eddie and Nell Lovell. Nell, Binx's 
cousin, and her husband Eddie are two of the most 
insufferable bores in all of Percy's fiction. They are the 
very epitome, the apotheosis, as it were, of everydayness. 
They come to Binx as ambassadors from that morally and 
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spiritually bankrupt world which surrounds him on every 
side. Percy only gives the reader a single verbal encounter 
apiece with Eddie and Nell, but in these encounters he makes 
his point abundantly clear. Like most everyone else in 
Binx's world, Eddie and Nell are "sunk in the everydayness" 
of their own lives, which, unbeknownst to them, contain 
virtually no meaningful substance. Percy offers little 
evaluative commentary concerning these characters (although 
what little he does offer is scathing), but prefers instead 
to let them speak for themselves. In these two 
conversations, Percy distills the very essence of 
everydayness, the aroma of which hangs over the entire novel 
like the smell of cheap perfume. 
Early in the novel, Binx runs into Eddie on the street. 
They converse for a full ten minutes, but after they part 
Binx realizes that he "cannot answer the simplest question 
about what has taken place." 
As I listen to Eddie speak plausibly and at length of 
one thing and another—business, his wife Nell, the 
old house they are redecorating—the fabric pulls 
together into one bright texture of investments, family 
projects, lovely old houses, little theater readings 
and such. It comes over me: this is how one 
lives!....And all the while he talks very well. His 
lips move muscularly, molding words into pleasing 
shapes, marshalling arguments, and during the slightest 
pauses are held poised, attractively everted in a 
Charles Boyer pout—while a little web of saliva 
gathers in a corner like the clear oil of a good 
machine. (18-19) 
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Eddie asks Binx if he is riding the Neptune float during 
Mardis Gras, and thanks him for sending a Mr. Quieulle to 
him. With "eyes twinkling from the depths," Eddie tells Binx 
how the old man "set up his trust fund and died," leaving 
Eddie with a tidy profit. Then, becoming "solemn as a 
bishop," Eddie goes on to eulogize this wonderful old man, 
this source of so much prosperity: 
"I'll tell you one thing, Binx. I count it a great 
privilege to have known him. I've never known anyone, 
young or old, who possessed a greater fund of 
knowledge. That man spoke to me for two hours about the 
history of the crystallization of sugar and it was pure 
romance. I was fascinated." (20) 
Eddie also expresses his admiration for Kate and Aunt Emily: 
"XI have never told anybody what I really think of that 
woman—' Eddie says *woman' as a deliberate liberty to be 
set right by the compliment to follow. %I think more of Miss 
Emily—and Kate—than anyone else in the world except my own 
mother—and wife. The good that woman has done'" (23). As 
the two friends prepare to part, Eddie asks Binx "in a 
special voice" how the troubled Kate is doing. To Binx's 
assurance that she is fine, Eddie responds: "*I'm so damn 
glad. Fellah!' A final shake from side to side, like a 
tiller. *Come see us!"' (21). 
If nothing else, this conversation makes clear Percy's 
incredible ear for banal conversation. The reader 
immediately recognizes in this encounter the sort of empty 
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small talk that occurs at cocktail parties, checkout lines, 
and coffee breaks. He is inclined to agree with Binx that 
Eddie does, indeed, "talk very well." In terms of Peirce-
Percyan semiotic theory (Postulate 1.53 "Every sentence is 
uttered and received in a medium") the medium through which 
Binx and Eddie exchange utterances is that of small talk. 
This medium is, by definition, characterized by a sort of 
necessary triviality, or emptiness, so neither Eddie nor 
Binx is condemned here for not saying anything profound. 
Eddie's great facility with this medium, however, provokes 
Percy's scorn. Eddie is so skilled at small talk, and 
follows the rules so well, that he can speak for a full ten 
minutes and manage to say absolutely nothing. 
Binx, who has just embarked on his great "search" (13), 
experiences a sense of uneasiness when confronted with such 
vacuity, reflecting some time after the conversation: 
"lately it is all I can do to carry on such everyday 
conversations, because my cheek has developed a tendency to 
twitch of its own accord. Wednesday as I stood speaking to 
Eddie Lovell, I felt my eye closing in a broad wink" (100). 
Binx's uneasiness can be explained in part by Eddie's great 
facility at, and identification with, a medium that is 
semantically devoid of substance. Other aspects of Eddie's 
conversation, however, are even more deadly, more 
indicative of the great spiritual emptiness which plagues 
the modern world. Since these aspects exhibit the same 
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pathology, as it were, and can be explained by the same 
postulates as Binx's conversation with Eddie's wife Nell, we 
would do well now to turn to this conversation and examine 
the verbal behavior of both Lovells as a single entity. 
Several days after his conversation with Eddie, Binx 
ruminates: 
For some time now the impression has been growing upon 
me that everyone is dead. 
It happens when I speak to people. In the middle 
of a sentence it will come over me: yes, beyond a doubt 
this is death. There is little to do but groan and make 
an excuse and slip away as quickly as one can. At such 
times it seems that the conversation is spoken by 
automatons who have no choice in what they say. I hear 
myself or someone else saying things like: "In my 
opinion the Russian people are a great people, but—" 
or "Yes, what you say about the hypocrisy of the North 
is unquestionably true. However—" and I think to 
myself: this is death. (99-100) 
Binx gives his earlier conversation with Eddie as an example 
of such deadness, and then recalls an equally deadly 
conversation he recently had in the public library with 
Nell. Nell, who has just finished a "celebrated novel" which 
"takes a somewhat gloomy and pessimistic view of things," 
storms over to Binx with book in hand and fire in her eye: 
"I don't feel a bit gloomy!" she cries. "Now that 
Mark and Lance have grown up and flown the coop, I am 
having the time of my life. I'm taking philosophy 
courses in the morning and working nights at Le Petit 
Theatre. Eddie and I have re-examined our values and 
found them pretty darn enduring. To our utter amazement 
we discovered that we both have the same life-goal. Do 
you know what it is?....To make a contribution, however 
small, and leave the world just a little better off.... 
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11—we gave the television to the kids and last 
night we turned on the hi-fi and sat by the fire and 
read The Prophet aloud. I don't find life gloomy!" she 
cries. "To me, books and people and things are 
endlessly fascinating. Don't you think so?" (101) 
As Binx listens to Nell talk he "shift[s] about on the 
library steps" and finds that "Looking in her eyes is an 
embarrassment." He feels a nimble in his descending bowel 
"heralding a tremendous defecation." As she drones on about 
her wonderful life with Eddie, Binx concludes that "there is 
nothing to do but shift around as best one can, take care 
not to fart, and watch her in a general sort of way." 
I get to thinking about her and old Eddie re-examining 
their values. Yes, true. Values. Very good. And then I 
can't help wondering to myself: why does she talk as if 
she were dead? Another forty years to go and dead, 
dead, dead." (102) 
Nell finally finishes, and the two part, "laughing and 
dead." 
Like her husband's conversation, Nell's verbal behavior 
is characterized by a certain degree of triteness (Postulate 
1.54. "Every sentence has a normative dimension....A 
sentence may be true or false, significant or nonsensical, 
trite or fresh, bad art or good art, etc."). This triteness 
indicates a fundamental lack of substance beneath all of 
those fine-sounding words. Also like her husband, Nell shows 
great skill in the medium of small talk. Her skill in this 
medium may, in fact, be even greater than Eddie's because 
24 
she somehow manages to take such worthy concepts as "values" 
and "life goals" and trivialize them to such an extent that 
they are admissible subjects for small talk. Both the 
triteness of their talk and their facility for chit-chat 
hint at the emptiness of their lives and the degree to which 
they are "sunk in the everydayness.11 Examination of their 
verbal behavior in conjunction with yet another parameter 
from Peirce-Percyan semiotic theory, however, reveals an 
even deeper problem. 
As mentioned in the earlier discussion of Binx's hunter 
and hiker friends, Postulate 1.523 describes the necessary 
condition of a speaker's "placement" in a "world." Like 
these other friends of Binx, Eddie and Nell both display a 
need to certify the validity of their experience (Eddie's "I 
was fascinated," and Nell's "I don't feel a bit gloomy!"). 
Percy's later elaboration of this parameter, however, allows 
us to peer even more deeply into the problem. In Lost in the 
Cosmos. Percy narrows the possibilities of a person's 
placement within his world to two: "self conceived as 
immanent, consumer of the techniques, goods and services of 
society; or as transcendent, a member of the transcending 
community of science and art" (113). Eddie and Nell are 
immanent selves to the highest degree; they have made 
immanence an art form. In his discussion of the immanent 
self in Lost in the Cosmos. Percy asserts that such 
immanence is a "continuum": 
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At one end: the compliant role-player and consumer and 
holder of a meaningless job, the anonymous "one"— 
German man—in a mass society, whether a back fence 
gossip or an Archie Bunker beer-drinking TV watcher. 
At the other end: the "autonomous self," who is 
sawy to all the techniques of society and appropriates 
them according to his or her discriminating tastes, 
whether it be learning "parenting skills," 
consciousness-raising, consumer advocacy, political 
activism liberal or conservative, saving whales, TM, 
TA, ACLU, New Right, square-dancing, creative cooking, 
moving out to the country, moving back to the central 
city, etc. (113) 
Eddie, with his aesthetic detachment ("...it was pure 
romance. I was fascinated") from a man whose timely death 
brought him a handsome profit, and Nell, with her philosophy 
courses and involvement with Le Petit Theatre, her 
re-examination of values and "endless fascination" with 
"books and people and things," both clearly qualify as 
Percy's "autonomous" selves. They are, indeed, "sawy to all 
the techniques of society," and they appropriate them 
"according to [their] discriminating tastes." And with good 
results. Their life together, after all, appears as "one 
bright texture of investments, family projects, lovely old 
houses, little theater readings and such" (18). On a purely 
dyadic level, as organisms in an environment, the Lovells 
lack for nothing. This accounts for their irrepressible, 
highly annoying cheerfulness. ("I'm so damn glad. Fellah!"; 
"I don't find life gloomy!"). 
For all its material benefits, such prosperity has one 
glaring, fundamental flaw. Eddie and Nell, like all human 
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beings, are not merely organisms in an environment, but are 
selves in a world, and prosperity in the former category has 
little to do with prosperity in the latter. Regardless of 
how successful an immanent self may be in the dyadic realm, 
his immanence results in impoverishment in the triadic realm 
where man, homo symbolificus, actually lives: 
The impoverishment of the immanent self derives 
from a perceived loss of sovereignty to "them," the 
transcending scientists and experts of society. As a 
consequence, the self sees its only recourse as an 
endless round of work, diversion, and consumption of 
goods and services. (122) 
Percy refers to a "perceived" loss of sovereignty. Eddie and 
Nell do not, even vaguely, perceive the loss of sovereignty 
entailed in their immanence. Like most of the people in 
Binx's world, they are so "sunk in the everydayness of their 
own lives" that they fail to see the desperate nature of 
their own existence and, failing to see it, live in a state 
of genuine despair. 
By so clearly portraying language as rule-governed 
normative behavior, as a game of sorts, while at the same 
time using language behavior to show the emptiness and 
despair which permeate the world of The Moviegoer. Percy 
implies that to escape from the despair one must also escape 
from the normative structure which both reflects and 
propagates it; one must, as it were, play the game by a 
different set of rules. Among the characters surrounding 
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Binx, we see a few abortive attempts to change the rules of 
the game, but these efforts at escape are generally doomed 
from the start because of a fundamental lack of 
understanding of the problem on the part of the would-be 
escapees. 
For instance, some characters feel that they can escape 
by adopting unconventional social roles. Closest to home are 
the courageous, if misguided, efforts of Kate Cutrer, Binx's 
cousin and eventual wife. Kate perceives only too clearly 
the despair of the world around her, and seeks to escape it 
by adopting a series of roles that are in some way or 
another at variance with what the community considers to be 
"normal" behavior. Not unexpectedly, Kate's role-playing has 
a marked linguistic component. At one point, Kate reveals to 
Binx the rather startling fact that the happiest moment in 
her life occurred just after a car accident in which she was 
uninjured but her husband Lyell was killed. After taking one 
last look at Lyell, lying on the side of the road with 
"gravel driven into his cheek," she got on a bus and headed 
for Natchez where she checked into a motel, sent her clothes 
out to be cleaned, ate a huge breakfast, and read the Sunday 
paper. The "happiest moment" was on the bus: "*1 just stood 
there until the door opened, then I got on and we went 
sailing along from bright sunshine down through deep clefts 
as cool and dark as a spring house'" (58-60). Immediately 
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following this moment of personal revelation, Kate grows 
uncomfortable with the sense of exposure: 
Kate frowns and drums her fingers on the wicker. A 
diesel horn blows on the river. Overhead a motor 
labors...."Pardon," says Kate, rising abruptly and 
leaving. The little Yankee word serves her well: she 
leaves in disguise. (60) 
On another occasion, Binx finds talking to Kate on the phone 
a "strain" because "For some reason or other she feels 
obliged to keep one jump ahead of the conventional" (65). 
Instead of "Hello, this is Kate'" she will say things like 
"Well, the knives have started flying," or "What do you 
know? I'm celebrating the rites of spring after all." 
In these and other attempts to escape the despair of 
conventional society by adopting unconventional roles, Kate 
meets only frustration, and ends up feeling even more 
desperate than before. Sarah Henisey describes the nature of 
Kate's failure to escape: 
Kate is lost in a world of the objective empirical, 
talking of people in her social work as case studies, 
observing her surroundings without commitment... and 
playing roles. But Kate always catches herself creating 
unauthentic selves and despairs. (210-11) 
Even though Kate, through her awareness of society's 
despair, is somewhat better off than the Eddie and Nell 
Lovells of the world, she still has no power to escape it 
because of a flawed perception of her own placement 
vis-a-vis the world around her. The linguistic roles which 
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Kate slips into and out of like poorly fitting clothes, and 
which she perceives to be so unconventional, exhibit just as 
high a degree of immanence as do the conventional roles 
adopted by the Lovells. Kate's unconventional behavior is 
only conventionally unconventional (i.e. different according 
to society's definition of "difference"). And, as 
reactionary nonconformity is no less dependent upon the 
norms of society than strict conformity, Kate suffers from 
the same "loss of sovereignty" as most everyone else in the 
world of the novel, and her escape attempts fail. 
Binx encounters another would-be escapee while he and 
Kate are headed back to New Orleans from Chicago on a bus. 
Binx never learns the young man's name, but immediately 
recognizes him as a "romantic"—"a romantic from Wisconsin," 
no less (214). Before speaking to him, Binx makes some 
rather Percyan observations on the romantic's placement 
vis-a-vis the world—on the authenticity of his romantic 
self: 
He is reading The Charterhouse of Parma....Two things I 
am curious about. How does he sit? Immediately graceful 
and not aware of it or mediately graceful and aware of 
it? How does he read The Charterhouse of Parma? 
Immediately as a man who is in the world and who has an 
appetite for the book as he might have an appetite for 
peaches, or mediately as one who finds himself under 
the necessity of sticking himself into the world in a 
certain fashion, of slumping in an acceptable slump, of 
reading as acceptable book on an acceptable bus? Is he 
a romantic? 
He is a romantic. His posture is the first clue: 
It is too good to be true, this distillation of all 
graceful slumps. (214-14) 
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This poor soul, recognizing the crass materialism, 
superficiality, etc. of society and deciding that he is too 
good for all of that, has, in an effort to escape it, 
latched on to probably the most conventional of all 
unconventional roles—the young romantic. The inauthenticity 
of this adopted self is immediately apparent to Binx, who 
walks over to rescue him from the "spasm of recognition and 
shyness" that seized him when he saw Binx reading Arabia 
Deserta. During this brief encounter, the romantic's verbal 
behavior verifies Binx's suspicion about the authenticity of 
his role. When Binx asks him how he likes his book, he 
closes it and "stares hard at it as if he would, by dint of 
staring alone, tear from it its soul in a word. *It's—very 
good,' he says at last and blushes" (215). As they talk, 
Binx asking direct questions and the romantic answering, the 
romantic tries hard to live up to the role he has chosen for 
himself: "he speaks in a rapid rehearsed way, a way he 
deems appropriate for our rare encounter, and when he is 
forced to use an ordinary word like xbus'—having no other 
way of conferring upon it a vintage flavor, he says it in 
quotes and with a wry expression" (215-16). He is trying so 
hard to escape from the conventional that he is paralyzed 
with self-consciousness, in deep despair, although not in 
the romantic way he believes, and finally every bit as sunk 
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in the everydayness as those people from whom he wishes to 
distinguish himself. 
As such examples indicate, role-playing does not 
provide a valid means of escape from everydayness in The 
Moviegoer. The verbal behavior of such would-be escapees as 
Kate and the romantic clearly betrays the inauthenticity of 
the roles selected and, consequently, the invalidity of 
role-playing as a means of escape. But if adopting 
unconventional roles does not succeed in extricating a 
person from, or lifting him above, the everydayness in which 
the conventional community around him is sunk, what option, 
short of physical isolation from the community itself, 
remains open to him? And what ever becomes of Binx's 
"search"? 
To anyone familiar with Percy's work, and his 
Catholicism, the solution is obvious. Only through faith in 
God can man ever hope to escape the everydayness in which 
the majority of modern human society is sunk. In Binx's 
case, escape is achieved through a specifically 
Kierkegaardian "leap of faith" from one "sphere of 
existence" to another. Linda Whitney Hobson explains the 
concept: 
Kierkegaard saw human activity divided into three 
spheres or stages: the aesthetic, the ethical, and the 
religious. People move back and forth among these 
stages, though most people in postmodern Western 
culture live in the aesthetic and fewest attain the 
religious sphere. The aesthetic man does not often know 
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that he is in despair, and Percy pictures him as the 
happy consumer, anxious only to purchase the "right" 
things by which he can identify himself to himself. 
(Understanding... 18) 
The highest level of human existence is the religious 
sphere, and it is ultimately toward this sphere that all of 
Percy's heroes strive, whether consciously or otherwise. 
When we first encounter Binx, he is firmly entrenched in the 
lowest sphere, the aesthetic, although he has just commenced 
his "search" for a more meaningful existence. Normally, a 
seeker such as Binx would pass through the second sphere, 
the ethical, before moving on to the religious, but Binx 
"jumps from the esthetic clear across the ethical to the 
religious. He has no ethical sphere at all" (Lawson and 
Kramer 66). Binx's failure to pass through the ethical 
sphere is evident in the reaction of his Aunt Emily to his 
unannounced and ill-fated trip to Chicago with Kate. Upon 
the couple's return to New Orleans, Aunt Emily, whose stoic 
philosophy of life embodies the basic values of the ethical 
sphere (Hobson, Understanding... 30, 38), expresses her 
total incomprehension of, and contempt for, Binx's behavior: 
"I ask you again. Were you intimate with her?" 
"I suppose so. Though intimate is not quite the 
word." 
"You suppose so. Intimate is not quite the word. I 
wonder what is the word. You see—" she says with a 
sort of humor, "—there is another of my hidden 
assumptions. All these years I have been assuming that 
between us words mean roughly the same thing, that 
among certain people, gentlefolk I don't mind calling 
them, there exists a set of meanings held in common, 
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that a certain manner and a certain grace come as 
naturally as breathing." (222) 
Aunt Emily's failure to understand Binx, which she expresses 
in strikingly semiotic terms, results from a fundamental 
incompatibility of spheres of existence. Having found the 
aesthetic sphere in which he lives, along with the verbal 
behavior through which its inhabitants communicate with one 
another, totally devoid of meaning, empty of substance, Binx 
repudiates it and sets out on his "search" for a more 
meaningful existence. His logical next move would be to slip 
comfortably into the ethical sphere and adopt Aunt Emily's 
value system with its "set of meanings held in common" and 
its "words [which] mean roughly the same thing." Sensing, 
however, a certain abiding emptiness in this sphere, and a 
hollow ring to its language, Binx rejects it as well and 
moves directly on to the highest sphere—the religious 
sphere. Since Binx's rejection of the first two spheres has 
such a marked linguistic component (i.e., we are given 
plenty of examples of the verbal behavior indigenous to 
these spheres), we might expect to see a verbal 
manifestation of the religious sphere, to hear what its 
inhabitants sound like. After all, the entire novel points 
toward this religious sphere as the ultimate object of 
Binx's search. 
Because of Percy's basic distrust of language in the 
postmodern world, his feeling that it is "almost bankrupt" 
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when it comes to communicating meaningful truths such as 
those found in the religious sphere (Lawson and Kramer 79), 
he finally eschews the attempt to portray the religious 
sphere in linguistic terms. Now in possession of the object 
of his search—religion—Binx concludes that language, as he 
knows it, is powerless to describe it; the experience is 
literally too deep for words: 
Further: I am a member of my mother's family after 
all and so naturally shy away from the subject of 
religion (a peculiar word this in the first place, 
religion: it is something to be suspicious of). 
Reticence, therefore, hardly having a place in a 
document of this kind, it seems as good a time as any 
to make an end. (237) 
Even though Percy intimates, through the unusual language of 
Binx's crippled half-brother Lonnie, the possibility of a 
still fresh language capable of communicating significant 
meaning ("Lonnie's monotonous speech gives him an advantage, 
the same advantage foreigners have: his words are not worn 
out" 162), he finally leaves us with nothing more than 
intimations, and concludes, along with Binx, simply that "It 
is impossible to say" (235). Percy will eventually succeed 
in discovering the fresh new language hinted at in The 
Moviegoer, but it will take him another four novels to do 
so. 
As will become apparent in the following chapters, The 
Moviegoer is not one of Percy's more "semiotic" novels. In 
other words, in this first of his published novels, Percy is 
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far less conscious of manipulating his characters' verbal 
behavior toward a specific thematic end than he will be in 
subsequent novels. If we read the novel, however, in light 
of Peirce-Percyan semiotic theory, as distilled in "Toward a 
Triadic Theory of Meaning," a new diagnostic dimension opens 
up for us. After all, these postulates are formulated to aid 
psychiatrists in reading their patients' verbal behavior for 
signs of psychological/emotional trouble, and then 
articulating the precise nature of this trouble. They can 
also help the reader to articulate an otherwise vague 
impression he has of a character based on clues in his 
verbal behavior. So, if a character's speech has a generally 
hollow ring to it, the reader can actually put the symptoms 
into words and get at their psychological or spiritual 
etiology. In The Moviegoer, such hollowness can be clearly 
traced back to its source in the malaise that permeates 
postmodern American culture. The novel can thus support a 
limited semiotic reading even though it is not a consciously 
semiotic work. The value of The Moviegoer to this study, 
then, is not that in it Percy does anything strikingly 
original with his characters' verbal behavior, as he will in 
some of his later work, but that it demonstrates the general 
effectiveness of Peirce-Percyan semiotic theory as a 
critical/diagnostic tool. It will become even more 
effective, however, when it is applied to the more self­
consciously semiotic novels to come. 
CHAPTER II 
CONFUSING THE MEDIUM WITH THE MESSAGE: 
THE LAST GENTLEMAN 
Some five years in the making, Percy's second published 
novel is "more ambitious...more spacious" (Luschei 1972), 
and "subtler and finer-grained" (Wolfe 182) than The 
Moviegoer. It has been described variously as "a comic 
version of the traditional heroic guest for adventure and 
accomplishment" (Tharpe 64), "the familiar novel of social 
observation" (Coles 178), a "Baedeker of the journey 
towards Kierkegaard's essential freedom, defined as dread" 
(Gaston 463), and even a "hospital hurrah of lunatic humor" 
(Cheney 345). The most fruitful readings of the novel are 
those such as Luschei's that view it as "a kind of 
pilgrimage" (112), for, like The Moviegoer. The Last 
Gentleman chronicles one man's search for some means of 
escaping the malaise which grips postmodern society. Of the 
novel's protagonist, Will Barrett, and his pilgrimage Percy 
has remarked: "He really existed in what Kierkegaard would 
call the religious mode. He was a real searcher. He was 
after something" (Lawson and Kramer 67). Unlike The 
Moviegoer's Binx Boiling, however, Will Barrett ultimately 
fails in his quest: "Well, it ends...with Barrett missing 
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it" (Lawson and Kramer 67). The world in which Will lives is 
every bit as "sunk in the everydayness" as Binx Boiling's, 
and is actually quite a bit more consumer-oriented, 
indicating a high degree of immanence among its inhabitants. 
Tenenbaum has observed of this world that "a pervasive 
commercialism is a major constituent, and force" of it, and 
that "most of Will's acquaintances are prodigious consumers" 
(304). Immanent selves such as Eddie and Nell Lovell feel 
comfortably at home in this world. Will Barrett does not 
feel at home here, however, and he spends the entire novel 
searching for some meaningful way of dealing with his sense 
of homelessness. With such good intentions and sincere 
effort, why does he finally end up "missing it"? 
Will Barrett is plagued by a variety of personal 
problems, not the least serious of which is a tendency to 
drift off into "fugue" states: "To be specific, he now had a 
nervous condition and suffered spells of amnesia and even 
between times did not quite know what was what" (11). Percy 
himself has called Will "half-crazy" (Lawson and Kramer 
111). As inconvenient as they are, these mental problems are 
not responsible for the ultimate failure of Will's search 
for meaning. In fact, these problems are an ontologically 
healthy sign, indicating Will's perception that something is 
amiss in his world. The "alienation and dislocation" 
actually "function positively to unveil existence" 
(Broughton 157). The greatest obstacle to Will's search for 
38 
meaning is a condition not unlike that which we saw in such 
great abundance in The Moviegoer—it is a problem with the 
self. The master diagnostician Dr. Sutter Vaught sums up the 
problem in his casebook: 
Barrett: His trouble is he wants to know what his 
trouble is. His "trouble," he thinks, is a disorder of 
such a character that if he only can locate the right 
expert with the right psychology, the disorder can be 
set right and he can go about his business. 
That is to say: he wishes to cling to his 
transcendence and to locate a fellow transcender (e.g., 
me) who will tell him how to traffic with immanence 
(e.g., "environment," "groups," "experiences," etc.) in 
such a way that he will be happy. Therefore I will tell 
him nothing. For even if I were "right," his posture is 
self-defeating. (338-9) 
Now Sutter is not without his own problems, including a 
deep-seated cynicism and marked suicidal tendencies, but 
because of his frequently cited brilliance in medical 
diagnostics (e.g., he once met a physicist at a party, spoke 
with him for five minutes and correctly predicted that he 
would be dead of malignant hypertension within a year 174), 
and the unmistakably Percyan language of his diagnosis, his 
summation of Will's condition is clearly trustworthy. Sutter 
is "onto the malaise" and "has some sense of its etiology" 
(Hobson Understanding... 50). 
Basically, Will has a flawed view of his own placement 
vis-a-vis the world (Postulate 1.523). This flaw is evident 
in his resolution, immediately following his decision to end 
five years of psychoanalysis, to take control of the 
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remainder of his life: "I am indeed an engineer...if only a 
humidification engineer, which is no great shakes of a 
profession. But I am also an engineer in a deeper sense. I 
shall engineer the future of my life according to the 
scientific principles and the self-knowledge I have so 
arduously gained from five years of analysis" (40). Such a 
transcendent attitude may be the proper way for a scientist 
to approach an experiment in the dyadic realm (e.g., two 
chemicals reacting with one another to create another 
substance, a dog salivating at the sound of a bell, etc.), 
but it is no way for a human being to approach his own life, 
which must be lived on a triadic level. 
Will feels detached from the immanent realm in which 
people go to football games, court one another, and buy 
Chevrolets, and he seeks some way of entering this realm 
without experiencing the discomfort and sense of hollowness 
that he has always felt in previous encounters with it 
(e.g., the plunge into the briar patch to escape the amiable 
group of Ohioans he befriended at a ski lodge, 21). He 
desires, in essence, some kind of bridge between the 
transcendent and immanent realms over which he can come and 
go as he pleases. Will fails to perceive (and this is 
ultimately at the root of his problem) that the human 
condition, by its very definition, does not allow for such a 
bridge. In his essay "A Novel About the End of the World" 
Percy speaks of man "as neither angel nor organism but as a 
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wayfaring creature somewhere between" (MS 113). Or, as 
Sutter puts it in his casebook, at this point addressing his 
sister Val: "Let us say you were right: that man is a 
wayfarer (i.e., not transcending being nor immanent being 
but wayfarer) who therefore stands in the way of hearing a 
piece of news which is of the utmost importance to him 
(i.e., his salvation) and which he had better attend to" 
(339). As a "wayfarer," man is not properly at home in 
either the transcendent or the immanent realm. If he 
perceives himself to be at home, as so many of Percy's 
characters do, then he is merely deluded, and suffers from 
the Kierkegaardian despair that is unaware of itself as 
being despair. Throughout his search, Will does not 
actually feel at home in either realm, but he believes such 
a feeling to be possible. This is why his "posture is 
self-defeating"; he is simply searching for something that 
does not exist. 
While the concept of man as a homeless creature in the 
universe, a wayfarer, or, as Percy describes him in another 
essay ("The Message in the Bottle"), an amnesiac castaway 
on a desert island, may on the surface appear to be bleak 
indeed, the very possibility of a "piece of news" from the 
outside rescues man from a descent into sheer hopelessness. 
In order to hear the news, however, he must be in a properly 
receptive posture, which Will is not. Given Percy's Catholic 
universe, the content of the message is nothing new or 
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surprising; it is the same information which catapulted Binx 
Boiling from the aesthetic stage of existence over into the 
religious. In the postmodern world, however, fewer and fewer 
people are in a position to receive this news. Like Will, 
they suffer from the "postmodern incapacity" described by 
Luschei: "What is it to be a pilgrim if you are blind to the 
signs along the way and deaf to the messages?" (112). 
In a discussion of Will, Percy sums up this incapacity 
even more specifically: "...Barrett has eliminated 
Christianity. That is gone. That is no longer even to be 
considered. It's not even to be spoken of, taken seriously 
or anything else" (Lawson and Kramer 67). Without the 
possibility of Christianity, of a home beyond the bounds of 
this earthly existence, man the wayfarer is truly a homeless 
creature. Unwilling to accept his homelessness, however, 
Will searches his world high and low for something that 
simply is not there, while signs and messages, including 
what may very well be a miracle in a hospital room in New 
Mexico, pass before him unseen and unheard. Because of his 
elimination of Christianity, his self-defeating posture, 
Will proves to be blind and deaf to such "pieces of news," 
and ends the novel preparing to move to Birmingham, marry 
Kitty, and sell Chevrolets for her father—a dizzying 
descent into immanence. 
Now to describe Will as unperceptive would seem to 
contradict the numerous references to the "amiable Southern 
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radar" (18) that he has at his disposal in his interactions 
with other people. The contradiction is only apparent, 
however, and is, in fact, a nontrivial component, as Percy 
would say, in our discussion of Peirce-Percyan semiotic 
theory. Postulate 1.53 of Percy's "Toward a Triadic Theory 
of Meaning" states: 
Every sentence is uttered and received in a medium. 
The medium is a nontrivial parameter or variable in 
every transaction in which sentences are used. The 
medium is not the message, but the message can be 
strongly influenced by the medium. (Mg 175) 
By "medium" here Percy refers specifically to the mechanical 
means by which the words of a sentence are passed from an 
utterer to a receiver. More generally, however, "medium" can 
be understood as the means through which any message 
whatsoever is transmitted. The message could be transmitted 
through the medium of oil paint, a violin, a physical 
touch, or, of course, language. This more general conception 
of the term "medium" will be appropriate for our discussion 
here. The medium of language ultimately proves to be such an 
obstacle to Will's search for meaning, for his radar is so 
finely tuned to the medium itself, that the message 
expressed through it is completely lost to him. 
Will's radar is a remarkable faculty indeed. In 
interpersonal encounters he can simply tune it in to the 
language being spoken and distinguish all manner of 
variations in dialect, tone, and even relative authenticity. 
43 
However questionable its spiritual merits may be, on a 
strictly social level this radar is quite a valuable asset, 
allowing Will to blend in to almost any social situation. It 
is solely responsible, in fact, for his introduction to, and 
subsequent relationship with, the Vaught family, around whom 
all the major thematic concerns of the novel unfold. 
After several days of observing, through his new 
telescope, Kitty Vaught and her sister-in-law Rita leaving 
notes for each other on a bench in Central Park, Will 
catches sight of Rita, known to him only as the Handsome 
Woman, in the subway and follows her to her destination—the 
hospital in which Jamie Vaught is being treated for 
leukemia. As he stands outside Jamie's room, into which Rita 
has disappeared, Mr. Vaught comes out of the room, walks 
straight up to Will, and addresses him: 
"It looks like Dr. Calamera is running late." The 
stranger screwed up an eye and spoke directly into the 
smoke. He was a puckish-looking old fellow who, the 
engineer soon discovered, had the habit of shooting his 
arm out of his cuff and patting his gray hair. 
"Who?" murmured the engineer, also speaking 
straight ahead since he was not yet certain he was 
being addressed. 
"Aren't you assisting him in the puncture?" 
"Sir?" 
"You're not the hematologist?" 
"No sir." 
"They suspect a defect in the manufacture of the 
little blood cells in the marrow bones, like a lost 
step," said the stranger cheerfully, rocking to and 
fro. "It don't amount to much." (47) 
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In Will's position, most people would nod politely and 
excuse themselves at the first opportunity, but Will 
immediately begins trying to tune his radar in to this 
stranger's verbal behavior: 
Two things were instantly apparent to the sentient 
engineer, whose sole gift, after all, was the knack of 
divining persons and situations. One was that he had 
been mistaken for a member of the staff. The other was 
that the stranger was concerned about a patient and 
that he, the stranger, had spent a great deal of time 
in the hospital. He had the air of one long used to the 
corridor, and he had developed a transient, fabulous, 
and inexpert knowledge of one disease. It was plain too 
that he imputed to the hospital staff a benevolent and 
omniscient concern for the one patient. It amounted to 
a kind of happiness, as if the misfortune beyond the 
door must be balanced by affectionate treatment here in 
the corridor. In hospitals we expect strangers to love 
us. (47-8) 
As fundamentally unsingular as is this verbal exchange 
between two strangers in a hospital corridor, the engineer's 
reaction to it is somewhat unusual. Perfect strangers 
frequently exchange words in public places, especially in 
hospitals where the subject of sickness provides an 
automatic common bond, but most people attribute no more 
importance to such exchanges than they do to other purely 
formal greetings such as "How you doing," "Hot enough for 
you?," "How 'bout those Bulls?," etc. The "sentient 
engineer," however, does not let it go at that, but 
immediately begins to speculate on what the stranger's 
remarks reveal about himself and his predicament. 
Significantly, Will gleans a large amount of personal 
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information from a few casual remarks, and he attains the 
information without relying on the semantic content of the 
words themselves. Will is clearly not paying as much 
attention to the literal message transmitted through the 
medium of language as he is to how this man uses the medium, 
and what his use of it reveals about him, for the 
conclusions he draws about the stranger (e.g., "The stranger 
was concerned about a patient and...had spent a great deal 
of time in the hospital") could not be drawn from the 
literal verbal content of his remarks. The same is true of 
Will's next conclusion concerning the man's situation: 
An intern passed, giving them a wide berth as he 
turned into the ward, holding out his hand to fend them 
off good-naturedly. 
"Do you know him?" asked the old man. 
"No sir." 
"That's Dr. Moon Mullins. He's a fine little 
fellow." 
The illness must be serious, thought the engineer. 
He is too fond of everyone. (48) 
Once again, Will ignores the literal message conveyed by Mr. 
Vaught's statement, and instead focuses on the man's speech 
acts themselves, drawing conclusions that have nothing 
whatsoever to do with the content of the message. 
While there is nothing intrinsically unique about the 
sort of educated guessing Will engages in in his first 
encounter with Mr. Vaught, it is important here because it 
establishes a recurrent thought pattern in Will that 
accounts in large part for the "sentience" attributed to 
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him. This thought pattern is his radar, and he next 
readjusts its frequency to pick up regional accent: 
"Excuse me, sir, but are you from Alabama?" He had 
caught a lilt in the old man's speech, a caroling in 
the vowels which was almost Irish. And the smell. The 
iron washpot smell. No machine in the world ever put 
it there and nobody either but a colored washwoman 
working in her own back yard and sprinkling starch with 
a pine switch. 
"I was." The old man took a wadded handkerchief 
from his pocket and knocked it against his nose. 
"From north Alabama?" 
"I was." His yellow eyes gleamed through the 
smoke. He fell instantly into the attitude of one who 
is prepared to be amazed. There was no doubt in his 
mind that the younger man was going to amaze him. 
"Birmingham? Gadsden?" 
"Halfway between," cried the old man, his eyes 
glittering like an eagle's. "Wait a minute," said he, 
looking at the engineer with his festive and slightly 
ironic astonishment. "Don't I know you? Aren't you—" 
snapping his fingers. 
"Will Barrett. Williston Bibb Barrett." 
"Over in—" He shook his hand to the southwest. 
"Ithaca. In the Mississippi Delta." 
"You're Ed Barrett's boy." (48-9) 
It turns out that Mr. Vaught was once acquainted with Will's 
family in Mississippi, but the previous connection has 
nothing to do with Will's identification of his regional 
origins, as he explains to the amazed gentleman: 
"How did you know I wasn't from Georgia? I spent 
many a year in Georgia." 
"You don't sound like a Georgian. And north 
Alabama doesn't sound like south Alabama. Birmingham is 
different from Montgomery. We used to spend the summers 
up in Mentone." (49-50) 
Listening to Mr. Vaught speak, Will has tuned his radar to 
the man's Southern accent, adjusted the frequency to weed 
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out traces of south Alabama and Georgia, and placed him 
accurately within sixty miles. Mr. Vaught is suitably 
impressed, and Will is ushered into the patient's room to 
meet the rest of the family, including his new love from the 
park, Kitty Vaught. 
One interesting side effect of Will's radar is a 
tendency, not only to distinguish between dialectical 
variations in other people's speech, but to adopt such 
variations as his own. When he first encounters the Vaughts, 
he has just recently ended a brief relationship with a group 
of Ohioans who worked at Macy's, where he had his job as 
humidification engineer. This relationship has not been 
without its effect on him: 
"Sho. But now you don't talk like—11 
"No sir," said the engineer, who still sounded 
like an Ohioan. "I've been up here quite a while." 
(50) 
The residual effects of this Ohioan influence do not survive 
this first meeting with the Southern Vaughts, however. 
After delivering a glowing account of Will's linguistic 
sleight of hand, Mr. Vaught presents Will to his wife: 
"Where're you from," cried Mrs. Vaught in a mock 
accusatory tone he recognized and knew how to respond 
to. 
"Ithaca," he said, smiling. "Over in the Delta." 
He felt himself molt. In the space of seconds he 
changed from a Southerner in the North, an amiable 
person who wears the badge of his origin in a faint 
burlesque of itself, to a Southerner in the South, a 
skillful player of an old play who knows his cues and 
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waits smiling in the wings. You stand in the posture of 
waiting on ladies and when one of them speaks to you 
so, with mock-boldness and mock-anger (and a bit of 
steel in it too) you knew how to take it. They were 
onto the same game. Mrs. Vaught feasted her eyes on 
him. He was nice. (52) 
So accurate is his radar, and so ingratiating is his use of 
it, that Will leaves the Vaughts' presence only by promising 
that he will return the next morning. 
As impressive as Will's radar is at tuning in to such 
general features of language as regional dialect, its 
accuracy does not end there. It is also capable of picking 
up finer, more individual information encoded within the 
medium of language. Not only is he able to ingratiate 
himself to the Vaughts in general, as one Southerner to a 
group of displaced Southerners, but he is also able to 
ingratiate himself to each Vaught individually: 
The Vaughts liked the engineer very much, each 
feeling that he was his or her special sort of person. 
And he was. 
Each saw him differently. (62) 
In essence, Will simply adjusts his radar to pick up the 
individual frequency of each family member, and transmits 
his own language at the frequency of whatever Vaught he is 
addressing at any given moment. So convincing are his 
transmissions through the medium of language that the 
Vaughts often forget that, even though they all share the 
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same frequency, he does not possess the same background 
information: 
So acute was his radar that neither Mrs. Vaught nor her 
husband could quite get it into their heads that he did 
not know everything they knew. He sounded like he did. 
(63) 
Because of his radar, the Vaughts feel so comfortable with 
Will, so at home in his presence, that within a week they 
have virtually adopted him as one of their own. Mr. Vaught 
even offers him a nebulous, unspecified job just to have him 
around the Vaught family in general and Jamie in particular. 
The remainder of the novel focuses on this relationship. 
As important as the Vaughts are, both to Will and to 
the novel itself, they are not the only targets of his 
radar, for it is at work in all his encounters with other 
people. For instance, while he is hitchhiking southward in 
an attempt to rejoin the Vaughts, who have left him behind 
in New York City because of a misunderstanding concerning 
his intentions, he is picked up by a "light-colored 
high-stomached Negro dressed in a good brown suit." The two 
new acquaintances speak amiably enough of one subject and 
another, but Will's radar soon begins to pick up something 
in the man's speech that is not quite right: 
Something was amiss here. He couldn't quite get hold of 
this bird. Something was out of kilter. It was his 
speech, for one thing. The driver did not speak as one 
might expect him to, with a certain relish and a 
hearkening to his own periods, as many educated Negroes 
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speak. No, his speech was rapid and slurred, for all 
the world like a shaky white nan's. (120-1) 
As it turns out, Will's radar once again proves to be 
uncannily accurate, for this "black" man is actually Forney 
Aiken, a white photographer posing as a Negro in order to do 
a "behind-the-scene life of the Negro" (124). He has even 
persuaded a dermatologist friend to darken his skin with an 
alkaloid substance. Dark skin or no, however, Forney, a.k.a. 
Isham Washington, cannot fool Will and his radar. When 
Forney exposes his true identity to his passenger, Will's 
suspicions concerning the man's speech suddenly make sense. 
Will even allows Forney to benefit somewhat from his 
sensitivity to regional dialect, giving him some pointers on 
how blacks in the South actually speak. Forney admits 
delightedly to Will: 
"You were my first test and I passed it, and you a 
Southerner. 
"Well, not quite," replied the tactful engineer. 
He explained that for one thing you don't say 
insur-ance but in-surance. or rather in-shaunce. 
"Oh, this is marvelous," said the pseudo-Negro, 
nearly running under a Borden tanker. 
You don't say that either, mahvelous. thought the 
engineer, but let it go. (124) 
On this and numerous other occasions throughout the novel, 
the "sentient engineer's" faculty for tuning into the medium 
of language is truly remarkable. 
For all its capacity to amaze and ingratiate, however, 
Will's radar is not the unmixed blessing that it might 
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superficially appear to be. For one thing, his habit of 
tuning in to, and transmitting at, whatever frequency he 
happens to encounter, often takes quite a toll on his own 
sense of selfhood. Early in the novel we are given one of 
the primary reasons why Will is under psychiatric care: 
His trouble still came from groups. 
It is true that after several years of 
psychoanalysis and group therapy he had vastly improved 
his group skills. So thoroughly in fact did he identify 
with his group companions of the moment, so adept did 
he become at role-taking, as the social scientists call 
it, that he all but disappeared into the group. As 
everyone knows, New York is noted for the number and 
variety of the groups with which one might associate, 
so that even a normal person sometimes feels 
dislocated. As a consequence this young man, dislocated 
to begin with, hardly knew who he was from one day to 
the next. There were times when he took roles so 
successfully that he left off being who he was and 
became someone else. (19) 
One such occasion is his brief acquaintance, mentioned 
earlier, with a group of Ohioans: 
He hadn't been in their company a week before he became 
one of them: he called a girl named Carol Kerrell. said 
mear for mirror, tock for talk, ottomobile. stummick. 
and asked for carmel candy. The consonants snapped 
around in his throat like a guitar string. In April he 
went to Fort Lauderdale. In short, he became an Ohioan 
and for several weeks walked like a cat with his toes 
pointed in, drank beer, forgot the old honorable 
quarrels of the South, had not a thought in his head 
nor a care in the world. (20) 
It is not at all surprising that such an interpersonal 
chameleon would have problems with the stability of his 
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self. The very faculty which makes him so likable (e.g., the 
Vaughts' "each feeling that he was his or her special sort 
of person. And he was") is in large part responsible for the 
fugue states that often send him roaming the countryside 
unaware of who or where he is. If one does not have a 
constant self, then everything else becomes relative as 
well. And if such an unstable self takes his cues about who 
he is or wishes to be from something as intrinsically 
unstable as the medium of language, while at the same time 
ignoring the message being communicated through this medium 
(e.g., "Why is it...I cannot hear what people say but only 
the channel they use?" 89), he is unlikely ever to find 
stability. 
Another problem with Will's radar is its inconsistent 
accuracy; it tends to "boggle" on occasions. This occurs 
when he encounters a frequency for which his radar is not 
programmed. For example, Forney Aiken, the undercover 
pseudo-Negro, puts Will up for the night at his house during 
their journey southward. After dinner, Forney discusses his 
plan to pick up Mort Prince, the writer, who has supposedly 
agreed to accompany Forney on his undercover expedition. 
Forney tells Will what a "sweet guy" Mort is, and how much 
Will is going to like him. He asks Will if he has read any 
of Mort's novels, and describes his latest, entitled Love: 
"You know what that guy told me with a straight face. I 
asked him what this book was going to be about and he 
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said quite seriously: it was about —ing. And in a 
sense it is!....But it is a beautiful piece of work 
and about as pornographic as Chaucer. Indeed it is 
deeply religious. I'll get you a copy." (130) 
Such a cavalier attitude toward sex is totally alien to the 
Southern code of gentility that permeates every fiber of his 
being. Will may be the "last gentleman," but he is a 
gentleman nonetheless and, try as he might, he cannot figure 
out how to take such ungentlemanly remarks as those uttered 
by Forney Aiken: 
The engineer groaned. What the devil does he mean 
telling me it's about —ing? Is —ing a joking matter? 
Am I to understand that I'm free to — his daughter? Or 
do we speak of —ing man to man, jokingly, literarily, 
with no thought of —ing anyone in the vicinity? His 
radar boggled. (130-1) 
Will is completely unfamiliar with the frequency at which 
Forney is transmitting here. His radar is thus incapable of 
tuning into it, and boggles as a result. 
Another occasion on which Will's radar fails him is his 
first encounter with Val Vaught, the nun. Val speaks of 
Jamie, of Will's father, of growing up in the suburbs, while 
Will, who "had never spoken to a nun," tries to tune in to 
her frequency: 
Now freed by her preoccupation with the forgotten 
trophies of her past, the sentient engineer swung full 
upon her. What to make of it, this queer casualness of 
hers? Was it Catholic, a species of professional 
unseriousness (death and sin are our affair so we can 
make light of them), almost frivolity, like 
electricians who make a show of leaning on high voltage 
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wires? Or was it an elaborate Vaught dialectic, thus: 
Rita and the rest of you are going to be so serious 
about Jamie, therefore I am not, etc. His radar boggled 
and he couldn't get hold of her. He was obscurely 
scandalized. He didn't like her much. (199-200) 
Will thus searches his channels for the proper frequency to 
tune Val in, but to no avail. If there is one thing that is 
more alien to Will than a flippant attitude toward sex, such 
as that displayed by Forney Aiken, it is religion. Having 
"eliminated Christianity" from his consciousness, Will 
views religion, and its representatives such as Val, as 
alien entities about which he can form only the most 
superficial conception. Watching Val speak, Will considers: 
"Her wrist was broad and white as milk and simple: it was 
easy to imagine that if it was cut through it would show not 
tendon and bone but a homogeneous nun-substance" (199). When 
faced with something with which he is unfamiliar, Will 
simply scans the external features and assumes that these 
features are consistent all the way to the core—that the 
thing is composed of a "homogeneous" substance throughout. 
Such an attitude is not at all uncommon, and does not, in 
fact, necessarily handicap a person in carrying out the more 
quotidian functions of life. It does present a problem, 
however, when a person is faced with the deeper, more 
mysterious aspects of life such as religion and love, 
concepts for which external appearances provide very little, 
and often misleading, information concerning the true nature 
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of the things in themselves. In such situations, Will's 
radar often simply boggles and he cannot make any sense of 
the person with whom he is speaking. 
Now such occasional malfunctions can be quite annoying, 
particularly to someone such as Will, who relies so heavily 
upon his radar. They are not nearly so serious, however, as 
another closely related flaw. The same superficial attitude 
that is evident in Will's encounter with Val, and which here 
causes his radar to boggle, in other instances leads Will to 
focus his attention so exclusively upon the medium of spoken 
language, and to trust so implicitly the clues he receives 
from this medium, that he is completely impervious to the 
message being expressed through it. He cannot see the forest 
for the trees, as it were. 
Concerning the language medium through which a message 
is expressed, Postulate 1.53 of Percy's essay states: "The 
medium is not necessarily the message, but the message can 
be strongly influenced by the medium." Percy here 
acknowledges what Will suspects—namely, that the medium of 
language is a significant epistemological tool; it provides 
access to whatever truths may exist in life, and can even 
affect the precise manner in which these truths are 
received after they are uttered. In the same postulate, 
however, Percy also makes it clear that the medium of 
spoken language, in and of itself, is in no way a substitute 
for truth, possessing no more semantic content than, say, a 
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palette of oil paints before a Titian or a Giorgione uses it 
to express his own unique vision of the truth. Will cannot 
seem to grasp this aspect of Percy's semiotic theory, and 
this inability finally results in his "missing," as Percy 
says, the truth he has sought throughout the entire novel. 
So finely attuned is Will's radar to the formal subtleties 
of spoken language, and so deaf is he to the truth which, 
while expressed through it, exists independently of it, that 
he quite literally confuses the medium with the message. 
Will's tendency to place barriers between himself and 
reality is not confined to the medium of language. In fact, 
it is something of a preoccupation for him, part of the 
"overly subtle" nature he is described as having in common 
with "many young men in the South" (10). On several 
occasions, when confronted with a reality, even a reality 
with which he has sought a confrontation, he almost 
compulsively retreats from its immediacy by placing some 
sort of obstacle between it and himself. In some of these 
instances, he rationalizes this procedure by claiming that 
it allows him to recapture an aspect of his world that has 
become lost to him, and to the rest of mankind for that 
matter. The most tangible symbol of this mental habit, and 
of Will's rationalization of it, is the $1900 telescope that 
he buys with what remains of his savings account after five 
years of psychoanalysis. As remarkable as this top-of-the-
line instrument is, it is after all only a telescope and 
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simply magnifies the images of objects that already exist 
out there. Will, however, sees it as something more, even 
attributing metaphysical qualities to it: 
It must be admitted that although he prided himself on 
his scientific outlook and set great store by precision 
instruments like microscopes and chemical balances, he 
couldn't help attributing magical properties to the 
telescope, It had to do with its being German, with 
fabled German craftsmen, gnomic slow-handed old men in 
the Harz Mountains. These lenses did not transmit light 
merely. They penetrated to the heart of things. 
The conviction grew upon him that his very life 
would be changed if he owned the telescope. (28) 
Will believes that by filtering images of the physical world 
through the medium of the telescope, he can achieve a sense 
of oneness with the world that is impossible through direct 
contact. When he gets the telescope back to his room at the 
Y.M.C.A., he immediately tests his hypothesis by screwing in 
an eyepiece and focusing on the side of a building "clear 
across the park and beyond Fifth Avenue": 
There sprang into view a disk of brickwork perhaps 
eight feet in diameter. Now stripping to his shorts, he 
drew up a chair, made himself comfortable, and gazed 
another five minutes at the bricks. He slapped his leg. 
It was as he had hoped. Not only were the bricks seen 
as if they were ten feet away; they were better than 
that. It was better than having the bricks there before 
him. They gained in value. Every crack and grain and 
excrescence became available. Beyond any doubt, he said 
to himself, this proves that bricks, as well as other 
things, are not as accessible as they used to be. 
Special measures were needed to recover them. 
The telescope recovered them. (30) 
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There is no intrinsic difference between the image of the 
bricks seen through the telescope from several hundred yards 
away, and that seen with the naked eye from ten feet away. 
The bricks exist independently of the viewer and are 
composed of the same exact molecules in the same exact 
configuration whether anyone sees them or not. And while 
even Will is not deluded enough to deny the physical stasis 
of the bricks, he places a great deal of faith in the 
metaphysical superiority of the image filtered through the 
telescope over that received directly through close 
proximity. The bricks he sees through the telescope are 
"better" because they are somehow more "available." 
Now while Will's faith in his telescope, and his 
closely related theory of the inaccessibility of highly 
visible objects (e.g., paintings in a museum) due to the 
"public secretion" with which they become "encrusted" after 
being viewed by millions of people, may at first glance 
appear benign enough, they become more questionable when 
viewed in the light of some of his other encounters with 
reality. In his first quasi-intimate encounter with his new 
"love" Kitty, for instance, he exhibits a need for physical 
interposition that is completely out of keeping with the 
nature of such encounters. After discovering her, quite by 
chance, while looking through his telescope in Central Park, 
and then getting to know her along with the rest of the 
Vaughts through visits to Jamie's room at the hospital, one 
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hot spring night he drops in on her at the apartment she 
shares with Rita and declares his love for her in the most 
gentlemanly manner, even asking her to marry him. Kitty, who 
has been drinking hikuli tea while listening to Rita's 
"fascinating account of the hikuli rite ... practiced by 
the Huichol Indians," and thus may or may not be in full 
possession of her faculties, suggests that Will take her to 
some place where they can be alone. With some reservations 
about safety, Will mentions a spot he knows in Central Park, 
and after Kitty changes clothes and hands Will a small 
revolver, the couple strolls off into the night. 
By the time they reach the park, Will's mood is 
already somewhat out of phase with Kitty's growing fervor, 
but he takes her to the little covert anyway. He kisses her 
"with an amiable passion," and she excuses herself for a 
moment: 
She moved away. As he traced a finger in the dust, 
drawing the old Northern Pacific yin-yang symbol, he 
heard the rustling of clothes and the singing of 
zippers. She returned without a sound. He embraced her 
and was enveloped in turn by the warm epithelial smell 
of her nakedness. What a treasure, he thought, his 
heart beating as rapidly and shallowly as a child's. 
What suppleness. (104) 
The average healthy young man, particularly one who has for 
some time fantasized about holding a specific woman's 
"charms in his arms," would view Kitty's actions as a 
welcome prelude to an even more welcome main event. Will is 
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not the average young man, however, and reacts strangely to 
her overture. Rather than becoming aroused as he might be 
expected to, he is overwhelmed, almost to the point of 
repulsion, by the sheer reality of her nakedness. Kitty asks 
him to hold her, and he dutifully complies: "Now holding her 
charms in his arms at last, he wondered if he had ever 
really calculated the terrific immediacy of it" (91). 
Holding Kitty in his arms, and trying his best to be 
suitably passionate, Will recalls a former work colleague's 
description of making love to his wife as "being in heaven": 
Now he understood. Kitty too, he would have to say, was 
an armful of heaven. The astounding immediacy of her. 
She was more present, more here, than he could ever 
have calculated. She was six times bigger and closer 
than life. He scarcely knew whether to take alarm or to 
shout for joy, hurrah! (105) 
Kitty speaks, quite conventionally, of love (e.g., "Oh, 
my darling, do you love me?" "Love is everything"), and 
Will considers this abstract notion in light of current 
concrete circumstances: "He was wondering: had the language 
of women, xlove' and xsweeping one off one's feet' and 
such, meant this all along, the astounding and terrific 
melon immediacy of nakedness" (106). Throughout this 
physical encounter with the woman with whom he has been in 
love from the moment he first laid eyes on her, Will simply 
cannot come to grips with the immediacy of Kitty's presence, 
or in other words with the absence of a medium through which 
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the two might communicate their feelings without actually 
coming in direct contact with one another. Indeed, when 
their lovemaking is abruptly halted by Kitty's nauseous 
reaction to the hikuli tea, Will feels actual relief at not 
having to carry through with the act, and tries as quickly 
as possible to get some clothing between himself and her 
nakedness: 
What with her swaying against him, he was having a hard 
time finding her clothes. It was too much for a man to 
follow, he mused, these lightening hikuli-
transformations from Kitty as great epithelial-warm 
pelvic-upcurving-melon-immediate Maja to Kitty as waif, 
huddled under his arm all ashiver and sour with gastric 
acid. But when they were dressed, they felt better. Now 
trousered, collared, buttoned up, he at least was 
himself again. There is a great deal to be said for 
clothes. (107) 
Will's discomfort in the presence of Kitty's immediacy, and 
his relief at its removal, illustrate a psychological 
predisposition that is at work in all his encounters with 
reality. No matter how much he claims to desire direct 
access to reality, or Truth, he generally feels more 
comfortable when it reaches him through the filter of some 
medium. His $1900 telescope, for instance, is therefore 
nothing more nor less than such a medium, despite his belief 
in its potential to "recover" bricks in a wall and girls in 
the park. Given this turn of mind, it is no surprise that 
the medium of language functions in the same way for him, 
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creating a barrier between him and reality, rather than 
providing direct access to it. 
The amazing accuracy of Will's radar at tuning into the 
medium of spoken language has already been noted; it is a 
remarkable tool that comes in quite handy on a number of 
occasions. Indeed, some critics see it as responsible for 
Will's ultimate redemption. Hobson, for example, calls 
Will's radar his "one strength," and "the means by which his 
life is saved at the end of the novel" (47-8). Now, as 
helpful as this faculty is in allowing Will to ingratiate 
himself to total strangers, Hobson's claim strains the 
bounds of credibility for two reasons. First, it assumes 
that Will attains spiritual salvation by the novel's end, 
which is quite an optimistic assumption considering the fact 
that, as far as we know, he still plans to return to 
Birmingham, marry Kitty, and go to work for Mr. Vaught at 
Confederate Chevrolet. And even if we try to explain away 
the redemption problem, as Tharpe does, by claiming that 
even though Will "may not be quite ready for a full, 
earnest search for being," his return to Birmingham could be 
the equivalent of Binx Boiling's acceptance of the "Little 
Way in Gentilly" as a path to spiritual fulfillment, we run 
into the second weak spot in Hobson's claim—namely, that 
Will's radar is directly responsible for this salvation. An 
examination of the role of Will's radar in his search for 
meaning reveals quite the opposite to be true. Rather than 
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enabling him to seek out and find truth, his radar prevents 
him from seeing truth when it is right before his eyes. 
To be fair to critics like Hobson, Will's radar does 
have its function in his search for meaning. In fact, it 
initiates this search by alerting him that something is 
missing from his own life, and that there is something out 
there that can fill the void. When he falls in with the 
group of Ohioans, for instance, he feels completely at home 
and even takes up with the "attractive and healthy brunette" 
Carol (Kerrell) Schwarz, until his radar warns him off. One 
evening at the ski lodge, as Will lies comfortably with his 
head on Carol's thigh, she leans over him and says, "*I'm a 
people-liker, and I think you're my kind of people. Are you 
a people-liker?'" (21). Will replies "yes," but it is too 
late; his radar has already picked up on the deadening 
emptiness and inauthenticity of her language: "His knee 
began to jerk involuntarily and at the first opportunity he 
extricated himself and rushed out of the lodge. Outside, he 
ran through the snowy woods and threw himself into a 
brierpatch like a saint of old." While Will's reaction to 
this girl's banal conversation, though extreme, may not 
strike the reader as remarkable, it does illustrate a 
pattern in Will's behavior; his radar alerts him that 
something is wrong and he seeks to rectify the situation, if 
only by escaping it. 
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This pattern is also responsible for his decision to 
undergo psychoanalysis with Dr. Gamow. After his father 
commits suicide, Will falls into "a long fit of melancholy 
and vacancy amounting almost to amnesia," revives himself, 
concludes his father's affairs, only to lose initiative once 
again. He is shaken out of inaction by a draft notice from 
the Army, where he serves for two years before being 
"honorably and medically discharged when he was discovered 
totally amnesiac and wandering about the Shenandoah Valley 
between Cross Keys and Fort Republic, sites of notable 
victories of General Stonewall Jackson" (16-17). After 
moving back into the Y.M.C.A. in Manhattan, Will takes stock 
of his situation and concludes that "There was something the 
matter with him and it should be attended to." To rectify 
the problem he "engaged a psychiatrist whom he consulted for 
fifty-five minutes a day, five days a week, for the 
following five years, at an approximate cost of $18,000" 
(17). So far so good. 
But the same intuitive faculty that allows him to be so 
objective about his own mental problems, and to seek help 
for these problems, finally blocks him from receiving any 
benefit from the source of help that he has chosen. As Will 
enters into psychoanalysis, it is not long before his radar 
tunes into the discourse between himself and Dr. Gamow until 
finally the discourse becomes an end in itself. With his 
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patient before him "for the thousandth time," the 
psychoanalyst reflects back upon the past five years: 
For the thousandth time Dr. Gamow looked at his 
patient—who sat as usual, alert and pleasant—and felt 
a small spasm of irritation. It was this amiability, he 
decided, which got on his nerves. There was a slyness 
about it and an opacity which put one off. It had not 
always been so between them. For the first year the 
analyst had been charmed—never had he had a more 
responsive patient. Never had his own theories found a 
readier confirmation than in the free (they seemed to 
be free) associations and the copious dreams which this 
one spread out at his feet like so many trophies. The 
next year or so left him pleased but still baffled. 
This one was a little too good to be true. At last the 
suspicion awoke that he, the doctor, was being 
entertained, royally it is true and getting paid for 
the priviledge beside, but entertained nonetheless. 
Trophies they were sure enough, these dazzling wares 
offered every day, trophies to put him off the scent 
while the patient got clean away.... 
The last year of the analysis the doctor had grown 
positively disgruntled. This one was a Southern Belle, 
he decided, a good dancing partner, light on his feet 
and giving away nothing. For five years they had 
danced, the two of them, the strangest dance in 
history, each attuned to the other and awaiting his 
pleasure, and so off they went crabwise and nowhere at 
all. (30-1) 
The doctor's understandable frustration with and mild 
antagonism toward his patient prove to be well-founded when 
we are given a glimpse into the patient's thoughts 
concerning his doctor: 
The engineer, on the other hand, had a high 
opinion of his analyst and especially liked hearing him 
speak. Though Dr. Gamow was a native of Jackson 
Heights, his speech was exotic. He had a dark front 
tooth, turned on its axis, and he puckered his lips and 
pronounced his r's like w's. The engineer liked to hear 
him say neu-wosis. drawing out the second syllable with 
a musical clinical Viennese sound. Unlike most 
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Americans, who speak as if they were sipping gruel, he 
chose his words like bonbons, so that his patients, 
whose lives were a poor meager business, received the 
pleasantest sense of the richness and delectibility of 
such everyday things as words. (32) 
Will, realizing that something is amiss in his mental 
well-being, has sought out and hired, at great expense, 
someone trained to deal with just the sort of problem he 
has. Customarily in such cases, the doctor asks his patient 
probing questions intended to draw him out of himself, and 
analyzes the patient's responses for what they reveal about 
his inner being. Then, based upon this analysis, the doctor 
formulates possible solutions to the patient's problems and 
communicates them to him with the assumption that he will 
act upon them. Will, however, short circuits this process 
in its earliest stages by tuning his ever-vigilant radar so 
closely to the spoken language through which patient and 
therapist interact, that the channels are completely 
blocked, making meaningful communication impossible. 
At one point in their final session, for instance, the 
doctor senses some ambiguity in Will's pronunciation of the 
word "bad": 
"I detected a little more jb than b. I think maybe 
you are a little mad at me." 
"I don't—" began the other, casting back in his 
mind to the events of the last session, but as usual he 
could remember nothing. "You may very well be right, 
but I don't recall anything in particular." 
"Maybe you think I'm a little mad at you." 
"I honestly don't know," said the patient, 
pretending to rack his brain but in fact savoring the 
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other's words. Maybe, for example, was minted 
deliberately as a bright new common coin mebbe in 
conscious preference to perhaps, (33) 
Given such close attention to the words spoken by Dr. 
Gamow, and so little attention to their content, it is 
little wonder that Will cannot recall anything from his 
previous sessions. It is also little wonder that he ends 
five years of intensive, costly psychoanalysis no better off 
than he was before he began. He has turned the medium of 
spoken language into a tangible barrier that prevents the 
aid, which he has so vigorously sought, from reaching him. 
The same basic dynamic is at work in Will's most 
important relationship in the novel—that with Dr. Sutter 
Vaught, the oldest Vaught sibling who is a strange 
combination of physician and pornographer. Long before he 
actually meets Sutter face to face, he is fascinated by the 
things he is told about him by the other members of the 
family. The family's feelings for him range from Jamie's 
adoration of him to the almost erotic hatred which Rita, 
Sutter's ex-wife, feels toward him. Based upon what he has 
heard about Sutter, Will concludes that his diagnostic 
expertise extends far beyond the physical body, and he has 
the vague notion that Sutter might be able to help him with 
his own mental/spiritual problems. His chance to meet Sutter 
finally comes while he is staying at the Vaught mansion in 
Birmingham. From his room, which shares a wall with 
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Sutter's, he hears a single gunshot and, having been told of 
Sutter's suicidal tendencies, runs to Sutter's room and 
bursts through the door. It turns out that Sutter is only 
taking target practice at a picture of The Old Arab 
Physician Abou Ben Adhem, whose name has a prominent place 
on the list of those responsible for promulgating the 
"meretricious bullshit of the Western world," but the shot 
provides an opportunity for Will to meet the doctor. 
After some discussion about the demise of Western 
culture, and Leigh Hunt's responsibility for "doing it in" 
Sutter turns his attention to Will himself: 
"What's the matter with you?" 
"I feel all right now. I was quite nervous a few 
minutes ago. I've had a nervous condition for some 
time." He told Sutter about his amnesia. 
"I know. Jimmy told me. Are you going into fugue 
now? 
"I don't know. I thought perhaps that you " 
"Me? Oh no. I haven't practiced medicine for 
years. I'm a pathologist. I study the lesions of the 
dead." 
"I know that," said the engineer sitting down 
wearily."But I have reason to believe you can help me." 
"What reason ? " (209) 
Will's reply to this last question indicates that he desires 
help with something much deeper than just his "nervous 
condition": 
"I can tell when somebody knows something I don't 
know." 
"You think I know something?" 
"Yes." 
"How can you tell?" 
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"I don't know how but I can. I had an analyst for 
five years and he was very good, but he didn't know 
anything I didn't know." 
Sutter laughed. "Did you tell him that?" 
"No." 
"You should have. He could have done a better 
job." 
"I'm asking you." 
"I can't practice. I'm not insured." 
"Insured?" 
"The insurance company cancelled my liability. You 
can't practice without it." 
"I'm not asking you to practice. I only want to 
know what you know." (209) 
Will's radar tells him that Sutter has some information, 
even a piece of news perhaps, that might assist him in his 
search for a meaningful life. He intuits that Sutter's 
cynical pronouncements upon Western civilization are in some 
fundamental way related to his own sense of emptiness, which 
in fact they are. Sutter has insight into the "postmodern 
incapacity" from which Western man suffers. Or, as Hobson 
puts it, he is "onto the malaise" of postmodern culture and 
"has some sense of its etiology." As unique as Will is in 
many ways, the incapacity from which he suffers is not at 
all unique; it is in fact the same malaise which hangs over 
all of postmodern society. Few people are aware that 
anything is wrong, however, so Will's desire to know what 
Sutter knows is a healthy sign. And he is quite persistent 
in his desire for knowledge, finally even following him to 
New Mexico where he has taken Jamie to spend his last few 
weeks on earth. 
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As we have seen before, however, a desire for 
knowledge, or truth, only goes so far in and of itself. One 
must be in a proper posture to receive it once it is made 
available, and we have already seen how receptive Will's 
11 self-defeating posture" is. Sutter does indeed have 
knowledge that could be of use to Will in his search, but as 
in so many other instances Will's radar, once it has picked 
up on the need for help, will create an effective barrier 
between him and the source of help by focusing on the medium 
through which it is communicated rather than the healing 
power behind it. 
Throughout their many discussions, Sutter offers Will 
several clues into the nature of his problem, although he 
never spells it out for him because he knows that Will would 
only "receive the news from his high seat of transcendence 
as one more item of psychology, throw it into his immanent 
meat-grinder, and wait to see if he feels better" (339). 
Even these clues are lost on Will, however, because he is 
paying such close attention to Sutter's individual 
statements or questions that he cannot see the overall 
pattern that Sutter is laying out for him. During their 
first conversation, for example, Will finally pesters Sutter 
into giving his psyche a brief examination. Sutter asks Will 
a series of questions about sex, God, gentility, and despair 
and then, on a hunch asks him, "What is the meaning of this 
proverb: a stitch in time saves nine?" When most people hear 
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a proverb, their minds automatically leap to the 
metaphorical significance of the statement and bypass the 
literal meaning altogether. Will's mind, or rather his 
radar, however, locks onto the words of the proverb and 
cannot get beyond their literal meaning: 
"I would have to think about it and tell you 
later," said the engineer, a queer light in his eye. 
"You can't take time off to tell me now?" 
"No." 
"You really can't tell me, can you?" 
"No." (212) 
During his conversation with Will, Sutter has come to 
suspect Will's incapacity to see through the medium of 
language; his question about the proverb proves his 
suspicions to be true. As the conversation draws to a close, 
Will further verifies Sutter's suspicions when he finally 
thinks of a question he wants to ask: "I want to know 
whether a nervous condition could be caused by not having 
sexual intercourse" (215). At one point in his interview 
with Will, Sutter does in fact ask him, "Do you have 
intercourse with girls?" but the question in itself is just 
one component of Sutter's theory of sex as a means of 
re-entry into immanence from the realm of transcendence. 
Will takes it at face value, however, and seizes on it as a 
possible cure for his problem. At this point, Sutter becomes 
disgruntled with his unsolicited patient much as another 
doctor before him has, and dismisses him: 
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"I can't help you. Fornicate if you want to and enjoy 
yourself but don't come looking to me for a merit badge 
certifying you as a Christian or a gentleman or 
whatever it is you cleave by." (216) 
When Will responds that he wishes only to know what it is 
that Sutter "cleaves by," an exasperated Sutter tells him 
simply to have a drink. Far more revealed than he realizes 
by their discussion, Will, true to form, mulls over Sutter's 
precise choice of words rather than what these words can 
tell him about himself: "Perhaps Kitty and Rita were right, 
he was thinking as he poured the horrendous bourbon. Perhaps 
Sutter is immature. He was still blushing from the word 
xfornicate.' In Sutter's mouth it seemed somehow more 
shameful than the four letter word" (216). 
On another occasion, the evening before the Tennessee 
game, Will is feeling "uncommonly bad" even though he is 
surrounded by the Vaughts, including his beloved Kitty, and 
a carload of revelers brought to the Vaught house by Son 
Thigpen. He feels dislocated and, try as he might, cannot 
bring himself to join in the merriment. Sutter, seeing that 
Will is slipping, approaches and asks him what is the 
matter. Will tells Sutter that he feels worse—that his 
memory is slipping. Sutter asks him several questions about 
his Southern "nationalistic feelings," and even begins to 
hint at a connection between these feelings and his amnesia 
until Will confesses, "but that's not what I'm interested 
in" (256). Then he tells Sutter his real problem, at least 
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as he sees it: "*Why do they feel so good,' he nodded toward 
the Oeltans, *and I feel so bad?"1 (257). Will wants to fit 
in with his fellow Southerners, to be happy like them, and 
he expects Sutter, with all his wisdom, to tell him how to 
do it. Sutter's response, though much closer to the heart of 
Will's actual problem than is Will's desire to fit in, is 
not quite what Will is looking for: 
Sutter eyed him. "The question is whether they 
feel as good as you think, and if they do, then the 
question is whether it is necessarily worse to feel bad 
than good under the circumstances." 
"That doesn't mean anything to me," said the 
engineer irritably. (257) 
Sutter's questions point to much larger issues than the 
perceived well-being of a group of Southern college students 
intoxicated with food, drink, and pre-game excitement, 
pleasures that are distinctly dyadic in nature. Viewed from 
a triadic level, from the perspective of a being in a world 
rather than an organism in an environment, judgmental terms 
such as "goodness" and "badness" lose their face value and 
become completely relative. Will takes them at their face 
value, though, and thus cannot understand Sutter's 
questions. All he knows is that he currently feels bad and 
he wants to feel good, like any person in his right mind 
would. 
To clarify matters for Will, Sutter gives him the case 
history of one of his former patients: 
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"One morning," said Sutter, "I got a call from a 
lady who said that her husband was having a nervous 
breakdown. I knew the fellow. He was a Deke from 
Vanderbilt, president of Fairfield Coke and a very good 
fellow, cheerful and healthy and open-handed. It was 
nine o'clock in the morning, so I walked over there 
from here. His wife let me in. There he stands in the 
living room dressed for work in his Haspel suit, 
shaved, showered, and in the pink, in fact still 
holding his attache case beside him. All in order 
except that he was screaming, his mouth forming a 
perfect 0. His corgi was howling, and his children were 
peeping out from behind the stereo. His wife asked me 
for an opinion. After quieting him down and having a 
word with him, I told her that his screaming was not 
necessarily a bad thing in itself, that in some cases a 
person is better off screaming than not screaming— 
except that he was frightening the children. I 
prescribed the terminal ward for him and in two weeks 
he was right as rain." (258) 
The screaming man's situation has a great deal of relevance 
for Will's own situation; both men have the feeling that 
something is wrong with their lives. If anything, the 
screaming man is the better off of the two because he is 
screaming, while Will only wishes to feel "good" like his 
classmates. Will likes the story, and does perceive a 
connection with his own situation, although not in quite the 
manner Sutter intends: 
The engineer leaned a degree closer. "I understand 
that. Now what I want to know is this: do you mean that 
in the terminal ward he discovered only that he was 
not so bad off, or is there more to it than that?" 
Sutter looked at him curiously but did not reply. 
(258) 
Once again, Will has taken Sutter's remarks strictly at 
their face value, their dyadic value, as it were, and 
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completely missed the deeper point of the story—even gotten 
it backwards, in fact. At its face value, the notion of 
death is a bad thing; for dyadic creatures it means the 
cessation of bodily functions and thus of being. From 
Sutter's perspective, however, he can see that there are 
things much worse than death—that the screaming man's 
dyadically sound existence is, triadically, a fate worse 
than death. And his trip to the terminal ward, rather than 
making him realize that he is not as bad off as the dying 
patients, as Will interprets the situation, actually makes 
him realize that he is worse off than they are. A 
confrontation with mortality makes him realize the despair 
of his own existence, and, as despair aware of itself is 
infinitely preferable to despair unaware of itself, he 
leaves the terminal ward still in despair, but with an 
awareness of it that negates the need for screaming. He is 
beyond screaming, in other words. 
Will is still this side of screaming, however, and 
wants to know how Sutter's story relates to his happy Delta 
classmates: 
The engineer nodded toward the Deltans. "What 
about them?" 
"What about them?" 
"Would you put them in the terminal ward?" 
"They're not screaming." 
"Should they be screaming?" 
"I should not presume to say. I only say that if 
they were screaming, I could have helped them once. I 
cannot do even that now. I am a pathologist." (258-9) 
76 
Sutter here answers Will's question, and even provides him 
with a key to the relevance of the story of the screaming 
man. All Will hears, though, is Sutter's refusal to "presume 
to say." In his refusal to speculate upon the ontological 
status of Will's acquaintances, he tells Will all he needs 
to know about them, but Will is deaf to the information, and 
even irritated at Sutter for his lack of cooperation: 
The engineer frowned. He felt a stirring of anger. 
There was something unpleasantly ironic about Sutter's 
rapid wry way of talking. It was easy to imagine him 
ten years from now haunting a barroom somewhere and 
pattering on like this to any stranger. He began to 
understand why others made a detour around him, so to 
speak, and let him alone. (259) 
Will is so put off by Sutter's wry ironic "way of talking" 
that he cannot hear the message Sutter is trying to tell him 
the only way he knows how. Nor can Will comprehend that 
Sutter's habitual irony is in itself a big part of the 
message. 
Throughout the novel, and his constant search for a 
meaningful solution to his persistent unrest, Will teeters 
precariously between plunging into the consumer world of 
immanence and flying off into the outer space of 
transcendence. He wants to be happy, and to feel at home in 
his world rather than be constantly torn between two 
extremes. Of all the avenues he pursues, his relationship 
with Sutter is the most potentially beneficial, because 
Sutter is at least in a position to make Will understand his 
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unrest, even if he cannot show him a way out of it. Sutter 
knows that man, by definition, does not have a home in this 
world. Along with his sister Val, he sees that man is 
neither a wholly transcendent being, nor a wholly immanent 
creature, but rahter a homeless wanderer between the two. 
This is why he spends so much of his time doing autopsies 
on male suicides, and studying their meatuses for residual 
spermatozoa; he is verifying his hypothesis that sex and 
other such attempts to re-enter the immanent realm from the 
transcendent are self-defeating and consequently result in 
depression. Although he tries his best to communicate his 
knowledge of man's place in the universe to Will, Will is so 
intent on scanning Sutter's cryptic remarks for the cure 
that he is looking for that he fails to hear the more 
important message that runs throughout them—namely, that 
there is no cure, and that to seek one is to risk falling 
into a life of pleasant, empty-headed immanence. 
This is, in fact, exactly what Will winds up doing. 
After following Sutter all the way across country to New 
Mexico, Will tries one last time to get Sutter to give him a 
cure for his unrest: 
"Tell me to be chaste and I will do it. Yes! I 
will do it easily!" he said striking the rail softly 
with is fist. "All you have to do is tell me." 
"I will not tell you." 
"Then tell me not to be chaste." (366) 
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Of course Sutter will tell him no such thing, because such a 
solution, any solution for that matter, is diametrically 
opposed to his beliefs concerning man's place in the 
universe. All he can do is try to help Will see the light, 
or rather the darkness, for himself, and this is not good 
enough for Will. So, he casts his lot with immanence. 
Following Sutter's final refusal to tell him what to do, 
Will tells Sutter of his plans for a shiny new future: 
"Dr. Vaught, Kitty and I are getting married. I am 
going to take a good position with your father, settle 
down on the South Ridge and, I hope, raise a family." 
"Yes," said Sutter after a pause." 
"I think I'm going to be a pretty fair member of 
the community. God knows the place could use even a 
small contribution of good will and understanding." 
(368) 
Will and Kitty are going to buy Cap'n Andy Mickle's place, 
find a sound "church home," "make a contribution, however 
small," and live happily and immanently ever after. As he 
listens to Will speak, Sutter realizes that he is finally, 
hopelessly cured of his problem: "I think you'll be very 
happy. In fact I'll go further than that. I don't think 
you'll have any more trouble with your fugues" (369). As 
bright as his future is, one thing concerns Will, something 
he remembers that Sutter once told him: 
"Dr. Vaught, why was that man screaming?" 
"What man?" 
"The man you told me about—the Deke from 
Vanderbilt—with the lovely wife and children—you 
know." 
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"Oh. Scotty. Christ, Barrett, for somebody with 
fugues, you've got quite a memory." 
"Yes sir." 
"Don't worry about Scotty. You won't scream. I can 
assure you that you will not scream." (370-1) 
Will is finally cured of his chronic unrest, and thus beyond 
help. He can now go on and live a happy, useful life. 
Sutter, in the meantime, has his own plans for the 
future. Early in this conversation, Sutter asks Will: 
"Which is the best course for a man: to live like 
a Swede, vote for the candidate of your choice, be a 
good fellow, healthy and generous do a bit of science 
as if the world made sense, enjoy a beer and a good 
piece (not a bad life!). Or: to live as a Christian 
among Christians in Alabama? Or to die like an honest 
man?" (364) 
As the conversation draws to a close, Sutter asks Will to 
stick around to take care of things after Jamie's death. 
Will is surprised by the request: 
"You'll be here." 
"No, Barrett. I'll not be here." 
"Why not?" asked the other angrily—he had had 
enough of Sutter's defections. . . . 
"If I do outlive Jamie," said Sutter, putting on 
his Curlee jacket (double breasted), "it will not be by 
more than two hours. What in Christ's name do you think 
I'm doing out here? Do you think I'm staying? Do you 
think I'm going back?" (373-4) 
Sutter will remain true to his beliefs to the end; he will 
"die like an honest man" by committing suicide immediately 
after Jamie's death. This is his alternative to Will's 
plunge into immanence, which he views as nothing more than a 
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living death. It is, in fact, the only meaningful course of 
action left open to him, given what he knows about the human 
condition. Man is not at home on this earth and, barring the 
possibility of a home elsewhere, he is better off dead than 
trying desperately to fit in where he does not belong. For 
all his insight into the malaise of postmodern civilization, 
and his awareness of man's essential homelessness, his 
theories obviously have an enormous gap—a missing capstone 
necessary to prevent man's being from collapsing into 
formless rubble. This missing capstone is none other than 
the "piece of news" which his sister Val believes can rescue 
castaway man from his universal desert island. In one final, 
impressive example of Will's linguistic radar, the 
long-awaited piece of news enters the novel...and Will 
misses it. 
With death clearly not far away, Jamie asks Will to 
"call old Val," ostensibly to find out what happened to a 
book on entropy she promised to send him. Val, realizing the 
gravity of Jamie's condition, and the imminence of his 
death, commissions Will to arrange to have Jamie baptized in 
the hospital by a Catholic priest. This request goes against 
everything he believes, or rather does not believe, but 
because Val gives him a direct command he agrees to carry 
out her wishes. As a devoted disciple of his brother Sutter, 
Val's request would seem to go against what Jamie believes 
as well, but when death and Father Boomer finally arrive, 
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something remarkable occurs, perhaps even a miracle, and 
Will's linguistic radar plays an integral role in bringing 
it about. 
By the time the priest arrives at Jamie's bedside, the 
youth is so weak that his words are barely audible. In order 
for the baptism to take place properly, someone with a keen 
ear for language is needed to render Jamie's acceptance of 
the sacrament understandable. This is clearly a job for the 
sentient engineer. After some preliminary discussion, the 
baptism gets underway, while Sutter watches wryly from 
across the room. Father Boomer asks Jamie if he accepts the 
"truths of religion": 
Jamie moved his lips. 
"What?" asked the priest, bending lower. 
"Excuse me Father," said the sentient engineer. 
"He said *what.'" (387) 
Father Boomer lists the truths of religion. After asking 
Will if what the priest says is true, Jamie looks toward the 
priest: 
The engineer cleared his throat and opened his 
mouth to say something when, fortunately for him, 
Jamie's bruised eyes went weaving around to the priest. 
He said something to the priest which the latter did 
not understand. 
The priest looked up to the engineer. 
"He wants to know, ah, why." said the engineer. 
"Why what?" 
"Why should he believe that?" 
The priest leaned hard on his fists. 
"It is true because God himself revealed it as the 
truth." 
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Again the youth's lip's moved and again the priest 
turned to the interpreter. 
"He asked how, meaning how does he know that?" 
The priest sighed. "If it were not true," he said 
to Jamie, "then I would not be here. That is why I am 
here, to tell you. (388) 
Father Boomer is in Jamie's room as a messenger from God. He 
has a piece of news to give Jamie, and all Jamie must do to 
be saved is to accept it. Jamie is fading quickly, however, 
so haste is of the essence. Just as it appears that Jamie 
may die without formally accepting the sacrament, Sutter 
enters the picture in a capacity that is utterly alien to 
his beliefs. 
As [Will] returned with the water [for baptism], 
Jamie's bowels opened again with the spent schleppen 
sound of an old man's sphincter. The engineer went to 
get the bedpan. Jamie tried to lift his head. 
"No no," said Sutter impatiently, and coming 
quickly across simply bound the dying youth to the bed 
by folding the counterpane into a strap and pressing it 
against his chest. "Get on with it, Father," he said 
angrily. (389) 
As impossible as it is for Sutter to believe in Father 
Boomer's news, he sees something mysterious, even 
miraculous, happening in his little brother and he does not 
want to stand in its way. The priest pours water over 
Jamie's head and administers last rites: 
Presently the priest straightened and turned to 
the engineer as blank-eyed as if he had never laid 
eyes on him before. 
"Did you hear him? He said something. What did he 
say? " 
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The engineer, who did not know how he knew, was 
not even sure he had heard Jamie or tuned him in in 
some other fashion, cleared his throat. 
"He said, *don't let me go."' 
When the priest looked puzzled, the engineer 
nodded to the bed and added: "He means his hand, the 
hand there." 
"I won't let you go," the priest said. (390) 
Here, before Will's eyes, a miracle has occurred. A 
solitary, wayfaring soul has found a home at last, has 
discovered the solution to the problem of the human 
condition that Will has been seeking throughout the novel. 
Certainly, witnessing this miracle could not help but have a 
profound effect upon the engineer, especially since he was 
the only one in the room able to tune in Jamie's final words 
of acceptance. 
Our last glimpse of Will, however, shows him to be just 
as deaf as ever to the message conveyed by the words he has 
tuned in. Outside the hospital, Will races to catch up with 
Sutter, who is presumably on his way to commit suicide: 
"Where are you going?" the engineer asked in an 
unexpectedly loud voice. 
"What?" said Sutter, giving a start. "Oh, to the 
ranch." 
"The ranch," repeated the engineer absently. When 
Sutter started to leave, he held up his hand. "Wait." 
"Wait for what?" 
"What happened back there?" 
"In the hospital room? You were there." 
"I know, but what did you think? I could tell you 
were thinking something." 
"Do you have to know what I think before you know 
what you think?" (391) 
84 
Will, having witnessed a miracle, and even taken part in 
bringing it about, is utterly blind to its significance, and 
ends the novel just as he began it—looking for someone who 
can tell him what is what. In the novel's final scene, 
interpreted more positively by some critics than by others, 
Will expresses his need for Sutter to remain alive: 
Dr. Vaught, I need you. I, Will Barrett—" and he 
actually pointed to himself lest there be a mistake, 
11—need you and want you to come back. I need you more 
than Jamie needed you. Jamie and Val too." 
Sutter laughed. "You kill me Barrett...." 
But as the Edsel took off, spavined and sprung, 
sunk at one corner and flatulent in its muffler, 
spuriously elegant and unsound, like a Negro's car, a 
fake Ford, a final question did occur to him and he 
took off after it. 
"Wait," he shouted in a dead run. 
The Edsel paused, and stopped. 
Strength flowed like oil into his muscles and he 
ran with great joyous ten-foot antelope bounds. 
The Edsel waited for him. (393) 
Some critics read this scene as a sign that Will has finally 
attained that receptive, non-self-defeating posture that 
will open him up to the good news, or perhaps less 
dramatically but no less optimistically, that "now he will 
presumably listen to Sutter intersubjectively as the two 
friends 'name' their pain and thus reverse the effects of 
the ravening particles" (Hobson 66). While it is apparent 
that Will's expression of need for Sutter has, at least 
momentarily, postponed the latter's suicide, Will himself 
shows no real signs of change. He is simply asking one more 
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question, the answer to which will no doubt escape him, 
before returning to Birmingham to live the good life. 
Will's problem is not unique to him, especially in the 
twilight years of the twentieth century. In a culture that, 
like Will, has "eliminated Christianity" from its collective 
psyche, any news coming from this quarter will fall on deaf 
ears. Unlike many of his fellow men, however, Will at least 
perceives a void in his life, senses his own homelessness in 
the universe. Because of his refusal to recognize the 
validity of Christianity as a solution to the unrest he 
feels because of his homelessness, however, he is condemned 
to spend his life searching for something that does not 
exist—a spiritual home on earth, a bridge between immanence 
and transcendence. He seeks answers to his many questions, 
but because the only truth that matters is one that he does 
not acknowledge, the answers he receives strike him as empty 
words. These words, however, these endless answers to 
endless questions, at least help him to keep up a barrier 
between himself and the immediacy of the reality to which 
Sutter Vaught is privy, so they become an end in themselves. 
The medium of language becomes an end in itself. Such faith 
in language ignores the obvious, however—namely, that 
language only has meaning in relation to the message, 
existing independently of it, that is expressed through this 
medium. Otherwise, it is like paper currency without gold to 
back it up—utterly valueless. This is why Will's posture is 
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self-defeating, and his search for meaning is doomed to 
failure. He has traded his life savings for valueless paper 
currency; he has confused the medium with the message, and 
he is destined to wander the earth a spiritually bankrupt 
soul as a result—at least until he reappears in Percy's 
sequel to the novel, The Second Coming. 
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CHAPTER III 
NARRATOR AS PATIENT: 
"SANITY" IN LOVE IN THE RUINS AND LANCELOT 
Percy's next two novels take a decidedly darker turn. 
The "genteel, reflective" tone of The Moviegoer and The Last 
Gentleman gives way to a "violence of imagery, plot, and 
narrative voice" so striking that "many readers wondered 
what had happened to Walker Percy" (Hobson 68). The world 
depicted by Percy in his first two novels is in trouble— 
plagued by malaise, sunk in the everydayness and so 
forth—but this trouble is mild in comparison with that 
which faces the characters who inhabit the worlds of Love in 
the Ruins and Lancelot. In these two novels, Percy raises 
the stakes and gives us "a prophetic vision of a public and 
private apocalypse in America" (Hobson 69). Both books are 
"end of the world" novels of the sort described by Percy in 
his essay "Notes for a Novel about the End of the World": 
By a novel about "the end of the world," I am not 
speaking of a Wellsian fantasy or a science-fiction 
film on the Late Show. Nor would such a novel presume 
to predict the imminent destruction of the world. It is 
not even interested in the very real capacity for 
physical destruction: that each of the ninety-odd 
American nuclear submarines carries sixteen polaris 
missiles, each of which has the destructive capacity 
of all the bombs dropped in World War II.... 
No, what the novelist sees, or rather senses, is a 
certain quality of the postmodern consciousness as he 
88 
finds it and as he incarnates it in his own characters. 
What he finds—in himself and in other people—is a new 
breed of person in whom the potential for catastrophe— 
and hope—has suddenly escalated. Everyone knows about 
the awesome new weapons. But what is less apparent is a 
comparable realignment of energies within the human 
psyche. The psychical forces presently released in the 
postmodern consciousness open unlimited possibilities 
for both destruction and liberation, for an absolute 
loneliness or a rediscovery of community and 
reconciliation. (MB 101, 112) 
Such a novel explores nothing less than the very soul of 
Western man in the troubled postmodern era—a soul that 
finds itself at a cataclysmic crossroads. The proper subject 
for so grave a theme is "a man who has very nearly come to 
the end of the line" (MB 112). Dr. Tom More and Lancelot 
Andrewes Lamar are both such men. We view the "worlds on the 
brink" depicted in Love in the Ruins and Lancelot through 
their psyches. 
Given Percy's description of the "proper subject" for 
novels such as these, we would not be terribly surprised to 
find their protagonists suffering some unfortunate psychical 
consequences for their "end of the line" states of being. In 
other words, we might expect them to be crazy—not just 
crazy in the lovable, dislocated sense in which Will Barrett 
is crazy, but classifiably, institutionally insane. And, in 
fact, this is precisely what we find in these two novels. 
Will Barrett may have spent five years in psychoanalysis 
(under his own volition), but Tom More and Lancelot Lamar 
spend the majority of the time periods covered in their 
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respective novels officially institutionalized for mental 
illness. 
Now it is important to note here what an extremely 
subjective and relativistic concept "sanity" is, and nowhere 
is it more relativistic than in Percy's fiction. Of Love in 
the Ruins Percy succinctly states: "The only problem facing 
the reader is who is crazy, whether it's Dr. More or the 
rest of the world" (Lawson and Kramer 48). This question 
applies as well to the protagonist of Lancelot and becomes, 
in fact, the central concern of both novels. After all, when 
every bit of information we have about a given situation 
comes from someone whom society has labelled "insane," we 
must settle this question for ourselves before we know how 
much of the information to believe. But how do we determine 
to our satisfaction the relative sanity or insanity of these 
narrators? Do we simply accept the opinions of the competent 
medical personnel who have examined these characters using 
the most up-to-date methods of behaviorism? Or do we go to 
the other extreme and, citing Percy's well-known criticism 
of behavioral psychology, throw these diagnoses out the 
window and pronounce the narrators perfectly sane? 
Fortunately, we as readers are provided with a means of 
making such an assessment with a fairly high degree of 
confidence. The means is, of course, language. By carefully 
examining the verbal behavior of the narrator/protagonists 
of these two novels in relation both to us, the readers as 
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addressees, and to the fictional characters with whom Tom 
More and Lancelot Lamar interact, we can come to a fairly 
reliable solution to the question Percy poses concerning 
Love in the Ruins: "The only problem facing the reader is 
who is crazy." 
This question has particular relevance to Percy's 
essay, "Toward a Triadic Theory of Meaning," which, after 
all, attempts to provide a foundation for a "basic science 
of listening-and-talking, as indispensable to psychiatrists 
as anatomy to surgeons" (159). In the list of postulates 
that Percy formulates in this essay, one is especially 
intriguing in its implications, but frustrating in its 
brevity and lack of elaboration. Postulate 1.54 states: 
"Every sentence has a normative dimension" (176). Possible 
variations in this dimension include "true-false, 
stale-fresh, appropriate-inappropriate, crazy-sane, etc" 
(179). After explaining briefly that "true-false" is only 
one prong of the normative dimension, Percy gives a few 
examples to demonstrate how the dimension actually works: 
Clouds are fleece is false as a literal statement, 
true in a sense as a metaphor, bad in the sense of 
being a trite metaphor. 
That is a sparrow may be a true assertion of class 
relationship but it may also be perfunctory, a bored 
assignment of a commonplace object (English sparrow) to 
a commonplace class. 
That is a duskv seaside sparrow may assert a 
similar relationship, yet it may be uttered with all 
the excitement and sense of discovery of a bird-watcher 
coming upon an occasional species. (177) 
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In addition to these examples of true-false, stale-fresh, 
etc., verbal behavior, Percy also gives us an example of 
what might be considered "crazy," or at least less than 
sane, verbal behavior: 
Patient says to therapist, "Don't you dare plot 
against me!" An imperative sentence and therefore 
neither true nor false but inappropriate because, let 
us stipulate, the therapist harbors no such plot. 
(177) 
Based upon this one instance of his patient's verbal 
behavior, the doctor can fairly confidently assume that all 
is not right with his mind—that he is at least mildly 
paranoid and thus in need of help. 
As interesting, albeit not all that original, as the 
postulate and examples may be, they leave us with a 
frustrated sense of incompletion, for after this brief 
discussion of an enormously complex issue, Percy moves on to 
the next postulate without further ado. He tells us that a 
person's verbal behavior can provide clues to the relative 
soundness of his mind, but he does not go on to develop an 
apparatus for making such an assessment. Certainly some 
verbal behavior self-evidently falls under the "insane" 
category of the normative dimension. The patient's command 
that his therapist not plot against him is clearly evidence 
of a paranoid state of mind. But even in such obvious cases 
as this we encounter difficulties with the articulation of 
the problem if we rely solely upon Percy's postulate as it 
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is discussed in the essay. If the essay is indeed intended 
to aid psychiatrists in the evaluation of the normalcy of 
their patients' verbal behavior, it falls short of its mark. 
If a psychiatrist can do no more than say that a patient's 
verbal behavior is crazy because, "quite frankly it just 
sounds crazy," he can provide no better help for his patient 
than an untrained layman might. 
To be fair to Percy we must acknowledge that the essay 
is intended as nothing more than a starting point for an 
eventual "basic science of listening-and- talking, as 
indispensable to psychiatrists as anatomy to surgeons." It 
is titled, after all, "Toward a Triadic Theory of Meaning." 
Still, we need more than Percy gives us if we are to examine 
the normative dimension of verbal behavior in his fiction. 
Fortunately, Percy is not the only linguist ever to show an 
interest in this aspect of language; indeed, it has become 
something of a specialized field of study in and of itself. 
Percy's study of language as a behavior (as opposed to a 
more purely formalistic study of language) allies him with 
the field of linguistics called "pragmatics," which 
"provides an account of how sentences are used in utterances 
to convey information in context" (Kempson 139). Probably 
the most important single figure in pragmatics is H. P. 
Grice, whose seminal work in the late 1960's and early 
1970's "developed principles of language use that were 
rooted in general principles of human cooperation" (Newmeyer 
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175). Grice's conception of language as a cooperative human 
endeavor is quite similar to Percy's view of the role of 
"community" in all triadic behavior ("The community of 
discourse is a necessary and nontrivial parameter of triadic 
behavior"), and of the system of norms that logically 
follows such a view. Grice's work, however, has the 
advantage for our purposes here of going into much greater 
detail on the precise nature of this cooperative behavior. 
He can thus assist us greatly in our exploration of Percy's 
"normative dimension" of verbal behavior. His 
systematization of the principles governing conversation 
will allow us actually to articulate the conditions 
governing such normative dualities as "appropriate-
inappropriate" and "sane-insane," and to examine the verbal 
behavior of Percy's characters in terms of these conditions. 
We will thus enlist his aid here in filling in some of the 
gaps in Percy's necessarily vague designation of the 
normative dimension of verbal behavior. 
Grice's work grows out of the tradition of speech act 
theory, which views speech as a behavior bound by certain 
"felicity conditions" which can be defined as "a set of 
conditions that are necessary for the successful and 
felicitous performance of the act" (Searle 44), or more 
simply as "the appropriate circumstances" (Austin 13). In 
other words, there are certain criteria that a speech act 
must meet before it can be considered a successfully 
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completed act. Now as impressive as this sounds it is still 
rather general, and does not get us that much closer to an 
evaluative apparatus than does Percy's brief description of 
the normative dimension of language. 
This is where Grice comes in. Dissatisfied by the 
limitations of Austin's "appropriateness conditions,11 Grice 
"attempts to clarify and correct the traditional Austinian 
view of appropriateness conditions by relating the ones 
which hold for a particular speech act in a particular 
context to general rules governing all verbal discourse and 
indeed all goal-directed cooperative human behavior" (Pratt 
125). At the heart of Grice's system of rules is what he 
calls the Cooperative Principle: "Make your conversational 
contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it 
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk 
exchange in which you are engaged" (Grice 45). Grice 
identifies four categories of maxims, "the following of 
which will, in general, yield results in accordance with the 
Cooperative Principle." These categories, and their maxims, 
are as follows: 
I. Quantity 
1. Make you contribution as informative as is 
required (for the current purposes of the 
exchange). 
2. Do not make your contribution more 
informative than is required. 
II. Quality 
1. Try to make your contribution one that is 
true. 
A. Do not say what you believe to be false. 
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B. Do not say that for which you lack 
adequate evidence. 
III. Relation 
1. Be relevant. 
IV. Manner 
1. Be perspicuous. 
A. Avoid obscurity of expression. 
B. Avoid ambiguity. 
C. Be brief (avoid unneccessary prolixity). 
D. Be orderly. 
(Grice 45-6) 
In normal conversation these maxims are regarded rather 
loosely, but as long as the Cooperative Principle is being 
recognized by all the participants in a conversation, an 
intentional violation of one or more of the maxims remains 
within the bounds of acceptable behavior and may, in fact, 
result in the communication of more information than is 
literally uttered, or what is called a conversational 
implicature. For example, if one friend asks another, 
"What's the new Pizza House like?" and he replies, "All the 
cooks there are Italian," he violates the maxim of Relation 
by not overtly commenting on the quality of the food there, 
but rather on the nationality of its cooks. His friend, 
however, understands him to mean by this that since pizza is 
particularly associated with Italy, people who are from 
Italy should be able to make especially good pizza. The 
reference to the Italian origin of the cooks at the Pizza 
House, then, implies without actually stating the fact that 
they make good pizza (Kempson 140). Such intentional 
violations of the maxims of the Cooperative Principle, which 
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are an integral part of nearly every conversation, do not 
concern us here because they do not violate any behavioral 
norms and thus provide no insight into the mental well-being 
of a speaker. The speaker may be crazy, but he is verbally 
cooperative, so we may make no assessment one way or the 
other based upon his speech alone. Unintentional violations 
of the Cooperative Principle, on the other hand, are an 
entirely different matter. We will focus our attention on 
these violations in assessing the mental stability of the 
protagonist/narrators of Love in the Ruins and Lancelot. 
In a discussion of the various ways in which violations 
of the Cooperative Principle may be interpreted, Marilyn 
Cooper states that "those who do not know they have violated 
a maxim are taken to be psychologically or mentally 
deficient in some way" (180). Thus, while an intentional 
violation on the part of a speaker may be accepted by the 
other participant(s) in a conversation as perfectly normal 
verbal behavior, an unintentional violation is grounds for 
considering him to be mentally impaired. This predisposition 
of listeners to judge a speaker's mental health on the basis 
of his verbal behavior can be effectively manipulated by 
writers of fiction to provide insight into a fictional 
character's mind that would be impossible, or at least 
unconvincing, with mere description. In Toward a Speech Act 
Theory of Literary Discourse Mary Louise Pratt discusses the 
recognition of the Cooperative Principle by fictional 
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characters, stating that "unintentional failure [to adhere 
to the Cooperative Principle] can result from carelessness 
or ignorance or from some temporary or permanent perceptual 
limitation such as psychological trauma, obsession, 
insanity, or delirium" (182). Assuming that a writer of 
fiction is in full control of his characters, when we "hear" 
one of them violate a normative rule of verbal behavior, 
such as Grice's maxims, we the readers are alerted to the 
possible presence of clues concerning the character's mental 
well-being (and in works such as Love in the Ruins and 
Lancelot. in which the issue of sanity is so central a 
concern, we can use all of the authorial assistance that we 
can get). After we determine what mile or maxim has been 
violated, we must then decide whether the violation is 
intentional or unintentional. Depending upon the severity of 
the violation, and the degree to which the speaker is aware 
of his violation, we may very well be dealing with a madman. 
By applying the procedure outlined here to the verbal 
behavior of the central characters in Love in the Ruins and 
Lancelot, we should be able to solve, with a fair degree of 
certainty, the problem posed by Percy concerning Love in the 
Ruins; "The only problem facing the reader is who is crazy. 
Whether it's Dr. More [or Lancelot] or the rest of the 
world." 
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LOVE IN THE RUINS 
The very first words uttered by Dr. Tom More, narrator/ 
protagonist of Love in the Ruins, invite us to examine the 
normative mode of his verbal behavior: 
Now in these dread latter days of the old violent 
beloved U.S.A. and of the Christ-forgetting Christ-
haunted death-dealing Western world I came to myself in 
a grove of young pines and the question came to me: has 
it happened at last? 
Two more hours should tell the story. One way or 
the other. Either I am right and a catastrophe will 
occur, or it won't and I'm crazy. In either case, the 
outlook is not so good. (3) 
More fears for the future of the U.S.A.—of the entire 
Western world, in fact. As he dictates his thoughts into a 
pocket recorder ("so that survivors poking around the ruins 
of Howard Johnson's a hundred years from now will have a 
chance of avoiding a repetition" 28), he goes on to explain 
the precise nature of his fears: 
These are bad times. 
Principalities and powers are everywhere 
victorious. Wickedness flourishes in high places. 
There is a clearer and more present danger, 
however. For I have reason to believe that within the 
next two hours an unprecedented fallout of noxious 
particles will settle hereabouts and perhaps in other 
places as well. It is a catastrophe whose causes and 
effects—and prevention—are known only to me. The 
effects of the evil particles are psychic rather than 
physical. They do not burn the skin and rot the marrow, 
rather do they inflame and worsen the secret ills of 
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the spirit and rive the very self from itself. If a 
man is already prone to anger, he'll go mad with rage. 
If he lives affrighted, he will quake with terror. If 
he's already abstracted from himself, he'll be sundered 
from himself and roam the world like Ishmael. (5) 
As dire as circumstances may be—and they are indeed dire 
('"It's not even the U.S.A., it's the soul of Western man 
that is in the very act of flying apart HERE and NOW"1 
115)—More has a little invention that could save the day: 
"In fact it could save the U.S.A. if we can get through the 
next hour or so" (20). 
The speaker of the preceding passages is very clearly 
"a man who has very nearly come to the end of the line," a 
man of the sort Percy describes in his "Notes for a Novel 
About the End of the World." The resounding question here is 
whether he is at the end of this line by himself, or 
accompanied by the whole Western world. Or as Tom More puts 
it, "Either I am right and a catastrophe will occur, or it 
won't and I'm crazy." We the readers are inclined to agree 
with these alternatives—something dire had better happen, 
or we will have no choice but to conclude that this man is 
as mad as a hatter. Now while our extreme reaction to this 
man's extreme claim may be perfectly natural, it is likely 
highly subjective. We question his sanity because he simply 
sounds crazy to us. But how can we objectify our impression? 
Remember that the ostensible purpose of the parameters Percy 
sets up in "Toward a Triadic Theory of Meaning" is to 
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provide psychiatrists with a means of making objective 
evaluations of a patient's mental health on the basis of 
clues found in his verbal behavior. And our assertion that 
Dr. More simply sounds crazy would not provide a great deal 
of help to either the psychiatrist or his patient. By 
enlisting the services of H. P. Grice, we will be better 
equipped to make a more objective assessment of Tom More's 
mental health. If we do finally decide that he, and not the 
world, is crazy, at least we will be able to give solid 
evidence for our conclusion. 
First of all, we should examine the particularly high 
stakes involved in the ultimate accuracy of Dr. More's 
prediction. People make predictions of one kind or another 
every day of their lives without fear of being called crazy 
should their predictions not come true. So what is so 
different about Dr. More's prediction? Why is his very 
sanity staked on its "successful" outcome? The basic 
distinction between More's prediction of the end of the 
Western world and someone else's prediction of, say, rain or 
a Red Sox World Series title, is simply one of statistical 
probability. Even in the middle of a drought or a shaky 
baseball season, a thunderstorm or a Red Sox World Series 
championship is far more likely than a global catastrophe of 
the sort predicted by Dr. More. Such predictions are thus 
not at all uncommon, and it is their very commonness that 
effectively detaches the speaker from his prediction, places 
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the prediction in the realm of public domain, so to speak, 
and absolves him of any direct responsibility for its 
outcome. By the same token, the unlikelihood, and hence the 
singularity, of More's prediction ties it to him in a way 
that these other predictions are not tied to their speakers. 
Consequently, even if we give More the benefit of the doubt 
and pay attention to his prediction, it had better come true 
or we will have no choice but to consider him mentally 
impaired. In other words, the far-fetched nature of his 
claim has placed him in a position where he is either a 
prophet or a lunatic. Either he is right, or he is crazy. 
Clearly, then, the single most important normative 
feature of Tom More's verbal behavior is Grice's maxim of 
Quality: 
1. Try to make your contribution one that is true. 
A. Do not say what you believe to be false. 
Now there is always the possibility that More is simply 
lying, and such an intentional violation of the Cooperative 
Principle, while admittedly unethical, does not provide 
grounds for questioning a speaker's sanity. Only 
unintentional violations provide this sort of information. 
So, outlandish as it may seem, and false though it may 
prove, More's initial claim is not admissible as evidence of 
his mental health, one way or another, until we establish 
whether or not he actually believes in the truth of his 
102 
claim, which is a mere formality in this case, but important 
nonetheless in establishing a protocol for using Grice's 
Cooperative Principle to explore the normative dimension of 
the verbal behavior of Percy's characters. 
Dr. More clearly believes what he says to be true, for 
his actions throughout the novel are totally consistent with 
such a belief. For instance, when we first encounter him he 
is seated, with a carbine in his lap, "against a young pine, 
broken out in hives and waiting for the end of the world" 
(3). A person does not arm himself in such a manner and hide 
in a grove of pine trees "on the southwest cusp of the 
interstate cloverleaf," unless he genuinely believes in the 
probability of imminent danger. The "ruined motel" that he 
observes from this vantage point provides further evidence 
of his belief in the truth of his prediction of the end of 
the world, for he has completely renovated one of the rooms 
there for his and his "girlfriend" Moira's safe habitation 
during the troubled times ahead. He has cleaned the moldy 
room from floor to ceiling, installed a generator and a 
makeshift shower, and stocked the closet with "cartons of 
Campell's chicken-and-rice, Underwood ham, Sunmaid raisins, 
cases of Early Times and Swiss Colony sherry (which Moira 
likes). And the Great Books stacked alongside" (258). More's 
careful apocalyptic preparations here, along with numerous 
other of his activities throughout the novel, show him to be 
a man fully convinced of the truth of his prediction. One of 
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our tasks, then, will be to examine the world in which More 
lives for signs of the kind of trouble that he anticipates. 
If this world proves to be as bad off as he claims, then 
perhaps he is not so crazy after all—perhaps he is, in 
fact, the only sane person left. Before attempting to make 
such a sweeping evaluation of More's world, however, we 
would benefit from a close look at some specific instances 
of "insane" or "inappropriate" verbal behavior among More 
and the other characters who inhabit it. Such instances show 
Percy to be acutely conscious of the connection between 
apparent mental health and overt language behavior in a way 
that he was not in his two previous novels. This is an 
important consideration because, from this point on in 
Percy's career, the connection becomes something of a 
preoccupation, reaching a climax in The Second Coming. 
On several occasions throughout Love in the Ruins, 
characters simply talk wrong. Listening to them talking, we 
are very aware that what we are hearing is not "normal" in 
comparison with the sorts of language behavior we encounter 
in our daily lives. Even without a Cooperative Principle to 
tell us precisely why such speech is not normal, we know 
that it somehow just sounds funny, and we automatically make 
a note of a possible problem with the speaker's mental 
health. Frequently, we the readers are not alone in our 
suspicions concerning the mental well-being of the speakers; 
their fictional addressees are quick to interpret normative 
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deviations in verbal behavior as "mental illness," and are 
often in a position to take action on such an 
interpretation. More's own questionable "patient-staff 
status" on the mental ward, for instance, fluctuates 
throughout the novel largely on the basis of his verbal 
behavior alone. Other characters similarly suffer at the 
hand of their fellow man because of apparent deviations 
along the normative dimension of their verbal behavior. The 
precise "deviance" of each of these examples can be 
explained with the aid of the maxims of Grice's Cooperative 
Principle. 
Despite his many infelicitous (apparent or otherwise) 
speech acts in the novel, Tom More consistently exhibits an 
awareness of the normative dimension of verbal behavior, and 
of the possible consequences of violations of the norms. On 
one occasion, he returns to the psychiatric ward (where he 
is still officially on patient-staff status as a result of a 
Christmas Eve suicide attempt) to ask his colleague Max 
Gottlieb for help in getting N.I.M.H. funding for a crash 
program to develop and distribute his invention the MOQUOL, 
or More's Qualitative and Quantitative Ontological 
Lapsometer. Before More even mentions the purpose of his 
visit, Max and another colleague, Colley Wilkes, eye him 
with skepticism as a result of his past behavior. When he 
does begin to explain why he is back at the hospital, his 
verbal behavior does not put their minds at ease. The 
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conversation begins normally enough, with Max exclaiming 
good-naturedly, "The prodigal returns. This time to stay, I 
hope" (110). But then More states his business: 
"I've a favor to ask...." 
"Ask it." 
"You know what it is. I want you to speak to the 
Director about my article and my lapsometer before my 
appointment with him Monday." 
Colley straddles the chaise and rises. 
"Wait, Colley. I want to tell you something too." 
"Well, Max?" 
"Sure sure." Max swivels around to the gold-green 
gauze. "If—" 
"If what?" 
"If you'll come back." 
"You mean as a patient?" 
"Patient-staff. As you were." 
"Why?" 
"You're not well." (Ill) 
The very mention of More's lapsometer causes his two 
colleagues to suspect him of an unintentional violation of 
the Cooperative Principle maxim of Quality: "Try to make 
your contribution one that is true." Max and Colley do not 
suspect More of lying to them—they give him credit for at 
least believing what he says, no matter how far-fetched it 
may sound. This very sincerity, however, gets him in 
trouble, for a belief in something as unlikely as imminent 
global catastrophe, and the related belief that this 
catastrophe can be averted only with the aid of a device 
called a "lapsometer" (after the fall of mankind) strike the 
objective scientific mind as the delusions of a madman. What 
distinguishes More's beliefs, or more importantly his verbal 
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expression of them, from the out and out ravings of a 
madman, however, is his awareness of how "crazy" he may 
sound to his listeners. In other words, he is fully aware of 
the normative dimension of language, and tries to get his 
point across with as little apparent deviation from the 
norm as possible. 
After he is "invited" to come back to the psychiatric 
ward, More tries to explain that he cannot do so because 
"Something is afoot." One bit of evidence that convinces 
More himself of the truth of this statement is the fact that 
he spent the morning of this day trekking through a 
Louisiana swamp to escape from a sniper who was pursuing 
him. While he was in the swamp, he heard the voices of Max 
and Colley, who were there in search of the ivory-bill 
woodpecker. More decides to relate this evidence to his 
skeptical colleagues, and to verify his presence in the 
swamp by letting them know that he heard them there: 
I sit down slowly and close my eyes. "You were 
both out birding this morning, weren't you? Down by the 
Quarters...." 
Max is looking at me sharply. "Why do you ask? Did 
you see us? Why didn't you join us? It would be good—" 
"I couldn't. I was trapped." 
"Trapped?" 
Colley, I see, is wondering whether he should risk 
an exchange of glances with Max. His eyes stray. He 
doesn't. 
"Yes," I say and relate to them the events of the 
morning, beginning with the sniper and ending with my 
eavesdropping on the three conspirators in the pagoda. 
I don't tell it badly, using, in fact, Max's own 
low-keyed clinical style of reciting case histories on 
grand rounds. (112-13) 
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The very fact that he knows there is a "good" way and a 
"bad" way to relate this information indicates More's 
awareness of the normative dimension of verbal behavior. 
Even though he is satisfied that he does not "tell it 
badly," however, the actual content of the message is of 
such a nature that Max and Colley cannot help but suspect an 
unintentional violation of the maxim of Quality, no matter 
how well More relates it. No matter how clinical or 
objective he sounds, a belief in the reality of events such 
as those More describes must indicate mental instability: 
Silence falls. Colley, who has lit up again, 
screws up an eye against the maple-sugar smoke. Max's 
expression does not change. He listens attentively, 
unironically. Daylight glances interestingly from his 
forehead. 
"Let me be sure I understand you," says Max at 
last, swinging to and fro. "You are saying first that 
somebody tried to shoot you this morning; second, that 
there is a conspiracy planned for the Fourth of July, a 
conspiracy to kidnap the Paradise baton-twirlers as 
well as staff members here who participate in Audubon 
outings?" 
"Not exactly. The shooting is a fact. The other is 
what I heard." 
"And they're planning to run a school on Honey 
Island for the Bantus and Choctaws," says Colley, 
drumming his fingers on his helmet. 
"They said it." 
Silence. (113) 
When his objective, level-headed description of a serious 
situation that must be dealt with immediately, is only met 
with further invitation to resume his former "patient-staff 
108 
status" in the hospital, a frustrated More lays all his 
cards on the proverbial table: 
"Max, I don't seem to be getting across. You're 
talking about doing business at the same stand here. 
I'm talking about a crash program involving N.I.M.H. 
and twenty-five million dollars." 
"A crash program? You mean on a national scale? 
You think there is a national emergency?" 
"More than even that, Max! It's not even the 
U.S.A., it's the soul of Western man that is in the 
very act of flying apart HERE and NOW. Christ, Max, you 
read the paper. I can measure it, Max! Number one, I've 
got to get this thing mass-produced and in the hands of 
G.P.'sj number two, I've got to hit on a therapeutic 
equivalent of my diagnostic breakthrough. Don't you 
agree?" (114-15) 
Max's scientific mind understandably reacts with some 
skepticism to such metaphysical ravings, and More, realizing 
the immediate futility of pursuing the matter further, 
willingly changes the subject. Like the reader, Max must see 
some tangible evidence to support More's apocalyptic claims 
or he will have no choice but to regard these claims as 
unintentional violations of the maxim of Quality, and to 
view the speaker as a "patient." 
Certainly, the maxim of Quality provides the most 
important link between More's verbal behavior and his 
apparent mental health, but it is not the only area in which 
his adherence to the Cooperative Principle is in question. 
In fact, on several occasions his violation of one of the 
other maxims is clearly bevond question. Significant to our 
ultimate appraisal of More's "sanity," however, is his 
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realization on these occasions that he has, in fact, 
violated one of the maxims, even though the violation itself 
may have been unintentional. Furthermore, his evaluation of 
the significance of these violations indicates a clear 
awareness on More's part, and a conscious manipulation on 
Percy's part, of the relationship between overt language 
behavior and apparent mental stability. 
One rather trivial, but unquestionable, example of a 
violation on More7s part occurs when More takes Moira to 
Howard Johnson's to show her how he has fixed "their" room 
up. As the couple wanders through the ruined hotel, the 
romantic specter of the "salesmen and flappers" who used to 
visit this place back in the 1960's makes Moira passionate, 
and she and More frequently pause from their explorations to 
kiss one another. More7s passion surges in return, so 
powerfully, in fact, that it affects his ability to speak 
normally: 
So we walked hand in hand and read the graffiti. 
Moira had taken a course in semantics and knew there 
was nothing in dirty words. 
Above the Gideon Bible: For a free suck call room 
208.  
Moira shook her head sadly. "What an unhappy 
person must have written that." 
"Yea. That is, yes." Desire for her had blown my 
speech center. "Love, I, you," I said. (136) 
In her discussion of the Cooperative Principle in fiction 
Pratt includes "temporary" as well as "permanent" 
"perceptual limitation[s]" as possible interpretations of 
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unintentional violations of one or more of the maxims. 
Clearly More suffers from the former here. A strong wave of 
desire has temporarily "blown [his] speech center," although 
there is no reason to doubt that it will be restored when 
the wave has subsided. The temporary nature of his 
linguistic affliction, however, does not make it any less 
deviant in the normative dimension of verbal behavior. It is 
abnormal language behavior, it is viewed as such by More 
(and Percy), and it is interpreted as a perceptual 
limitation on the part of the speaker (in this case fey the 
speaker). More's unorthodox response to Moira here violates 
the maxim of Manner, or more specifically sub-maxims A 
("Avoid obscurity of expression) and D ("Be orderly"). 
More's violation of the maxim of Manner is temporary, as is 
the mental condition that gives rise to it, but its 
impermanence does not make it any less relevant to our study 
of the normative dimension of language. 
Another example of a temporary perceptual limitation 
manifesting itself in More's verbal behavior occurs after he 
has consumed several gin fizzes, to which he is severely 
allergic. He is on the golf course trying to do whatever he 
can to stave off the catastrophe that he by now feels is 
imminent. He is talking to Dr. Mark Habeeb, who wants to 
slap electrodes on some of the golfers in order to study 
their aggressive behavior. More can tell that things are 
going from bad to worse, and knows he must do something 
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soon, but unfortunately he is in the early stages of 
anaphylaxis as a result of the gin fizzes. He accuses Dr. 
Habeeb of "abstracting and withholding judgment," behavior 
that is symptomatic of "angelism." Dr. Habeeb defends his 
behavior by stating, "I'm a scientist. We don't judge 
behavior, we observe it" (a claim, by the way, which 
verifies More's diagnosis of his angelism). More responds to 
this claim in a quite unusual manner: "*That's not enough.' 
I stagger a bit. *Blow hold or cot"' (358). Shortly after 
this More lies passed out on the ground due to lack of 
oxygen. Like his unorthodox speech to Moira, his remark to 
Dr. Habeeb, "Blow hold or cot," clearly violates the maxim 
of Manner (specifically sub-maxims B: "Avoid ambiguity" and 
D: "Be orderly"). The violation is unintentional, because 
he quickly corrects himself after he realizes what he has 
said: "I mean blow hot or cold...." The violation 
accurately indicates a temporal perceptual limitation of the 
variety More experienced when his desire for Moira blew his 
speech center. And, whether we attribute it to the presence 
of alcohol in his blood, or to the absence of oxygen in his 
brain, or a combination of the two is finally irrelevant. 
The fact is that More is suffering from a perceptual 
limitation, and that one of the signs Percy uses to 
indicate this is a slip-up in the normative dimension of 
More's verbal behavior. 
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In addition to these two relatively unimportant 
violations of the maxim of Manner, More on another occasion 
experiences a violation of this particular maxim which is of 
direct relevance to our overall evaluation of his mental 
health. It takes place outside of The Pit, a "seriocomic 
clinic, an end-of-the-year hijinks put on by the doctors for 
the students" (ill). More runs into Dr. Buddy Brown, his 
scheduled opponent in the day's "hijinks," who offers him a 
last minute opportunity to examine Mr. Ives, the elderly 
mute patient who will be the subject of More's and Brown's 
debate. More has just come from the Director's office, where 
he expected to find out that he had received full support 
for N.I.M.H. funding of his invention, but instead found 
out that the Director had no idea what he was talking about 
and, furthermore, still considered him a patient of the 
psychiatric ward. Understandably shaken, More shuffles out 
into the hall, his "hands groping for the pockets of [his] 
string robe" (207). It is in this psychologically vulnerable 
state that he encounters Buddy Brown: 
"You're just in time, Tom!" 
"In time for what?" 
"To give Mr. Ives the once-over. Be my guest." 
"No thanks." 
"Look at this." Taking a reflex hammer from his 
pocket, he taps Mr. Ives' knee tendon with quick deft 
taps. 
Mr. Ives dances a regular jig in his chair, all 
the while watching me with his mild blue gaze. 
"Isn't that upper-motor-neurone damage, Doctor?" 
Buddy asks me. 
"I don't think so." 
113 
"Try it yourself." He hands me his hammer, a 
splendid affair with a glittering shaft a tomahawk head 
of red rubber. 
"No fanks." 
"What? Oh. Then I'll see you shortly." 
"Fime." 
I do not speak well. I've lost. I'm a patient. But 
Buddy doesn't notice. Like all enemies, he puts the 
best construction on his opponent. But Moira knows 
something is wrong. She hangs her head. (208-9) 
Even though More is fully aware that his language behavior 
is not normal, in his present mental state he is powerless 
to take any corrective measures, and blunders right along: 
"Is something wrong?" [Moira] asks in a low voice. 
"I'm fime." I notice that they are waiting outside 
the tunnel that leads into The Pit from the lower 
level. 
"Don't forget Howard," says Moira. 
"Who? Oh." Howard Johnson. "Nopes." 
"Who is Howard?" Buddy asks. 
"We can go now," whispers Moira. She sees the 
abyss and is willing to save me. 
"When will you come in?" asks Buddy. 
"Eins upon a oncy," I reply. 
"O.K. Eins zwei drei," says Buddy, willing to give 
me the benefit of the doubt. "He's going to the men's 
room," he tells Moira, trying to make sense of me. 
"Rike," I say. 
"Rotsa ruck." 
More here repeatedly and unintentionally violates the maxim 
of Manner (submaxims A: "Avoid obscurity" and B: "Avoid 
ambiguity"). And even though Buddy does not acknowledge the 
abnormality of More's speech, preferring to continue 
thinking of him as a worthy opponent, Moira notices, and so 
does More, who interprets it as a sign of his own mental 
illness ("I do not speak well. I've lost. I'm a patient"). 
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As amusing as violations of the maxim of Manner may be 
(we are certainly not expected to view the preceding 
exchange with any degree of solemnity) amusement alone is 
not our reason for dealing at such great length with More's 
violations of this maxim. The importance of these particular 
violations to our current study lies in their uniqueness 
among Percy's works up to this point. In his previous two 
novels he has depicted inauthentic or empty speech (e.g. 
that of Eddie and Nell Lovell) and situationally 
inappropriate speech (e.g. Binx's Uncle Oscar "getting off 
on niggers, Mrs. Roosevelt, dagos and Jews" at the Boiling 
dinner table), but he has not yet shown anyone actually 
straying outside the bounds of what is at least recognizable 
as ordinary spoken language. More's violations of the maxim 
of Manner represent a new awareness on Percy's part of the 
normative dimension of verbal behavior as a correlative of a 
speaker's mental health. This new direction in Percy's 
thinking is particularly significant in its anticipation of 
what he will do with the normative dimension in The Second 
Coming. in which Allison Huger's apparent violations of the 
maxim of Manner, and their relation to her mental health, 
actually become one of the central concerns of the novel as 
a whole. 
As prominent as More's "crazy" speech is in Love in the 
Ruins. he is not the only character whose verbal behavior 
causes other people to question his mental stability. One of 
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the most consequentially grave of these is the verbal 
behavior of Mr. Ives, the elderly patient being examined by 
Dr. More and Buddy Brown in The Pit. During his stay at the 
Golden Years Senior Citizen Settlement in Tampa, Florida, 
Mr. Ives has violated a wide variety of behavioral norms. He 
has refused to participate in "shuffleboard tournament, 
senior softball, Golden Years gymkhana, papa putt-putt, 
donkey baseball, Guys and Gals a go-go, the redfish rodeo, 
and grandaddy golf." He has twice "defecate[d] on Flirtation 
Walk during the Merry Widows promenade." During the period 
of well-wishing at the Ohio Day breakfast, when Mr. Ives' 
turn at the microphone arrived, he uttered "gross insults 
and obscenities to Ohioans, among the mildest of which was 
the expression, repeated many times, piss on all Ohioans," 
and later did, in fact, "urinate on Ohio in the Garden of 
the Fifty States" (223). The most damning of all his 
abnormal behavior, however, is his complete mutism following 
an alleged "stroke" a month before his appearance in The 
Pit. Buddy Brown attributes this mutism to "advanced 
atherosclerosis, senile psychosis...hemiplegia and aphasia 
following a cerebrovascular accident" (221). His 
recommendation for Mr. Ives' treatment is transferral to the 
"Happy Isles Separation Center," which is actually a 
euthanasia facility for no longer productive members of 
society. The old gentleman's very life, thus, depends upon 
his ability to abide by the Cooperative Principle. 
116 
With his prolonged silence Mr. Ives violates the maxim 
of Quantity (submaxim 1: "Make your contribution as 
informative as is required [for the current purposes of the 
exchange]). In Mr. Ives' case, this maxim can be simplified 
as: "Speak when you are spoken to," which he either cannot 
or will not do. As with many of More's violations, intention 
is the key here in determining Mr. Ives' mental health, and, 
in this case, even his survival. Buddy Brown believes that 
the problem is organic—that Mr. Ives is silent because he 
cannot speak. In other words, that his violation of the 
Cooperative Principle is unintentional. More has his doubt 
about this, however, and these doubts are confirmed when he 
examines Mr. Ives' brain activity with his lapsometer. More 
relates his findings to his nurse, Ellen Oglethorpe: 
"No wonder he won't talk," I say, flipping back 
through his stack of wave patterns. 
"Won't or can't," Ellen asks me. 
"Oh, he can. No organic lesion at all. Look at his 
cortical activity: humming away like a house afire. 
He's as sharp as you or I." 
"Then why—?" 
"And he's reading me right now, aren't you Mr. 
Ives?" 
"Ecccc," says Mr. Ives. 
"You asked me why he won't talk," I tell her 
loudly. "He's too damn mad to talk. His red nucleus is 
red indeed. Look at that." 
"You mean—" 
"I mean he doesn't trust you or me or anybody." 
(160) 
Mr. Ives' violation of the maxim of Quantity is wholly 
intentional—he is silent because he chooses to be. 
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More later proves this fact in The Pit when, using the 
new therapeutic component of his MOQUOL, invented by Art 
Immelman, he "administer[s] a light chloride dampening to 
his red nucleus (whence his rage) and a moderate sodium 
massage to his speech area in the prefrontal gyrus" (229). 
This light ionic brain massage diminishes Mr. Ives' anger to 
a point where he is no longer "too damn mad to talk," and he 
explains his unusual behavior to The Pit audience. It turns 
out that Mr. Ives is a linguist who has for some time been 
trying to "decipher the Occala frieze," and it is his belief 
that an artifact that will enable him to do so is buried 
somewhere around Tampa, specifically in the area now 
occupied by the Golden Years Senior Citizens Settlement. As 
he himself explains: "why else would I hang around that 
nuthouse?" (230). His anger, and consequent anti-social 
behavior (including his mutism) are nothing more than an 
understandable reaction to incessant trivial interruptions 
to his important work: 
"Doctor," says Mr. Ives, hunkering down in his 
chair, monkey eyes glittering, "how would you like it 
if during the most critical time of your experiments 
with the Skinner box that won you the Nobel Prize, you 
had been pestered without letup by a bunch of 
chickenshit Ohioans? Let's play shuffleboard, let's 
play grandaddy golf, Guys and Gals a go-go. Let's jump 
in our Airstream trailers and drive two hundred miles 
to Key West to meet more Ohioans, and once we get there 
talk about—our Airstream trailers? Those fellows 
wouldn't let me alone." (231-2) 
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On being asked by the Director a few moments later why he 
has neither spoken nor walked in the past month, Mr. Ives 
further elaborates: 
Mr. Ives scratches his head and squints up the 
slope. "Well sir, I'll tell you." He lays on the 
cracker style a bit much to suit me. "There is only one 
kind of response to those who would control your 
responses by throwing you in a Skinner box." 
"And what would that be?" asks the Director 
sourly, knowing the answer. 
"To refuse to respond at all." (234) 
Thus, instead of being hopelessly impaired and fit for 
nothing but the euthanasia facility at the Happy Isles 
Separation Center, as Buddy Brown considers him to be, Mr. 
Ives is every bit as mentally sound as Buddy Brown himself, 
and probably a good deal more intelligent. While 
unintentional violation of the maxim of Quantity may very 
well indicate mental problems, Mr. Ives' intentional 
violation of it indicates nothing more abnormal than a touch 
of orneriness, and perhaps some well-deserved righteous 
indignation. 
The violations of the maxim of Quantity by Tom More's 
friend Father Rinaldo Smith are not so harmless, however. 
While Tom More was a patient in the acute wing of the mental 
ward, Father Smith, one of the few remaining Catholic 
priests in America, "turned up in the bed next to [More's]" 
as a result of an unintentional violation of the maxim of 
Quantity he committed while performing a mass: 
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It seemed he had behaved oddly at the ten o'clock mass 
and created consternation among the faithful. This 
happened before the Schism, when hundreds of the 
faithful packed old Saint Michael's. When he mounted 
the pulpit to make the announcements and deliver his 
sermon, he had instead—fallen silent. The silence 
lasted perhaps thirty seconds. Thirty seconds is a very 
long silence. Nothing is more uncomfortable than 
silence when speech is expected. People began to cough 
and shift around in the pews. There was a kind of 
foreboding. Silence prolonged can produce terror. 
(183-4) 
Father Smith finally broke this silence only to say, "Excuse 
me...but the channels are jammed and the word is not getting 
through," and then he "walked to the rectory in his 
chausuble, sat down in the Monsignor's chair in a gray funk 
and, according to the housekeeper, began to mutter something 
about *the news being jammed.'" After this incident he was 
admitted to the acute ward and placed in the bed next to 
More's, where he lay "stiff as a board, hands cloven to his 
side, eyes looking neither right nor left." 
Unlike Mr. Ives' prolonged silence, Father Smith's is 
unintentional—he doesn't speak because he cannot speak, 
believing as he does that "the channels are jammed." In 
terms of the maxim of Quantity, this silence violates the 
Cooperative Principle because the "current purpose" of the 
gathering of the congregation requires of Smith, as a 
minimum informational contribution, a sermon, which he does 
not deliver. This violation creates "consternation among the 
faithful" because it is outside of the bounds of what they 
recognize as "normal" verbal behavior, and thus a sign of 
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mental impairment, or insanity. Furthermore, Smith has the 
extremely bad manners to exhibit this abnormal verbal 
behavior in such a highly public setting. To go insane in 
the privacy of one's own home is one thing, but to do it in 
front of hundreds of people, all of whom are made extremely 
uncomfortable as a result, is well-nigh unforgivable. The 
immediate consequence for Smith of this very public 
unintentional violation of the maxim of Quantity is a speedy 
admission to the acute psychiatric ward. 
His hospitalization turns out to be much needed, for in 
the acute ward he lies in his bed stiff as a board, speaking 
of the victory of the "principalities and powers," and 
alternating between ecstasy and gloom, laughter and tears. 
His unintentional violation of the Cooperative Principle 
thus proves to be an accurate indicator of his unsound 
mental health. 
The preceding examples indicate a natural tendency of 
people, fictional or otherwise, to interpret violations of 
the Cooperative Principle as evidence of a speaker's mental 
instability, whether permanent or merely temporary. The 
accuracy of such interpretations depends upon a combination 
of two factors: 1) the degree of actual violation (has a 
violation really occurred?) and 2) the speaker's intention 
(does he violate the Cooperative Principle on purpose or 
not, and to what end?). Only actual, rather than apparent, 
violations of the Cooperative Principle, that are 
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unintentional on the speaker's part, qualify as valid 
evidence of a speaker's mental impairment. More 
unintentionally violates the maxim of Manner, and Father 
Smith unintentionally violates the maxim of Quantity, and 
both violations are accurately interpreted by the other 
characters in the novel, including the narrator himself, as 
evidence of More's and Smith's temporary mental impairment. 
Mr. Ives, on the other hand, violates the maxim of Quantity, 
but does so intentionally and thus proves to be merely very 
angry, not mentally ill. 
Having thus seen in these rather localized examples how 
the Cooperative Principle may be manipulated by an author to 
indicate a speaker's mental health, we are now ready to turn 
to the more general question we raised at the beginning of 
this chapter: in terms of the maxim of Quality, how 
sane/reliable is Tom More as the narrator of Love in the 
Ruins? He have already established that he genuinely 
believes in the truth of his dire pronouncements about the 
sorry state of the Western world, so the element of 
intention is present. Now all we need to establish is 
whether or not these pronouncements actually violate the 
maxim of Quality—is the world really as bad off as More 
says it is? 
As the events of the novel unfold, they reveal that 
there is, indeed, some basis for More's fears about the 
danger of imminent catastrophe. Barricaded in Howard 
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Johnson's with his two lovers, Moira and Lola, and his nurse 
Ellen Oglethorpe, he delineates his fears for the benefit of 
his three companions: Three things are possible: a 
guerrilla attack [from the Bantus living in the outlying 
swamps], a chain reaction [of Heavy Sodium deposits lying 
underneath Louisiana, brought on by the diabolical Art 
Immelman's indiscriminate distribution of More's 
lapsometer], and a political disturbance at the 
speech-making [following the Pro-Am golf tournament being 
held at Paradise Estates this weekend" (263). Before the day 
is over, each of these fears has been realized—to a degree. 
The Bantus do, indeed, carry out a guerrilla attack on 
Paradise Estates, but it comes to nothing. Or as More puts 
it, looking back on the events of this day from a vantage 
point of "Five Years Later," "their revolution was a flop; 
they got beat in the Troubles five years ago and pulled back 
to the swamp" (385). A Heavy Sodium reaction does occur, but 
it is limited to a "burning" sandtrap on the Paradise 
Estates golf course, the vapors from which produce some 
isolated fisticuffs, but no epidemic "angelism" such as More 
fears. Finally, there is a "disturbance at the 
speechmaking,11 but it has more to do with ordinary bigotry 
than with politics. Watching TV reports of the Fourth of 
July celebration from the safety of their hotel room, More 
and his three female companions hear alarming accounts of 
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increasing restiveness among the crowd that threatens to 
erupt into violence at any moment: 
A reporter is interviewing a deputy sheriff, a 
good old boy named Junior Trosclair. 
"We cain't hold these folks much longer," Junior 
is telling the reporter. 
"Hold them from doing what?" 
"They talking about marching on the federal 
complex." 
Another passerby, who is armed with an M-l rifle, elaborates 
on the deputy's statement: 
"What? Oh, we're going over there and clean them 
out." 
"Over where?" 
"Over to Fedville." 
When the reporter asks the man whom they intend to "clean 
out," the man replies: 1,1 You know, commonists, atheistic 
scientists, Jews, perverts, dope fiends, coonasses— 
(322). Such bigotry is certainly disturbing, but it does 
not, on this occasion at least, result in any "disturbance" 
organized enough to be properly called "political." 
So, Hore's predictions of widespread catastrophe are 
clearly not one hundred percent accurate. They are, however, 
just accurate enough to maintain his overall credibility. In 
terms of the maxim of Quality, all More is really guilty of 
is a predisposition for hyperbole, exacerbated by a fondness 
for alcohol. Or as Lewis Lawson sums up the case, More 
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"succeeds only in getting stumbling-down drunk and 
exaggerating the mess the world is in" (508). 
When we examine the normative dimension of More's 
verbal behavior according to the parameters of Grice's 
Cooperative Principle, we must finally conclude that, 
although he is not without his problems, More's account of 
his troubled world is generally trustworthy—if we do not 
dwell too long on particulars. Even though he shares many of 
its myriad pathologies, a fact of which he is all too aware 
("It is my misfortune—and blessing—that I suffer from both 
liberal and conservative complaints" 20), his diagnosis of 
his world's sickness is fundamentally sound. Based upon his 
extensive observations of his fellow man, More concludes 
that modern man suffers from a "new plague," 
...the modern Black Death, the current hermaphroditism 
of the spirit, namely: Hore's syndrome, or: chronic 
angelism-bestialism that rives soul from body and sots 
it orbiting the great world as the spirit of 
abstraction whence it takes the form of beasts, swans 
and bulls, werewolves, blood-suckers, Mr. Hydes, or 
just poor lonesome ghost locked in its own machinery. 
(383) 
We must look no further than the gross abstraction of the 
Love Clinic, with its vaginal computers, orgasm circuits, 
and interpersonal gynecologists, to see that he is clearly 
onto something here. More's world is, indeed, in serious 
spiritual and psychological trouble, even if not on the 
verge of a global catastrophe such as he fears. And while 
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More himself is not without his own spiritual and 
psychological problems, he is better off than the vast 
majority of the inmates who inhabit the "nuthouse" he calls 
his world. As a resident of this world, More is no saner 
than he ought to be; as its diagnostician, he is just 
insane enough. 
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LANCELOT 
Based upon his actions alone, Lancelot Andrewes Lamar 
would seem to be far and away the most deranged of all of 
Percy's protagonists. This narrator/protagonist of what is 
has been called "unquestionably Percy's darkest work" 
(Poteat, Walker Percy and... 139) suspects his wife's 
fidelity, spies on her with the most advanced electronic 
surveillance equipment to prove her infidelity, slashes the 
throat of her current lover movie director Janos Jacoby, 
then blows up his own house killing his wife and other 
members of the movie company to which she belongs. 
Disturbing behavior indeed, so disturbing, in fact, that 
"After Lancelot was published, Percy spent many hours on the 
phone reassuring Catholic friends all over the country that 
no, he hadn't become a gnostic madman, he was not critical 
of the Church, and he had not lost his faith" (Hobson 97). 
As disturbing as Lancelot's actions are in and of 
themselves, however, they are not nearly as disturbing as 
the apparent sanity of his narrative exploration of their 
significance. After finding out what Lancelot has done to 
have himself placed in a "Center for Aberrant Behavior" (a 
significantly ambiguous name), the reader expects to find 
verbal behavior in his nearly three hundred page monologue 
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that is as "crazy" as his physical behavior, but as he makes 
his way through the novel he is first puzzled, then 
unsettled, and then deeply disturbed to find no obvious 
signs of insanity in his speech. In fact, the reader finds, 
in spite of himself, that he is somewhat impressed by this 
man's sober objectivity, and is ultimately inclined to agree 
with the Center for Aberrant Behavior's decision to declare 
him "psychiatrically fit" and discharge him after a year's 
confinement. 
What is so troubling about Lancelot's apparent sanity 
is that it implies a sanctioning on Walker Percy's part of 
Lancelot's violent actions; it implies Percy's 
identification with his homicidal protagonist. Many critical 
interpretations, some positive, most negative, are founded 
on the assumption of this direct identification of the 
author with his character. Ralph Wood, who sees Lancelot. 
along with The Second Coming, as marking "a decline not only 
in Percy's literary mastery but in his theological 
discernment as well," states that the "vision of human life" 
that it presents "amounts to a moral rage that is nearly 
misanthropic" (1122). Less typical of such interpretations 
is Edward Cashin's claim that Lancelot's discovery that he 
does not have to "tolerate" this intolerable age represents 
"Percy's discovery that in his past there is an alternative 
life-style to that of the present." He even goes so far as 
to praise Lancelot/Percy's return to the past for a code of 
128 
behavior in the present, because the past, in the South at 
least, was a time "when men dared to greatness because they 
saw themselves as only a little less than the angels" (880). 
As personally biased and critically unsound as such extreme 
interpretations may be, their assumption of Percy's 
identification with Lancelot is understandable. There is 
little in Lancelot's verbal behavior to place much distance 
between himself and his creator—to disqualify himself as 
Percy's spokesman. And certainly many of Lancelot's 
criticisms of his age can be taken at face value as 
representative of Percy's own beliefs. In fact, Percy 
intentionally blurs the boundaries between himself and his 
protagonist so that the reader will find himself agreeing 
with Lancelot's basic assessment of the problem, even if he 
cannot swallow his solution to it. As with Tom More in Love 
in the Ruins the ambiguity of Lancelot's sanity ("Here Percy 
particularly enjoys asking if it is the crazy man who is 
crazy" Tharpe 102) is no technical flaw on Percy's part. 
Neither is it, however, a whole-hearted endorsement of 
murder and mayhem of the sort Lance engages in. The apparent 
absence of craziness in Lance's verbal behavior is a 
carefully calculated means to an end. Lance's verbal 
behavior appears just sane enough to force the reader to 
look around himself and admit, uneasily, that he is on to 
something. But, to the careful reader at least, it exhibits 
just enough evidence of mental impairment to disqualify his 
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extreme behavior (i.e. murder and a planned Third 
Revolution) as a viable alternative to the current state of 
the Western world, sorry though it may be. Or as Tharpe sums 
up Percy's (and the reader's) sense of identification with 
this character: "Percy does not reject Lancelot. He writes 
Lancelot's tirade. He rejects Lancelot's plan" (102). A 
brief examination of the normative mode of Lance's verbal 
behavior, with the aid of the Cooperative Principle, will 
help to distinguish precisely where Percy draws the line 
between acceptance and rejection of his protagonist. 
As with our investigation of Tom More's verbal 
behavior, a good place to start here is the maxim of 
Quality, because Lance has some very clearly stated opinions 
concerning the "moral wasteland" (Tharpe 88) in which he 
lives. And he most definitely believes in the accuracy of 
his opinions. He is willing, after all, to commit murder on 
the basis of their accuracy. So, we should look at some of 
his statements concerning the world around him, and then 
examine this world for evidence to support his claims. 
When we hear Lance's diagnoses of his world's 
condition, we are reminded of many of Tom Hore's statements 
concerning the ill health of his world; both characters are 
millenialists at heart who believe that the Western world 
has come to the end of its line—is played out, used up, 
morally and spiritually bankrupt. Both believe that, as a 
result of the sorry state of the world, some sort of global 
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catastrophe is imminent. Lance sums up his vision of the 
Last Days in a general theory of human history, which he 
outlines for his priest/friend auditor Percival: 
You're curious. I see I haven't told you my sexual 
theory of history? You smile. No, I'm serious. It 
applies both to the individual and mankind. 
First there was a Romantic Period when one "fell 
in love." 
Next follows a sexual period such as we live in 
now where men and women cohabit as indiscriminately as 
in a baboon colony—or in a soap opera. 
Next follows catastrophe of some sort. I can feel 
it in my bones. Perhaps it has already happened. Has 
it? Have you noticed anything unusual on the "outside"? 
I've noticed that the doctors and guards and attendants 
here who are supposed to be healthy—we're the sick 
ones—seem depressed, anxious, gloomy, as if something 
awful had already happened. Has it? 
Catastrophe then—yes, I am sure of it—whether it 
has happened or not; whether by war, bomb, fire, or 
just decline and fall. Most people will die or exist as 
the living dead. Everything will go back to the desert. 
(35-6) 
Like Tom More, Lance is so sure that a catastrophe is coming 
that the only question in his mind is whether or not it has 
already occurred. Much later in the novel, he zeroes in on 
the U.S.A. as the center of all the corruption and 
degradation of the festering Western world: 
Washington, the country, is down the drain. 
Everyone knows it. The people have lost it to the 
politicians, bureaucrats, drunk Congressmen, lying 
Presidents, White House preachers, C.I.A., F.B.I., 
Mafia, Pentagon, pornographers, muggers, buggers, 
bribers, bribe takers, rich crooked cowboys, sclerotic 
Southerners, rich crooked Yankees, dirty books, dirty 
movies, dirty plays, dirty talk shows, dirty soap 
operas, fags, lesbians, abortionists, Jesus shouters, 
anti-Jesus shouters, dying cities, dying schools, 
courses in how to fuck schoolchildren. (220) 
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The language here is perhaps a bit more vituperative than 
Tom More's, but Lance's diagnosis of his country's 
spiritual illness is virtually identical to More's—a 
diagnosis which proved to be pretty accurate on the whole. 
Unfortunately, we are not provided with the kind of external 
corroborating evidence that we are provided with in Love in 
the Ruins, with which we might judge the accuracy of Lance's 
sexual theory of human history, and the evaluation of modern 
Western culture that is based on it. Lance's confinement to 
a cell throughout the novel restricts the reader's 
immediate view of the world outside the cell to what he can 
see through a single narrow window. Even this tiny slice of 
Lance's outside world, however, hints at the sort of moral 
degeneracy that he feels permeates Western culture, for in 
addition to a cemetery it contains "two homosexuals holding 
hands," a coed-driven Volkswagen sporting a bumper sticker 
that reads "IF IT FEELS GOOD DO IT," and an adult cinema 
that plays such pictures as "The 69ers" and "Deep Throat." 
While these items are, indeed, in keeping with Lance's 
theory of human history, they are not sufficient by 
themselves to either prove or disprove such a theory. And 
even though we the readers recognize much of what he says as 
an accurate description of our own world outside the novel, 
we must resist the temptation to use this sense of 
recognition as the basis for a judgement of the accuracy of 
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his description of the fictional world inside the novel. We 
must confine our search for evidence of the accuracy of his 
evaluation of modern culture to the representative sampling 
of this culture assembled at Belle Isle exactly one year 
before the time of his narration of the violent events that 
took place there. 
The common thread running throughout Lance's narration 
of the myriad ills of the modern world is a pervasive sense 
of this world's moral degeneracy. As Lance explains to 
Percival: 
What I can't stand is the way things are now. 
Furthermore, I will not stand for it. 
Stand for what, you ask? Well, for that, to give 
an insignificant example. What you're looking at. You 
see the movie poster across the street? The 69ers? Man 
and woman yin-yanged, fellatioed, cunnilinged on the 
corner of Felicity and Annunciation Streets? What would 
I do about it? Quite simply it would be removed. (155) 
The sturdy moral fiber that made this country great has 
slowly but surely eroded to the the point where its complete 
dissolution is inevitable. The movie poster is a symbol for 
this erosion, pornography being as it is the "gospel" for a 
world in which the "secret of life is violence and rape" 
(224). When we look at the cross section of humanity 
assembled at Belle Isle—Margot and Lucy (Lance's wife and 
daughter); Bob Merlin and Janos Jacoby (Hollywood movie 
directors); and Troy Dana and Raine Robinette (movie stars), 
we have little reason to wonder how Lance has arrived at 
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some of his conclusions. At the time described in Lance's 
narration, Margot was just ending a lengthy affair with 
Merlin (out of which was born Siobhan, the daughter that 
Lance thought was his own), and beginning an affair with 
Janos Jacoby. Lucy, Lance's daughter from his previous 
marriage, had become starstruck with Dana and Raine and 
entered into a menage a trots affair with them. Lance, who 
had kept himself heavily sedated with alcohol for the last 
several years, sobered up at the accidental discovery of 
Siobhan's true parentage, and set out on his quest for the 
"Unholy Grail" (138). These events, soap opera-like as they 
are, epitomize the sort of moral degeneracy that Lance sees 
as pervasive in modern society, and whether or not they are 
truly representative of modern society at large, they are 
sufficiently degenerate to warrant a certain amount of moral 
outrage on his part. Regardless of how accurate is his 
inductive application of this outrage to modern society as a 
whole, his interpretation of these events as indicative of 
moral decay is clearly accurate enough to satisfy the maxim 
of Quality (submaxim B: Do not say that for which you lack 
adequate evidence). 
Accompanying this decay of moral fiber is, as we have 
seen throughout Percy's work, a devaluation of language—a 
linguistic relativism to match the moral one. Rampant among 
these fashionable people is an empty language the likes of 
which it is difficult to find in any other Percy novel. 
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Various characters in all of Percy's novels engage in banal 
conversation, but so completely vacuous is the talk of 
Margot and company that the speakers themselves cannot bear 
to pay attention to the meaningless drivel that streams from 
their mouths. Raine, for instance, is involved in a 
California cult called Ideo-Personal-Dynamics, which is 
"more scientific than astrology, being based not merely on 
the influence of the stars but on evidence of magnetic 
fields surrounding people." She explains to Lance the 
national, even global possibilities of I.P.D., as she calls 
it: 
"Don't you see the possibilities?" 
"Possibilities?" 
"For the future, for mankind, for preventing 
wars." 
"How's that?" 
"Everyone could have his ideogram, which is a 
scientific reading of his magnetic field. Some 
ideograms are clearly stronger than others or 
incompatible with others. If the President of the 
United States has a weak ideogram, it would be stupid 
to send him to a summit meeting. It's the ultimate 
weapon against Communism." (111-12) 
This is the same sort of immanence-parading-as-transcendence 
that we observed in The Moviegoer, but here it is so 
exremely banal that Raine herself does not pay attention to 
what she is saying: "The trouble was that even when she was 
on this, her favorite subject, her voice went flat and 
trailed off. Her eyes were steady but unfocused. I had the 
feeling that she wasn't listening to herself" (113). Lance 
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has the same feeling when listening to other members of the 
movie company, even his own wife Margot, speak pseudo-
transcendently of cinema—"*cinematographic language,' *the 
semiotics of film,' ^Griffith as the master of denotative 
language,' xMetz as the only critic who understands the 
connotative film;' and so forth" (110-11). Janos Jacoby 
drones on about such things "with a slight gap of 
inattention even to himself as if he weren't listening to 
his voice" (166). Margot explains to Lance her decision to 
go to England to play Nora in A Doll's House ("there are 
other me's. One grows"), but even in the midst of this 
momentous revelation, "She was not too attentive" (207). As 
prone as these actors are to banal conversation, they are 
not the only inhabitants of Belle Isle who find it difficult 
to listen to themselves. Tex Reilly, Lance's father-in-law 
who "made a million dollars in mud" and then "moved to New 
Orleans to make still more in offshore rigs" (71), warns 
Lance, as he has done on numerous occasions before, about 
the necessity of cementing in an old gas well under Belle 
Isle, but there is no urgency in his warning—to him it is 
just noise: "On he went, poking me like poking Siobhan, 
poking and not listening, not even listening to himself" 
(54). 
The inhabitants of Belle Isle are truly hollow men. 
Like Raine, their "depths were vacant" (111). Their verbal 
behavior, of course, reflects this vacancy, and leads Lance 
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to another inductive conclusion about the modern world, or 
more specifically about language in the modern world: "To 
make conversation in the old tongue, the old worn-out 
language. It can't be done" (85). Lance is not the first of 
Percy's protagonists to come to the conclusion that language 
is worn out, but he has perhaps the most impressive body of 
evidence to date upon which to base this conclusion. So worn 
out, and consequently relativistic, is the language of his 
world that the normative dimension of verbal behavior here 
is virtually non-existent. A bit of table talk will 
illustrate: 
One night at supper during a lull in conversation 
Lucy, my daughter, who had said little or nothing and, 
feeling the accumulating necessity of saying something 
suitable, saw her chance and piped up, frowning and 
ducking her dark brown head and saying it seriously: 
"It just occurred to me last night: here I am an adult 
human being, a person, and I have never seen my own 
cervix." (182) 
Common sense tells us that Lucy's remark is ridiculous, and 
the Cooperative Principle tells us that it is ridiculous 
because it flagrantly violates the maxim of Relation: "Be 
relevant." Under normal circumstances, in a world that still 
recognized the normative dimension of verbal behavior, 
Lucy's violation of the Cooperative Principle would be 
viewed as inappropriate behavior and thus a cause for 
embarrassment. Indeed Lance, who still recognizes the 
normative dimension of language, sees the remark as 
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inappropriate, and feels a great deal of embarrassment for 
his daughter: "There was a silence. I found myself worrying 
more about her worrying about her halting conversational 
entry than about her not seeing her cervix." 
His worry is groundless, however, for in a world 
without a normative dimension it is impossible to say 
anything abnormal. or inappropriate, as both Lucy and Lance 
discover: 
But Raine and Dana nodded thoughtfully and even, I 
could see, with a certain courtesy and kindliness as if 
to encourage her timid foray into their lively talk. 
Raine put her arm around Lucy, gave her a hug, and said 
to me: 
"Think of it! A mature woman who has never even 
seen her own cervix!" 
I thought about it. (182) 
Once again, the behavior of a few shallow, amoral people at 
Belle Isle might not be sufficient grounds for drawing a 
conclusion about the behavior of society as a whole. But 
based upon the evidence that he, and consequently we, have 
at hand, his conclusion that these people's verbal behavior 
is as empty and meaningless as their sexual behavior, that 
any sort of normative structure governing either language or 
sex is virtually non-existent, is the only logical 
conclusion that he can draw. After looking at, and listening 
to, the world in which he has lived, we find ourselves 
completely convinced of the truth of what he says about it. 
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Regarding the inhabitants of Belle Isle, at least, he in no 
way violates the maxim of Quality. 
Moreover, in the very last pages of the novel we find 
evidence that even Lance's more generalized conclusions 
about modern society are accurate. This evidence comes in 
the form of a single word, but this word is sufficient to 
provide independent verification of Lance's assertion that 
the modern world is in a bad way. After remaining silent 
throughout the entire novel, Lance's auditor/friend finally 
pipes up in response to a series of Lance's questions about 
the significance of what he has been saying throughout the 
past week. After the two agree on the need for a "new 
beginning" of some sort, and that Lance's and Percival's 
plans for such a beginning are the only viable, though 
mutually exclusive, options, Lance concludes: 
All we can agree on is that it will not be their 
way. Out there. 
Yes. (257) 
Percival, whose sanity we have no reason to doubt, agrees 
with Lance that "their way," whatever that way may be, is 
unacceptable. Lance finds the age in which he lives 
intolerable, and so does Percival. 
So, as far as the maxim of Quality is concerned, 
Lance's verbal behavior complies with the Cooperative 
Principle. Based upon this maxim alone, we have no choice 
but to reluctantly declare him "sane," as do the 
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psychiatrists at the Center for Aberrant Behavior. 
Undeniably, he has murdered his wife and several other 
people, and is planning a "Third Revolution" which will 
produce a "new order" based, not "on Catholicism or 
Communism or fascism or liberalism or capitalism or any ism 
at all, but simply on that stern rectitude valued by the new 
breed and marked by the violence which will attend its 
breach" (157-8). The apocalyptic nature of his plans is 
evident in his prophecy concerning the immediate future: 
This country is going to turn into a desert and it 
won't be a bad thing. Thirst and hunger are better than 
jungle rot. We will begin in the Wilderness where Lee 
lost. Deserts are clean places. Corpses turn quickly 
into simple pure chemicals. (158) 
Not content to let this process take its natural course, 
Lance intends to help it along: "We shall not wait for it to 
fester and rot any longer. We will kill it" (160). As 
disturbing as these plans for the future sound to us, based 
solely upon what we have seen so far we cannot simply 
dismiss them as the ravings of a lunatic, which is what 
accounts in large part for the unsettling effect of the 
novel. Percy wants us, in spite of everything our moral and 
ethical sensibilities tell us is right, to identify with 
this sociopathic killer. As abhorrent as his solution to 
the problem strikes us, we are forced to conclude that he 
does have a good grasp of the problem itself. 
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Beyond this point, however, Percy withdraws from his 
protagonist, taking the perceptive reader with him. While 
Lance is sane enough to accurately perceive and describe a 
serious problem in modern culture, he exhibits in his verbal 
behavior sufficient mental impairment to disqualify his 
proposed remedy to the problem as being in any way 
representative of Percy's own beliefs. The signs of this 
mental impairment come in the form of subtle, but 
detectable, violations of the maxims of Quantity and 
Manner. 
Given Percy's Catholicism, it is difficult not to view 
Lance's long narration to his priest/friend Percival as 
confessional in nature. Indeed, the entire novel can be 
viewed as one long confession (Hobson 93, Tharpe 88). By its 
very definition, a confession of this kind would be expected 
to include, in addition to the more quotidian transgressions 
such as swearing or coveting a neighbor's possessions, an 
account of those actions which the Church considers to be 
the most gravely sinful in nature. Certainly murder ranks 
rather highly on that list. Thus, in Lance's confession we 
should expect to hear a detailed account of his homicidal 
actions of that night a year ago. Indeed, Lance gives every 
indication that such an account is forthcoming. He tells 
Percival: "I've discovered that I can talk to you and get 
closer to it, the secret I know yet don't know. So I'll 
start behind it and work up to it, or I'll start ahead of it 
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and work back" (62), and later: "I have to tell you what 
happened in my own way—so I can know what happened. I won't 
know for sure until 1 say it" (106). In terms of the maxim 
of Quantity (1: Make your contribution as informative as is 
required [for the current purposes of the exchange]), Lance 
must give a detailed account of the murders themselves 
because such an account is the "current purpose" of this 
particular exchange (Lance's confession). After circling 
around these events for a majority of the novel, however, 
casting backward to his first meeting with Margot, then 
forward to his planned Revolution, and so forth, he suddenly 
questions the necessity of discussing them: 
What do you mean? Do you mean what happened at 
Belle Isle? 
That's in the past. I don't see what difference it 
makes. 
You want to know what happened? 
Hm. It's hard to remember. Jesus, let me think. My 
head aches. I feel lousy. Let me lie down for a while. 
You don't look so hot either. You're pale as a ghost. 
Come back tomorrow. (160) 
And the next day: 
Christ, what were we talking about? Oh yes, 
Percival, you wanted to know what happened? Jesus, what 
difference does it make? It is the future that matters. 
Yes, you're right. I did say there was something that 
still bothered me. What? Sin? The uncertainty that 
there is such a thing? I don't remember. Anyhow, it 
doesn't seem very interesting. (163) 
After nearly two hundred pages worth of preface, Lance 
decides that the main event is not worth the trouble of 
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telling. Percival pushes him onward, however, but when Lance 
gets to the actual killing he once again evades it: 
The rest of it? What? Oh. Yes. Well, I'll be 
brief. Do you mind if I summarize? There is no pleasure 
in dwelling on it. Anyway it happened almost as an 
afterthought. The whole business took no more than 
fifteen minutes. (236) 
The "whole business" to which he refers involved the deaths 
of at least four people, yet he dispenses of it with a mere 
summary of highlights, thus failing to provide all the 
information that is required of him in this exchange and 
violating the maxim of Quantity. And, since he has 
absolutely nothing to gain from intentionally annoying 
Percival, the one person he feels he can talk to, we can 
assume that the violation is unintentional. 
Unintentional violations of the Cooperative Principle 
being, as they are, signs of "some temporary or permanent 
perceptual limitation such as psychological trauma, 
obsession, insanity, or delirium" (Pratt 182), Lance here 
displays a definite chink in his verbal/psychological armor. 
It takes no great psychologist to see that he is clearly 
repressing these violent events, about which his conscience 
is much less at rest than he lets on. This violation of the 
Cooperative Principle, subtle though it may be, and the 
repression that it indicates, place some important distance 
between Percy and his protagonist. 
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An even greater distance is placed between Percy and 
Lancelot by Lancelot's recurrent violation of the maxim of 
Manner. In Love in the Ruins. Tom More's violations of the 
maxim of Manner (e.g. "Eins upon a oncy") were amusing, and 
evidenced a mild, more or less harmless dislocation on the 
speaker's part. In Lancelot. such violations are much less 
amusing and indicate a much deeper disturbance. In several 
instances throughout the novel, Lance violates the maxim of 
Manner (sub-maxim D: Be orderly) with an inconsistency of 
tone, oscillating between cold objectivity and violent, 
emotional subjectivity, that indicates a fundamental split 
in his psyche. It is this split that finally allows us to 
see that, while Percy "does not reject Lancelot" (Tharpe 
102), neither does he condone his past actions or future 
plans. 
Throughout the greater part of his narrative Lance 
exhibits a detached, totally unemotional objectivity that is 
quite shocking considering the extremely personal and 
gruesomely violent nature of the story he tells. Time and 
again we are amazed at the apparent emotional distance 
between Lance and the events he describes. Early in the 
novel he tries to explain to Percival his feelings upon 
discovering his wife's infidelity: 
First, you must understand that the usual emotions 
which one might consider appropriate—shock, anger, 
shame—do not apply. True, there is a kind of dread at 
the discovery but there is also a curious sense of 
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expectancy, a secret sweetness at the core of the 
dread. (41) 
We are doubly appalled here, first by the distance from 
which Lance is able to view his own emotions, and second by 
the nature of the emotions he views from this distance, or, 
more accurately, by their non-existence. The same tone 
prevails when Lance describes the actual act of adultery 
that led him to murder: 
But why? Why did it become the most important, the 
sole obsession of my very life, to determine whether or 
not Margot slept with Merlin when in fact I knew she 
had, or at least with somebody not me? You tell me, you 
being the doctor scientist and soul expert as well, 
merchant of guilt and getting rid of it and sorting out 
sins yet knowing as well as I that it, her fornication, 
anybody's fornication, amounts to no more than 
molecules encountering molecules and little bursts of 
electrons along tiny nerves—no different in kind from 
that housefly scrubbing his wings under my hair. (89) 
Not only is he capable of viewing the act of sexual 
intercourse itself with the detached objectivity of a 
scientist ("molecules encountering molecules and little 
bursts of electrons along tiny nerves"), but he observes 
violence which ensues from this act from a posture of 
objectivity as well: 
It is because the past, any past, is intolerable, not 
because it is violent or terrible or any such thing, 
but just because it is so goddamn banal and feckless 
and useless. And violence is the most banal and boring 
of all. It is horrible not because it is bloody but 
because it is meaningless. It does not signify. (105) 
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Lance acknowledges here that violence in general is 
"horrible,11 but only because it is so "meaningless" as to 
be actually "banal and boring." Like sexual intercourse, a 
violent act such as his slashing Jacoby's throat involves 
nothing more significant than an encounter of molecules with 
molecules: "All it came down to was steel molecules entering 
skin molecules, artery molecules, blood cells" (254). 
Given such a molecular view of human experience, it is 
no wonder that, as he finally admits to Percival, Lance 
feels "a certain coldness" in his life. From his objective 
perspective of the world, a plan to use motion-activated 
video cameras to prove beyond a shadow of a doubt his wife's 
infidelity is described by him as an attempt to discover 
precisely "Who moved, toward whom, with whom" (145). Lance's 
cold objectivity reigns even at the moment of the bloodiest 
event described in the novel—Jacoby's murder. With a 
hurricane raging outside the walls of Belle Isle, Lance 
discovers, in the flickering illumination of almost constant 
lightning, Margot and Jacoby engaged in sexual intercourse. 
Summoning the strength that made him a great college 
football player, Lance wraps his arms around the intertwined 
pair and begins to squeeze the life out of them. Rather than 
cursing them, however, or weeping in agony over this direct 
confrontation with his wife's infidelity, Lance's thoughts 
and words at this moment exhibit the same tone of 
objectivity as the majority of his narrative: 
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It is possible that I said something aloud. I 
said: "How strange it is that there are no longer any 
great historical events." In fact, that was what I was 
musing over, that it seemed of no great moment whether 
I squeezed them or did not squeeze them. 
"How strange it is that there are no longer any 
great historical events," I said. 
At any rate, it is certain that after a while 
Janos gasped, "You're not killing me, you're killing 
her." 
"That's true," I said and let go. (240) 
From start to finish, then, whether he is discussing the 
most trivial or the most momentous events, the prevailing 
tone of Lance's narrative remains one of cold objectivity. 
Were this tone completely uniform, unrelieved by any 
traces whatsoever of emotion, we might simply say that Lance 
has a flawed sense of his placement vis-a-vis the world 
(Postulate 1.523), seeing himself as a transcendent being 
orbiting life on earth rather than as an immanent being 
residing within it. Such an assertion might provide grounds 
for establishing a spiritual problem in Lance's life, but it 
would provide no grounds, one way or another, for making an 
assessment of his psychological condition. Nor would it help 
to explain the shockingly violent actions, immanent in their 
retributive nature, that this transcendent being engaged in 
at Belle Isle a year ago. 
The tone of Lance's narrative is not uniformly 
objective and unemotional, however, but on several 
occasions, particularly toward the end of the novel, 
actually erupts into quite violent emotion, conveyed in a 
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language laced with profanity and dripping with anger and 
sarcasm. While explaining to Percival that the Catholic 
Church provides no alternative to the intolerable modern 
age because it has become just another "part of the age," he 
suddenly unleashes a surprising burst of violent language: 
I'll take war rather than what this age calls love. 
Which is a better world, this cocksucking cuntlapping 
assholelicking fornicating Happyland U.S.A., or a Roman 
legion under Marcus Aurelius Antoninus? Which is worse, 
to die with T.J. Jackson at Chancellorsville or live 
with Johnny Carson in Burbank? (157-8) 
A short time later he accuses Percival's God of playing a 
dirty, irremediable trick on innocent and unsuspecting 
teenagers, and the Church of not being equipped to handle 
the consequences of this trick: 
One discovers there is a little secret that God didn't 
let us in on. One discovers your Christ never did tell 
us about it. Yet God himself so arranged it that you 
wake up one fine morning with a great thundering 
hard-on and wanting nothing more in life than a sweet 
hot cunt to put it in, drive some girl, any girl, into 
the ground, and where is the innocence of that? Is that 
part of the innocence? If so, he should have said so. 
From child to assailant through no doing of one's 
own—is that God's plan for us? Damn you and your God. 
Between the two of you, you should have got it straight 
and had it one way or the other. Either it's good or 
it's bad, but whichever it is, goddamn say so. Only you 
don't. You fuck off somewhere in between. You want to 
have it both ways: good, but—bad only if—and so 
forth. Well, you fucked up good and proper, fucked us 
all up, for sure fucked me up. (176) 
The Church's inability to address this problem in any 
meaningful way has been in large part responsible for the 
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current moral wasteland and sexual inferno that America has 
become: 
I won't have it your way and I won't have it their way, 
the new way. A generation stoned and pussy free and 
devalued, pricks after pussy, pricks after pricks, 
pussy after pussy. But most of all pussy after pricks. 
Christ what a country! A nation of 100 million 
voracious cunts. I will not have my son or daughter 
grow up in such a world. (177) 
The coupling of violence and sex in these emotional 
outbursts is completely in keeping with his discovery of 
"the monstrous truth lying at the very center of life:" 
Ah, sweet mystery of life indeed, indeed yes, 
exactly, yes indeed that is what it is: to be rammed, 
jammed, stuck, stabbed, pinned, impaled, run through, 
in a word: 
Raped. (223) 
And the emotional outbursts themselves are in keeping with 
the intensely personal and violent nature of the events he 
dscribes. They are not in keeping, however, with the 
prevailing tone of the narrative as a whole. Within the 
generally homogenous tone of objectivity of Lance's 
narrative, these moments of intense subjectivity have a 
markedly different texture, giving the narration as a whole 
a somewhat lumpy quality. This lumpiness can be explained in 
terms of the Cooperative Principle as a violation of the 
maxim of Manner (sub-maxim D: Be orderly). Within the 
unemotional framework that surrounds them, these emotional 
displays are distinctly disorderly conduct, and thus violate 
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the maxim of Manner. Furthermore, these violations of the 
maxim of Manner are clearly unintentional, because Lance so 
consistently tries to come across to Percival as a sober, 
rational, totally objective observer of life (e.g. "Yet it 
dawned on me that suddenly, the solution is as clear and 
simple as an arithmetic problem. As a matter of fact, that 
is what it is: a matter of logic as simple as two plus two" 
255). Therefore, we can interpret his verbal behavior as 
indicative of some sort of impairment of his mental 
faculties. 
Within Lance's narration, then, we can hear two 
distinct voices—an objective one and a subjective one, what 
Oliver has called the equivocal and the univocal voices (8). 
Now the mere presence of these two voices within a single 
narrative, or within a single psyche, is not intrinsically 
abnormal. The spontaneous, involuntary intrusion of one 
voice into the other is, however, and indicates an 
unsuccessful attempt on the speaker's part to suppress a 
seething roiling mass of emotions that lurks just below the 
level of full consciousness. This internecine struggle, of 
course, manifests itelf in Lance's violation of the maxim of 
Manner which, along with his violation of the maxim of 
Quantity, invalidates much, but not all, of what he says. 
So, even though the Center for Aberrant Behavior may find 
Lance "psychiatrically fit and legally innocent" (249), we 
have enough evidence to conclude that there is some definite 
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mental impairment there—enough, at least, to disqualify him 
as Percy's unconditional spokesman. We can conclude, along 
with Tharpe, that "Percy does not reject Lancelot....He 
rejects Lancelot's plan" (102). Percy is one hundred percent 
behind Lancelot in the criticisms that he levels at the age 
in which he lives, but he in no way supports his proposed 
solution to the myriad problems of his age. His support, of 
course, goes behind the Christian solution represented by 
Percival. Lance has told his auditor, "There is no other way 
than yours or mine, true?" to which Percival responds simply 
"Yes." The reader clearly sees the unacceptability of 
Lance's plan, and Lance himself senses a flaw in all of his 
logic ("But there is one thing...There is a coldness...You 
know the feeling of numbness and coldness, no, not a 
feeling, but a lack of feeling, that I spoke of during the 
events at Belle Isle" 253). So our attention, along with 
Lance's, shifts to Percival in order to hear his solution to 
the age's problems: 
Very well. I've finished. Is there anything you 
wish to tell me before you leave? 
Yes. (257) 
Even though we can infer, based upon the theological bases 
of Percy's other novels, the general drift of what Percival 
wishes to tell Lance, and we can assume, based upon Lance's 
stated willingness to listen to Percival, that he will 
attend to what he has to say, we are not actually allowed to 
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hear Percival's message to Lance. As in his other novels, 
Percy stops just short of including the Christian message 
within the actual text of Lancelot because of his abiding 
mistrust of language, in its present "worn-out" form, to 
adequately convey concepts as profound and timeless as those 
at the heart of Christianity. 
A quasi-romantic subplot in the novel specifically 
focuses on this worn out-ness of language, and shows Percy 
groping to find some way of freshening it up. In the room 
next door to Lance's cell is a woman named Anna who "was 
gang-raped by some sailors in the Quarter, forced to commit 
unnatural acts many times, then beaten up and thrown onto 
the batture" (12). Even though he has never seen Anna, and 
hears that she refuses to speak to anyone, Lance believes he 
is "falling in love" with her, and even plans to make her a 
part of his Third Revolution. As a "survivor of the 
catastrophe and the death of old worlds" (37) whose 
"defilement restores her to a kind of innocence" (12), 
Lance sees her as a possible "prototype of the New Woman" 
for the new order that will follow his Revolution. Because 
of her potential importance to the Revolution, Lance feels 
he must find some way of communicating with her, despite her 
refusal to talk. So, he tries tapping on the wall. At first, 
she ignores him, but eventually begins to respond by 
mimicking his knocking patterns: "She just repeats the one 
knock, two knocks" (84). Lance is encouraged that this is a 
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"communication of sorts," but he realizes that this type of 
simple repetition can only get them so far: "She has not yet 
caught on that we might invent a new language" (84). Using 
such rudimentary exchanges as taps on a wall, the two of 
them might come up with a fresh new way of conversing that 
will replace "the old tongue, the old worn-out language" 
(85). Then a man and a woman might have a simple, 
unambiguous relationship such as is currently impossible. A 
man would be able "to come close but keep a little distance 
between us, to ask the simplest questions in a new 
language—How are vou—just to hear the sound of her voice, 
to touch the tips of her fingers" (86). 
When Lance finally abandons his wall-tapping and 
initiates actual verbal communication with Anna, his 
description of the way she uses language closely resembles 
his description of the new, simplified, unambiguous language 
he seeks to establish: 
I went to see Anna this morning. We spoke. She sat 
in a chair. She's going to be all right. She speaks 
slowly and in a monotone, choosing her words carefully 
like someone recovering from a stroke. (218) 
Whatever potential her verbal behavior shows for being a 
model for Lance's new language, however, goes unrealized 
within the scope of this novel. Not long after this first 
conversation, Lance manages to offend Anna, presumably in 
the old language, by telling her his theory that because she 
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has suffered, and survived, "the worst violation a woman can 
suffer, rape at the hands of several men, forced fellatio, 
and so on," she qualifies to be his "new Eve" (251). Not 
surprisingly, Lance's theory does not go over very well 
with Anna: 
"Are you suggesting," she said to me, "that I, myself, 
me, my person, can be violated by a man? You goddamn 
men. Don't you know that there are more important 
things in this world" Next you'll be telling me that 
despite myself I liked it." (251) 
Even though Lance finds out from Percival that Anna has put 
Lance's remarks behind her and still plans to join him in 
Virginia where she and he and Siobhan will "begin a new 
life," nothing more is said about the new language which 
will attend this new life. 
Percy is clearly searching here for a new language 
capable of expressing the currently inexpressible. He is 
perhaps tired of reaching a point in each of his novels 
beyond which, as he says in The Moviegoer. "It is impossible 
to say." And even though he does not quite find what he is 
looking for in Lancelot. he is at least one step closer to 
it than he was in his previous novels. It will take only one 
more novel, The Second Coming, for him to find the new 
language he is looking for, and the speaker of that 
language, Allison Hunnicutt Huger, will appropriately be a 
patient just like Anna, and Lancelot, and Tom More. 
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Love in the Ruins demonstrates Percy's growing 
awareness of the normative dimension of language, 
particularly in relation to a speaker's apparent sanity or 
insanity. Tom More certainly has his problems in this area, 
and Percy uses his occasional forays to the outer reaches of 
the normative dimension of language to mark the depth and 
scope of his problems, which do not finally prove serious 
enough to disqualify his observations of the world around 
him as worthy of our attention. Like his verbal behavior, 
More's overt physical behavior, though quirky, is more or 
less harmless to the people around him. So, in Love in the 
Ruins we have an amusing story about a man who speaks and 
acts a little funny, but who points out even funnier things 
about the world around him, that make us wince a bit with 
their familiarity to us, even while we laugh at them. 
Our winces turn to shudders in Lancelot. however, as 
Percy approaches his subject from an entirely different 
angle. The protagonist's overt physical behavior is far more 
"insane" in appearance, and harmful to the people around 
him, than is More's, but his verbal behavior appears 
disturbingly sane. And even though we can finally 
distinguish normative deviations in his verbal behavior, 
there is nothing at all funny about them. What Percy has 
done in these two novels is to create two distinct 
portraits, one shaded a little more darkly than the other, 
of the same world, which is in fact morally and spiritually 
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bankrupt, just as the narrator/protagonists of these two 
novels describe them to be. Both narrator/protagonists view 
this world from a stance of alienation, and both seek to 
remedy this alienation, one through healing and one through 
killing. Neither is successful. The protagonists of Percy's 
next novel are similarly alienated, but as The Second 
Coming, which Percy has called "the first unalienated novel 
since War and Peace" (Lawson and Kramer 235), unfolds, Will 
Barrett and Allison Huger together achieve an integration 
that has eluded every Percy protagonist up to this point. 
And it is Percy's awareness of the normative dimension of 
language that makes this integration possible. 
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CHAPTER IV 
"THE FIRST EDENIC WORLD OF THE SIGN USER": 
THE SECOND COMING 
Even though he would go on to write one more novel 
after it, The Second Coming reads like it could, or perhaps 
should, be Percy's last novel. Tharpe, writing about The 
Second Coming long before the publication of Percy's final 
novel The Thanatos Syndrome, speculated that Will Barrett's 
"beautiful, simple words" on the last page "end the novel 
and what may be Percy's work" (120). Even knowing of the 
existence of The Thanatos Syndrome it is difficult for us 
not to feel a sense of completion in the work—a tying up of 
ends that have been hanging loose since The Moviegoer. Like 
Allen, we "experience a sense of closure at the end of The 
Second Coming, a feeling of the rounding off of an 
imaginative world" (xii). Regarding the precise nature of 
the loose ends tied up in it, Pearson has called the novel 
"the philosophical love story toward which the first four 
novels were building" (91), and Tharpe has similarly 
commented that it "brings to a conclusion in unity the 
puzzling matter of love that Percy began to study implicitly 
in his first novel" (107). 
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Comments such as these indicate the undeniable 
importance of The Second Coming within the overall canon of 
Percy's fiction, but as a work of art the novel is not 
without its flaws. Many critics have rather justly faulted 
Percy for the way he handles the May-September love affair 
between Allie Huger and Will Barrett. Ralph Wood, for 
instance, sees the novel as marred by an "unfortunate 
romanticism" (1126), and criticizes Percy for exhibiting "a 
romantic hopefulness almost sloppily sentimental" (1122). 
While other critics, such as Hobson and Pearson, do not 
share Wood's negative opinion of this aspect of the novel, 
and even go so far as to single out for praise the 
"refreshing lack of sentimentality in the love scenes" 
(Hobson, "A Sign..." 56), all but the most sentimental 
readers have a hard time not being irritated by some of the 
more mawkish details of the relationship—the eyebrow 
smoothing and blackhead squeezing and such. This tendency of 
Percy's to lapse into excessive sentimentality in his 
treatment of Allie's and Will's romance, in addition to 
being merely irritating, actually somewhat undermines an 
otherwise completely satisfying resolution to the semiotic 
theme of the novel. In some of the most semiotically 
important scenes Allie's and Will's dialogue begins to 
sound like that of any other newly-in-love couple, rather 
than the fresh new language that makes their relationship 
possible in the first place. Another annoying aspect of the 
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novel is the rather obtrusive manner in which Percy injects 
his philosophical concerns into the story line. Always a 
little inclined to prosiness, Percy here gets his more 
abstract notions into the novel through "the hero's long 
interior monologues, which slow down the action" (Hobson, 
Understanding... 109). 
A testimony to the novel's overall strength is the fact 
that, despite these flaws in its parts, the novel as a whole 
has generally received favorable critical response. Pearson 
sees The Second Coming as "one of Percy's most powerful and 
affirmative metaphors for the nature of love" (99), and 
Kennedy calls it "arguably Percy's best" (104). The single 
most important factor in allowing the novel to rise above 
its amply evident flaws is the sense of closure mentioned 
earlier. For the first time in his career, Percy is able to 
actually resolve the major conflicts of a novel within the 
covers of the book itself. In each of his novels, Percy has 
examined some of the major problems confronting man in the 
modern world: alienation, moral and spiritual bankruptcy, 
the devaluation of language that accompanies this 
bankruptcy, and the ambiguous nature of" sanity" in a world 
plagued by such problems. The protagonists respond to these 
problems, usually ineffectually, and end up poised on the 
brink of some sort of resolution, but not actually in 
possession of it. We the readers then find ourselves as 
frustrated Moseses on Binx's and Will's and Tom's and 
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Lance's Mt. Pisgah, overlooking a Promised Land we never 
reach. This irresolution, annoying as it may be, is not 
unintentional on Percy's part, and therefore cannot be 
considered a flaw in his work. Quite the contrary, it 
represents a courageous honesty on Percy's part—a 
commitment to portraying the world as it really is, and 
avoiding easy, inauthentic solutions to its problems. He 
would rather admit that, given the conditions that he has 
established within the world of the novel, such solutions as 
exist are inarticulable—they are "impossible to say." 
In The Second Coming. Percy finally discovers a way to 
break through this barrier of inarticulation—to carry his 
protagonist, and reader, on into the Promised Land. Hobson 
has commented on this development: 
The endings of the first four novels are deliberately 
ambiguous because Percy himself didn't know whether his 
heroes would or could come to good endings. But The 
Second Coming has an unequivocal and satisfying ending. 
("A Sign..." 56) 
Percy himself was just as pleasantly surprised as his 
critics with the "happy ending" (Lawson and Kramer 184) of 
The Second Coming: 
I really surprised myself because I'd never done it 
before. This man actually figured out what to do with 
his life. He figured out a way to live, to love, and to 
work. My novels have been criticized—maybe 
justifiably—by saying that they nearly all end 
ambiguously: you never know what happened to Binx 
Boiling; it's sort of up in the air. He makes a 
separate peace and not a very good peace; it's 
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compromised...But in this case I surprised myself and I 
was pleased that this man actually figured out that he 
could work with people, actually within the system. 
(Lawson and Kramer 234) 
Percy's surprise at finding a way for his protagonist to 
work with people actually within the system is genuine and 
significant, for it is this very issue, man's relationship 
with his fellow man and with the system at large, that has 
been so problematical to his attempts to reach a "satisfying 
ending" in his novels. Modern society is morally and 
spiritually bankrupt. Most members of this society are 
blissfully unaware of its bankruptcy, and lead lives of 
happy, though empty, integration. Percy's protagonists, 
though, are on to this bankruptcy and spend the greater part 
of their novels trying to overcome it. Unfortunately, their 
knowledge of society's bankruptcy, and of society's 
ignorance of its own bankruptcy, inevitably alienates them 
from this society. Now Percy does not advocate alienation in 
and of itself, but in his first four novels it is the price 
one must pay if he wishes to escape society's bankruptcy. In 
these novels, "Percy's characters seem whole and healthy 
exactly in proportion to their estrangement from society" 
(Fowler 17). Not surprisingly, such estrangement is often 
interpreted by society as mental illness, so Percy's most 
perceptive characters are often found in mental institutions 
or on the couches of psychoanalysts. And to complicate 
matters, the moral and spiritual bankruptcy of society is 
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accompanied by a linguistic bankruptcy, so that whatever 
small separate peace Percy may find for his protagonists 
remains inarticulable because words such as love, faith, 
marriage, etc., which represent viable alternatives to 
bankruptcy or estrangement, are so worn out with use as to 
be virtually meaningless. Given this Gordian knot of modern 
existence, then, we can appreciate the difficulty Percy had 
in bringing his novels to an honestly happy ending. We can 
also appreciate the surprise he felt at finally untying this 
knot in The Second Coming. 
The solution to this problem with which Percy has been 
dealing for four novels, when it finally did come to him, 
did not exactly come from an unexpected source. Throughout 
his career as a writer both of fiction and of philosophical 
essays, Percy's driving interest has been language, or more 
specifically, language as verbal behavior. Since all of 
Percy's reflections proceed from the assumption that 
language is synonymous with humanity (i.e. that verbal 
behavior is the one behavior that distinguishes man from all 
other creatures in the animal kingdom), it is only fitting 
that he would find the solution to the paradoxical 
predicament of modern man in language itself. Indeed, The 
Second Coming, whatever may be its secondary concerns, is 
primarily about language. It is Percy's "most densely 
semiotic narrative" (Kennedy 105), according to Percy's 
definition of semiotics as "a behavioral theory of language" 
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(Lawson and Kramer 139). In Lancelot. Lance saw the 
necessity for a "new language" as part of his final solution 
to the ills of Western Culture, but aside from a little 
wall-tapping exchanged with his neighbor Anna, nothing ever 
came of his proposal. In The Second Coming, however, Percy 
actually creates a new language of the sort hinted at by 
Lance. His vehicle for the creation of this language is 
Allison Hunnicutt Huger, yet another mental patient, but one 
whose verbal behavior is like none we have seen in Percy's, 
or any other novelist's, work. 
Allie Huger has deservedly received more critical 
attention than any other female character in Percy's 
fiction. She has been called "the most fully realized of all 
of Percy's characters" (Pearson 90), and even "a new image 
for Percy of the whole self" (Hobson 129). In addition to 
expressing such general approval for her as a character, 
most critical attention has focused on her unique verbal 
behavior. Pearson has called her "the most serious of 
Percy's talkers to date" (96); Fowler sees her verbal 
behavior as "an act of revivification" (18); and Hardy 
writes of her "strange, beautiful and disturbing 
utterances" which represent "a way of speaking that seems at 
times almost a reinvention of language" (191). Percy echoes 
such sentiments in his comments on what he was trying to 
accomplish with his creation of this unusual character: 
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It was an experiment; I wanted to see what could be 
done working on Will Barrett with a used-up 
language—and he was very much aware it was used 
up—and Allie, using schizophrenic language, which 
incidentally I took many liberties with...it's not 
clear she's schizophrenic, and she's probably not. I 
was interested in the linguistics of it, so that I was 
trying to get her to use schizophrenic speech in the 
same discovering way of metaphor as a two-year old 
child, so that she actually rediscovers language all 
over again. In a way she does that. I wanted to see 
what could be done by using pathological speech to 
recover a certain freshness, vividness, a way of 
looking at things. (Lawson and Kramer 228-9) 
As "beautiful" and "fresh" as most critics may view Allie's 
verbal behavior, the vast majority her fellow men and women 
view it as simply strange. And in a society like ours, which 
demands convention above all else—for which, as Kisor says 
of the novel's highly conventional Reverend Jack Curl, 
"trendiness is next to godliness" (Lawson and Kramer 196), 
strange behavior of any kind is interpreted as a sign of 
mental instablity. Allie is thus ruled "insane" and placed 
in a mental institution, from which she escapes before the 
novel's opening, and out of which she attempts to remain 
throughout the entire novel. 
In his previous two novels Percy has shown an 
increasing awareness of the normative dimension of verbal 
behavior, and of the relationship between this dimension and 
the perceived sanity of a given speaker. In The Second 
Coming. this somewhat inchoate awareness crystallizes into a 
highly self-conscious scheme for providing an alternative to 
the moral, spiritual, and verbal bankruptcy that has 
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troubled him from the beginning of his writing career. In 
terms of the postulates outlined in "Toward a Triadic Theory 
of Meaning," Percy uses Allie's unconventional verbal 
behavior to explore the relationship between postulate 1.54 
(normative dimension) and 1.51 ("Every sentence is uttered 
in a community. The community is a necessary and nontrivial 
parameter of triadic behavior"), or more specifically, the 
normative dimension of verbal behavior as a function of 
community. Stanley Fish has coupled the two postulates in 
his designation of a "speech act community" (994), in which 
all meaningful discourse takes place, and to whose scrutiny 
the verbal behavior of each member of this community is 
subject. A speaker, such as Tom More on an occasional basis 
and Allie on a consistent basis, whose verbal behavior falls 
outside the normative bounds of the speech act community, 
finds himself or herself rejected by this community as a 
flawed creature. As we have seen throughout Percy's work, 
however, it may very well be the speech act community itself 
that is flawed, and not the offending member. Indeed, this 
question of who is sane and who insane has been a central 
concern to Percy's previous two novels, and he asks it yet 
again in The Second Coming. What is so different, and so 
significant, about this novel, is that in it Percy actually 
answers the question. 
Percy's method for answering this vital question, and 
for solving his dilemma of inarticulability, is to place 
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Allie Huger, with her highly unconventional verbal behavior, 
in the midst of the highly conventional speech act community 
of Linwood, North Carolina, and to explore the inevitable 
clash of verbal worlds that results. The members of this 
community can be divided into two distinct groups: 
disinterested, or impartial, parties (the townspeople of 
Linwood with whom Allie "practices" speaking immediately 
after escaping from the mental hospital) and interested 
parties (Allie's parents, her psychiatrist, and Will 
Barrett). The latter group can be further subdivided into 
Will and everybody else. By confronting these divisions of 
the speech act community with Allie's flagrant violations of 
the Cooperative Principle, and marking their differing 
responses to these violations, Percy is able, not only to 
show the bankruptcy, staleness, and meaninglessness of the 
verbal behavior of the speech act community at large, as he 
has done on numerous occasions already, but for the first 
time to actually fill in the other half of the normative 
equation as well and show his readers a type of verbal 
behavior that is solvent, fresh, and meaningful. 
After escaping from the mental hospital, in which she 
was placed by her parents, Allie's first verbal encounter 
with the speech act community comes in the form of a few 
random conversations with Linwood residents shortly after 
her arrival in the town. Back in the midst of "normal" 
people after so many years away, Allie wonders whether or 
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not she can still talk, and decides to "practice" on various 
strangers passing by "her" bench ("Could one * save a place' 
on a public bench? She couldn't remember"). Her first speech 
act experiment is with a "good-natured and dumb-looking 
youth" wearing a Michigan State T-shirt. Throughout the 
course of this conversation, Allie violates a couple of the 
maxims of the Cooperative Principle, but is for the most 
part pleased and encouraged by this first attempt at 
"normal" verbal behavior: 
"Michigan State," she said. It came out not quite 
as a question and not quite as a statement. "You—?" 
This sounded more like a question. 
"Oh no. Linwood High. I play for the Wolves." 
"The Wolves. Oh yes." She noticed the banner. 
"Yes, but is that permitted?" 
"Is what permitted?" 
"The Michigan State T-shirt." 
That was a slight blunder. For a moment she had 
imagined there might be regulations preventing 
unauthorized persons from wearing university T-shirts, 
perhaps a semi-official regulatory agency. In the next 
instant she saw that this was nonsense. 
But the youth did not see anything unusual. "You 
can get them for three and a half from Goode's 
Variety." (24) 
Allie's opening half-question half-statement, "Michigan 
State," violates the maxim of Manner (sub-maxim B: Avoid 
ambiguity), and her uncompleted question, "You—?" violates 
the maxim of Quantity (1. Make your contribution as 
informative as is required). She violates the maxim of 
Quality (1. Try to make your contribution one that is true) 
in her question about the permissibility of wearing a 
167 
Michigan State T-shirt, which is based on the false 
assumption of the existence of "regulations preventing 
unauthorized persons from wearing university T-shirts." In 
each of these cases, she is aware of the violations after 
they occur, and is thus prepared to make adjustments in her 
verbal behavior based upon what she learns about language in 
these initial experiments. In this particular conversation 
she learns an important lesson about the normative dimension 
of language: 
"Are the Wolves—?" She paused. She was making two 
discoveries. One was that you didn't have to talk in 
complete sentences. People didn't seem to need more 
than a word or two to make their own sense of what you 
said. The other discovery was that she could talk as 
long as she asked questions. Making a statement was 
risky. (24-5) 
In her brief verbal exchange with this youth, Allie has 
discovered what Bach and Harnish call the Principle of 
Charity, which requires of an addressee: "Other things being 
equal, construe the speaker's remarks so as to violate as 
few maxims as possible" (168). In this particular situation, 
the Principle of Charity requires that the youth, a total 
stranger to Allie with nothing except perhaps embarrassment 
to gain from interpreting her remarks as abnormal, give 
Allie the benefit of the doubt and interpret her verbal 
behavior as complying with the Cooperative Principle. The 
Principle of Charity continues to work throughout the 
remainder of their conversation: 
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"If we win this one, we'll be state champs, 
single A," he said. 
"That's—" she said and stopped. But he didn't 
notice. He must have been waiting for somebody, for 
suddenly he was up and on his way. 
"Have a nice—11 he said, but he turned his face 
away. 
"What?" she asked in a very clear question. "Have 
a nice what?" But he was gone. (25) 
By asking him to complete his seemingly incomplete farewell, 
Allie violates the maxim of Quantity by demanding more 
information than is required for the purposes of his parting 
statement. "Have a nice—" is simply another way of saying 
"goodbye," "so long," "see you later," etc., and thus has no 
literal meaning apart from this purely formal function. 
Allie, who "took words seriously to mean more or less what 
they said" (34), tries to find such a literal meaning, 
however, and violates the Cooperative Principle, although 
the Principle of Charity, and more pressing business 
elsewhere, causes him to ignore her inappropriate question. 
The Principle of Charity is also evident in her next 
two encounters with the townspeople of Linwood. The first 
occurs as she is walking down the crowded sidewalk wondering 
how it is that all these people seem to know how to veer out 
of each other's way, just at the right moment to avoid a 
collision: "It must be a trick, an exchange of signals which 
she must learn"(32). As she is mulling over this thought, a 
woman approaches who does not veer out of her way: 
They stopped, facing each other. Oh my, she 
thought, this is it. But the woman was smiling, for all 
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the world as if she knew her. Oh my, she thought, 
perhaps she does and I am supposed to know her. (32) 
As it turns out, the woman is only a missionary of some sort 
looking for new recruits to her cause: 
The woman, still smiling, was handing her a pamphlet. 
Anxious to make up for not being able to recognize the 
woman, she began to read the pamphlet then and there. 
The first three sentences were: Are vou lonely? Do vou 
want to make a new start? Have vou ever had a personal 
encounter with our Lord and Saviour? While she was 
reading, the woman was saying something to her. Was she 
supposed to listen or read?.... 
Facing the woman, she considered the first 
sentences of the pamphlet. "Yes," she said,"there is a 
sense in which I would like to make a new start. 
However—" 
But the woman was saying something. 
"What?" 
"I said, are you alone? Do you feel lonely?" 
She considered the questions."I am alone but I do 
not feel lonely." 
"Why don't you come to a little get together we're 
having tonight? I have a feeling a person like yourself 
might get a lot out of it." 
She considered that question."I'm not sure what 
you mean by the expression *a person like 
yourself.'Does that mean you know what I am like?" 
But the woman's eyes were no longer looking 
directly at her, rather were straying past her. The 
smile was still radiant but in it she felt a pressure 
like the slight but firm pressure of a hostess's hand 
steering one along a receiving line. 
"Won't you come?" said the woman but steering her 
along with her eyes. "The address is stamped on the 
back. I promise you won't regret it." Her voice was 
still cordial, but the question did not sound like a 
question and the promise did not sound like a promise. 
(33) 
During this exchange, in spite of her best efforts to abide 
by the rules of normal verbal behavior, cooperatively 
starting to read her pamphlet the moment she gets it, then 
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struggling with the dilemma over whether to listen or read, 
Allie repeatedly violates the maxium of Quantity. A verbal 
exchange such as this, which we have all experienced at one 
time or another, customarily requires on the part of the 
listener a polite tolerance and then a brief, usually false, 
statement of intention to come to this or that meeting or to 
become more globally aware. After her own encounter with the 
woman, Allie notices this rule at work in other people's 
encounters with her: 
Later, from the bench, she observed that other 
people dealt with the woman differently. Some ignored 
her, veered around her. Others took the pamphlets 
politely and went their way. Still others stopped for a 
moment and listened (but did not read), heads down and 
nodding. (33) 
But Allie, however, for whom "questions asked were to be 
answered, printed words to be read" (33), accepts the 
woman's questions as literal questions rather than the 
purely formal, content-free utterances that they really are, 
and in attempting to answer them both gives and demands more 
information than is required of the exchange. The woman, so 
accustomed to the conventional brush off that she usually 
receives, views Allies attempt to respond to the content of 
what she says as inappropriate, and inconvenient, verbal 
behavior, and she slickly disposes of her with a squeeze of 
the hand and a glance of the eye. 
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Allie is treated with a little more courtesy in a 
verbal exchange with a Linwood policeman, in spite of making 
a couple of rather glaring violations of the Cooperative 
Principle during this exchange. Needing someone to give her 
directions to the estate she has just inherited, Allie 
decides to ask the policeman standing a short distance from 
her bench, and manages to violate the maxim of Manner with 
the first sound that comes out of her mouth: 
Drumming her fingers on her knees, she watched the 
ants carrying their little green sails toward the 
policeman. Rising suddenly, she took half a dozen steps 
and tapped him on the shoulder and in the same moment 
(this was wrong) asked him a question. He did not give 
a start but turned, his head already inclined and 
nodding as if he were prepared for her question. Many 
people must ask him questions. His eyes were darting 
around the concrete of the sidewalk. 
"What's that?" he said, putting his great hairy 
ear close to her mouth. (41) 
Sub-maxim D of the maxim of Manner (Be orderly) requires a 
speaker, when initiating a conversation, to first get the 
attention of the addressee and then begin speaking. Only the 
briefest of intervals is usually required between these two 
actions, but there must be an interval—the two actions must 
not occur simultaneously, as in Allie's case here. Her 
verbal behavior in this initial exchange is distinctly 
disorderly. The policeman, however, accustomed to having 
all sorts of people ask him all sorts of questions, and 
having nothing to gain personally by taking her verbal 
behavior amiss, prepares to address her question as if no 
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violation has occurred: "she had asked her question too soon 
and in too much of a rush. Yet before she could repeat it, 
it seemed to her that he was backtracking and listening to 
her first question again"(41). 
The policeman follows her to her bench, where she has 
her map of the area spread out, and knowingly traces out 
trails until he finds the location of her inherited estate. 
After he explains to her that the house itself burned down 
long ago and that nothing but an old greenhouse remains 
intact, Allie tells him to show her how to get there: 
"Take this trail." The watch glass glided. Then 
hesitated, then stopped like a Ouija in a white 
space."It's just the other side of the golf course." 
"How far is it from here?" 
"Three, four miles." 
"Do you mind telling me how old you are?" It would 
help if she knew whether he was forty-five or sixty-
five. But he went on nodding and didn't reply. Her 
question, she saw, was inappropriate, but he let it go. 
(42) 
Allies' query into the man's age violates the maxim of 
Relation (Be relevant). Their immediate conversation is 
about trails and greenhouses, things with which the man's 
age have nothing to do. Her quantum leap from one subject to 
the other, then, is a flagrant violation of the Cooperative 
Principle, and Allie herself sees it as "inappropriate," but 
the policeman charitably ignores the inappropriate question 
and goes on to warn her about the "hippies and bums" who 
often stay on the abandoned estate. 
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These amusing but harmless encounters with the 
disinterested people of Linwood serve two important 
functions in the semiotic theme of the novel. First, they 
illustrate what an extremely complicated, rule-ridden thing 
everyday language actually is. In "The Delta Factor" Percy 
explains how difficult it is for the average person to 
actually view language as something separate from 
himself—to "focus on the magic prism through which he sees 
everything else": 
In order to see it, one must either be a Martian, 
or, if an earthling, suffficiently detached, marooned, 
bemused, wounded, crazy one-eyed, and lucky enough to 
catch a glimpse of it. (MB 29) 
Allie's unique outsidedness provides her with the detachment 
necessary to actually see language, to focus on the magic 
prism. Through her, the reader is allowed to see that, 
despite his own faith in the natural stability of language, 
it is actually quite dynamic and relativistic, governed by a 
body of rules that are intrinsically no more universal than 
those governing any of the other games that human beings 
play. His daily round of conversational exchanges, then, is 
something like a football game, played on an enormous field 
to be sure, but controlled by regulations just as artificial 
and mutable as those in effect on the gridiron. In her few 
verbal experiments with the townspeople of Linwood, Allie 
quickly picks up on the relativism of this language game: 
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She took words seriously to mean more or less what they 
said, but other people seemed to use words as signals 
in anothier code they had agreed upon. For example, the 
woman's questions and commands were evidently not to be 
considered as questions and commands, then answered 
accordingly with a yes, no, or maybe, but were rather 
to be considered like the many signboards in the 
street, such as Try Good Gulf for Better Mileage, then 
either ignored or acted upon, but even if acted upon, 
not as an immediate consequence of what the words 
commanded one to do. 
Such a code, she reflected, may not be bad. 
Indeed, it seemed to cause people less trouble than 
words. At one time she must have known the code. It 
should not be hard to catch on to. (34) 
Allie's, and from over her shoulder our, awareness of the 
relativism of language prepares us to view the verbal 
behavior of other members of Allie's speech act community 
with a little more skepticism, and a little less reverence, 
than we might view it without this awareness. We are thus 
prepared to question, and ultimately to reject, the speech 
act community's interpretation of Allie's aberrant verbal 
behavior as inferior to its own "normal" verbal behavior. 
The second semiotic function of Allie's verbal 
encounters in downtown Linwood follows from her awareness of 
this linguistic relativism. As we have just seen in Allie's 
reflections on the success of her language experiments, she 
is quite aware of the existence of a set of rules, or a 
code, governing conversational exchanges between members of 
the speech act community, and, more importantly, knows when 
she violates one or more of the rules. The implications of 
this knowledge to our assessment of the question of 
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intention are obvious. If she realizes that she is violating 
the rules, and yet continues to violate them, then, 
according to the guidelines established by Pratt, something 
more complicated than mere insanity is going on. What is 
actually occurring is nothing less significant than the 
creation of a fresh new language to counteract the deadening 
effect of the old worn out language in which the speech act 
community at large traffics. 
Because of their impartiality regarding Allie, the 
townspeople with whom she speaks on her first day in Linwood 
extend the Principle of Charity to her unusual verbal 
behavior. Having nothing to gain by viewing her speech as 
abnormal, they give her the benefit of the doubt and 
interpret it in the most normal manner possible. The other 
segment of Allie's speech act community, that composed of 
interested parties, is not so quick to ignore her deviations 
from the norm. This group perceives her violations as 
violations, recognizes that she is, indeed, breaking the 
rules. The different reactions on the part of the members of 
this group to Allie's violations further divide it into two 
groups, namely: those who think she is crazy, and those who 
do not. The former sub-group is composed of Allie's parents 
and her psychiatrist, Dr. Duk, and the latter is composed of 
Will Barrett. A large part of the novel's plot line concerns 
the attempt of the first sub-group to get Allie back into 
the mental institution and of Will Barrett to keep her out 
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of it. Will's efforts, of course, win out in the end, but 
not without a struggle. The Hugers and Dr. Duk are 
formidable opponents, having, as they do, the bulk of the 
speech act community in their corner. 
When we first encounter Allie, she has just escaped 
from the mental hospital where she was placed, for her own 
good, by her parents. Her initial institutionalization 
resulted from abnormal physical behavior (crouching in 
closets and such) and abnormal verbal behavior. After her 
admission to the hospital, however, her prolonged 
involuntary stay there primarily resulted from her verbal 
behavior alone. Dr. Duk interprets Allie's verbal behavior 
as unintentionally aberrant, and hence crazy. Her parents 
agree with his diagnosis, and to the electroshock treatments 
he prescribes for her, and she remains hospitalized until 
finally taking matters into her own hands and escaping. 
As cruel and insensitive as we may consider Allie's 
parents for keeping her locked up in a second-rate mental 
institution, and as incompetent and unprofessional as we may 
consider Dr. Duk, we must admit that the few examples we see 
of her verbal behavior in their presence are unusual to say 
the least. In fact, her use of language around them is 
actually one continuous violation of the Cooperative 
Principle. In the note she writes to remind herself to 
escape after a session of electroshock therapy, she explains 
why the doctors think she is still sick: 
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I don't feel bad. To tell you the truth, I'm not even 
sure I'm sick. But they think I'm worse because I 
refuse to talk in group (because there is nothing to 
say) and won't eat with the others, preferring to sit 
under the table (because a circle of knees is more 
interesting than a circle of faces). (27) 
Allie's refusal to talk is a clear violation of the maxim of 
Quantity (sub-maxim 1. Hake your contribution as informative 
as is required), and the doctors interpret this violation as 
evidence that her mental condition is getting worse. Her 
silent violations in group therapy, however, are not nearly 
so impressive as the violations she commits when she 
actually speaks. During a session with Dr. Duk, in which he 
explains why she "might do with a light massage of your 
neurones. A small refresher course," she replies, "No buzzin 
cousin" (88). When he tells her simply that it will make her 
feel much better, she responds in an even more curious 
fashion: 
I feel bad? Which I? It was the lilt at the end of 
a question that let her say it, freed her up. She did 
not want to go down yet the way a statement goes down 
flat and hard, ends. Isn't there a difference between 
the outside-I, the me you see, the meow-I and the 
inside deep-I-defy? Back to the old meow-I. (89) 
Dr. Duk's nonplussed reaction to these flagrant violations 
of the maxims of Manner (submaxims A. Avoid obscurity of 
expression, and B. Avoid ambiguity) and Relation (Be 
relevant) indicates on his part, first, a familiarity with 
this sort of verbal behavior from her, and second, an 
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attempt, as her doctor, to derive from her unconventional 
question a central conventional meaning: "I'm talking to the 
deep-I or the I-defy—only I thought we had agreed it became 
the I-define. Your I as you want to define it" (89). As we 
shall see shortly, such attempts to distil from ambiguous 
speech acts such as this one a single unambiguous meaning 
are completely misguided when the speech acts are coming 
from Allie. Misguided or not, as her doctor, and as a 
representative of the conventional speech act community, Dr. 
Duk has little choice but to try to find some glimmer of 
conventionality in her highly unconventional speech. The 
session ends with a brief conversation about stars, the 
meaning of which he believes he understands completely, but 
actually does not even begin to grasp: 
I have to go down first. You're trying to keep me 
up. 
Down? 
I have to go down down down before I go up. Down 
down in me to it. You shouldn't try to keep me up by 
buzzing me up. 
Down and down I go, round and round I go. He 
twirled around, keeping his hands in his pockets. God, 
she thought, if I were him I'd be crazier than me. 
Tacky-tacky, she said. I need to go down to my 
white dwarf. 
White dwarf? 
You know stars? He did know stars, often spoke of 
the constellations. To stay sane, learn about wrens, 
mums, Orion. 
What about stars? 
A red giant collapses into a white dwarf. Hard and 
bright as a diamond. That's what I was trying to do 
when my mother found me in the closet going down to my 
white dwarf. 
Ah. Quite a speech, although I suspect you meant 
going down to become my white dwarf, I think. 
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I have to get down to it, to me. And you won't let 
me. You want me up before going down. 
Ah, but what if the star collapses all the way 
into a black hole? (This pleased him) How will we find 
you in a black hole? (The more he thought about it, the 
more pleased he was.) I'm not up to a time warp. (90) 
Regardless of what he thinks she actually means by this sort 
of talk, the bottom line is that he thinks that the way in 
which she expresses her meaning indicates a high degree of 
mental impairment. In this brief conversation alone, she 
violates three of Grice's four maxims. The abrupt 
introduction of stellar evolution into the conversation 
violates the maxim of Relation; the overall obscurity and 
ambiguity of her end of the exchange violates the maxim of 
Manner; and finally the silence into which she withdraws 
after he tells her that her parents are coming tomorrow 
("Now she wanted him to leave. One advantage to being crazy 
is that one is given leave to be rude....She turned her face 
into the wing of the chair until he left") violates the 
maxim of Quantity. Even the reader must admit that, with no 
more evidence to go on than exchanges such as this one, it 
would be difficult to consider her unequivocally sane. 
Allie exhibits the same sort of verbal aberration in a 
visit with her parents the day after the above conversation 
with Dr. Duk. Allie's father and mother (Kitty Huger, nee 
Vaught from The Last Gentleman), have come to the hospital 
to talk with Dr. Duk about plans for Allie's future, which 
is suddenly of great interest to them now that an old woman 
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has died and left Allie two very valuable pieces of real 
estate. The parents, who intend ultimately to have Allie 
declared mentally incompetent to handle her own finances, 
and to take control of the property themselves, explain to 
her how they have arranged for her to move into a lovely 
little carriage house back home and become music director of 
the new community art center there. Kitty assures her 
daughter that, despite appearances to the contrary, this 
latter idea was not her own idea but rather that of "the 
board": Allie replies, ambiguously, irrelevantly: "The Board 
or Aurora bora?" (100). The doctor kindly attempts to 
clarify: "Boring or beautiful? said Dr. Duk, looking at her 
with a smile (they were after all two of a kind, she and 
Docky, compared with these exotic outsiders) I think 
beautiful" (100). Kitty elaborates on her benevolent motives 
behind this plan to take Allie back home and get control 
over her property ("she'll be at home among family and 
friends, she'll have her own lovely little place") and then 
asks Allie what she thinks of the plan. To which Allie 
replies: "Nnnnaaaahrgh." Just as nonplussed as Dr. Duk by 
such verbal behavior, Kitty makes her own unambiguous sense 
of Allie's "remark" and goes blithely on: "Yes. Well, I 
agree, honey, it must come as quite a shock. But think about 
it. What do you think, dear?" (101). The remainder of the 
interview is punctuated by similar violations of the 
Cooperative Principle (most commonly the maxim of Manner), 
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and by subsequent attempts on the part of Allie's parents 
and Dr. Duk to translate these violations into simple, 
unambiguous statements or questions. 
In these attempts at translation, Allie's parents and 
Dr. Duk are engaging in a process that Bach and Harnish call 
"disambiguation." This is a common practice in verbal 
discourse, and is in fact often necessary just to keep a 
conversation from breaking down. Two subsequent verbal 
exchanges in this session between Allie, her parents, and 
Dr. Duk, illustrate the process particularly clearly. When 
Allie's father tells her how much she will like her new 
chalet apartment because it has, among other attractive 
features, "the damndest view you ever saw," Allie replies: 
"Wif you? Wiv view?" These are strikingly ambiguous 
questions, which Allie's father and Dr. Duk immediately 
attempt to disambiguate: 
A view! said her father. You wouldn't believe the 
view! 
Interesting, said Dr. Duk, safe behind his thigh 
and therefore more able to conceal himself. You thought 
she said with view, meaning room with view. But thought 
I heard with you, meaning praps she might have some 
reservations about living with you. With you both. With 
y'all. (102) 
When Dr. Duk speculates that Allison "knows a great deal 
more than she lets on. Right Allison?" she responds, 
""Wraing," which Dr. Duk disambiguates for Allie's parents: 
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You see, said Dr. Duk. What she said was halfway 
between right and wrong. She's afraid to commit 
herself. My own wish is that she have a final little 
refresher course of treatment. (103) 
Disambiguation is often helpful in conversation, but it is 
not always accurate, especially when the addressee stands to 
gain something from a particular interpretation of an 
ambiguous statement. An ambiguous statement can thus 
function as something of a Rorschack blot which each 
individual filters through his own personal biases and 
interprets according to his own best interests. This is 
precisely what is going on here with Allison, whose 
ambiguous verbal behavior is far more complex than ordinary, 
accidental ambiguity. Her parents and Dr. Duk, as would in 
fact most people in their situation, fail to recognize this 
complexity, and they each settle on the single 
interpretation that best suits their own respective 
interests, which happen to be quite considerable in this 
case, now that Allison has inherited property that is valued 
in the millions. Her parents obviously have a lot to gain by 
a legal declaration of Allie's mental incompetence, and so 
does Dr. Duk, since he is in charge of the strings that must 
be pulled for such a declaration to be made. So, in spite of 
the differences in their specific interpretations of Allie's 
individual ambiguous utterances, they all agree on the 
interpretation of the overall pattern that these utterances 
make up: she is crazy. In their presence, Allie repeatedly 
183 
violates the maxim of Manner, speaking obscurely and 
ambiguously by turns. Assuming, as most people in their 
position would, that these violations are unintentional, 
they interpret her behavior as a simple manifestation of 
mental illness. In terms of the speech act community, 
Allie's verbal behavior strays outside of what the community 
considers "normal" behavior, so it automatically expels her 
from its midst, until such time as she can learn to conform 
to its rigid guidelines. 
Or is it the other way around? In his speech act 
analysis of Coriolanus Fish demonstrates that it is actually 
Coriolanus who effectively banishes the people of Rome, and 
not they him. Such relativism is very much in keeping with 
Percy's general view of society, and is, in fact, very 
similar to what is going on with Allie's consistently 
abnormal verbal behavior. Her deviations from the 
community's verbal norms result in an exile every bit as 
complete as Coriolanus' exile from Rome. 
As we have seen repeatedly in Percy's work, because of 
the moral, spiritual, and verbal bankruptcy of society at 
large, such isolation is not necessarily a bad thing. In 
fact, it is quite often a necessary thing, if a person 
wishes to escape this bankruptcy himself. Allie's chronic 
violations of the Cooperative Principle serve as something 
of a declaration of independence from a speech act community 
in which convention is more important than meaning—in which 
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abiding by the purely formal normative miles governing 
verbal behavior is more important than actually saying 
anything worthwhile with this verbal behavior. 
The general speech act community from which Allie's 
verbal behavior isolates her has been divided into two 
distinct categories: "Those who reveal themselves through 
language and those who use it to disguise their true 
motives" (Allen 141). The latter of these categories, by far 
the more populous of the two, is made up of people like 
Allie's parents and Dr. Duk who "talk a bastardized blend of 
down-home southernness, terms from pop psychology, and 
contemporary slang that is a parody of honest 
communication." This use of language as a disguise, which 
must be regarded as the statistical norm for verbal behavior 
throughout The Second Coming, is clearly illustrated in the 
interview between Dr. Duk and Allie's parents. Kitty, whom 
Dr. Duk views as a "dashing exotic person" who is 
nevertheless so effusive toward him that he almost dares to 
consider her his "buddy," speaks of the party to which she 
and her husband are headed after this meeting is over: 
I'll tell you whose party it is, Alistair, said 
her mother. 
It's Will Barrett, said her mother. You know the 
Barretts of Linwood-Asheville? 
She could tell by the way her mother hung fire 
ever so slightly, eyes flicking, that she was waiting 
for Dr. Duk's reaction. 
You mean—1 said Dr. Duk, straining forward 
another inch. 
185 
Yes, Will married a Peabody. They own the joint. 
She died. Now he owns the joint. 
The joint? said Dr. Duk. All the grass, eh? 
(Jesus, don't try to make jokes, Docky Duck. 
You're much better in your listening-doctor position, 
legs crossed, thigh hiked up as a kind of barricade, 
gazing down at your unlit Marlboro as if it were a Dead 
Sea scroll.) 
Yeah, all the grass Alistair. They own the whole 
joint, half the country, the mills, the hotels. And 
that rascal Will! Not only did he marry a Peabody, he 
also made it on his own, from editor of the Law Review, 
straight into the top Wall Street firm, one of the Ten 
Most Promising Young Attorneys, early retirement, man-
of-the-year here—I mean, he did it all! I should have 
known better—but he was always out of it when I knew 
him—little did I know what was going on behind that 
absent-minded expression. Just wait till I get my hands 
on that rascal! So who do I end up with? Old blue-eyes 
here. But he's cute. Aintcha, hon? (98-99) 
What Kitty is actually saying here is that a man she used to 
know quite well, Will Barrett, unexpectedly went on after 
their brief acquaintance to become a successful Wall Street 
attorney. Now, after all these years, she is here in the 
mountains of North Carolina to press this old acquaintance 
into doing her a favor—namely, to use his famed legal 
prowess to cut through whatever red tape exists between 
herself and her daughter's newly acquired fortune. So 
heavily cloaked is this message in good ol' boy southern 
jargon (e.g. "that rascal Will," "Aintcha hon") that her 
true meaning is virtually impossible to discern. Poor Dr. 
Duk, who is "straining every nerve" to follow the general 
drift of her remarks to see if perhaps there is something in 
all of this for him as well, peppers his speech with stupid 
jokes (like that about the "grass") and Southernisms ("With 
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you both. With yall") so that his own less than professional 
interests in Allie will not be quite so obvious either. 
The fundamental emptiness of all this language flying 
around her head is abundantly clear to Allie. Her 
reflections on one of Dr, Duk's customarily lame responses 
apply just as well to the language of her parents, and to 
that of the greater majority of the speech act community, in 
fact. Allie's father benevolently explains that, despite 
disagreements on particulars, there is 
...one thing we can sure as hell agree on and that's 
Allison's well-being. It's her happiness and health 
which comes first, now and always, right? 
Right on, said Dr. Duk. 
(No, dumb Docky Duk. Not right on. Like Kelso 
says, when you try to sound like something, you don't 
sound like nothing.) (116) 
Most of the people who make up Allie's speech act community 
similarly try so hard to "sound like something" that, along 
with Dr. Duk, they wind up sounding "like nothing." Such 
non-signifying sound and fury is certainly nothing new in 
Percy's fictional world; in fact, it represents the 
linguistic "norm" for all of his novels. Neither is Allie's 
perception of this emptiness a novelty; Binx Boiling's 
bowels were set to rumbling by it, and Lancelot Lamar 
plotted a Third Revolution to wipe it out and start afresh 
with a brand new language. Indeed, all of Percy's 
protagonists are aware of the bankruptcy of language in 
modern society, and experience a strong sense of alienation 
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from this society as a result, forced as they are to choose 
between a meaningless integrated existence, and a meaningful 
alienated existence. What is entirely new in Allie's 
situation, however, is the addition of a third alternative 
to these two choices. Like other of Percy's protagonists, 
Allie senses the emptiness of her community's language, and 
will have no part of it. Her unique language is the most 
tangible sign of this rejection. Initially, like other Percy 
characters, Allie finds herself alienated from the community 
whose empty language she has rejected. Her emotional and 
spiritual alienation from the community is accompanied by a 
literal physical isolation from it, first in a mental 
hospital, and then in a greenhouse on a ruined estate in the 
North Carolina mountains. Now, Allie might be content to 
live out the rest of her days in this state of happy 
isolation, but neither Percy nor the speech act community 
that Allie has rejected is content to let her. The speech 
act community, represented by Allie's parents and Dr. Duk, 
wants to take away all her possessions and place her in a 
controlled environment where it can keep an eye on her. 
Percy, less selfishly, wants more for her than either the 
meaningless controlled integration offered Allie by the 
speech act community, or the meaningful alienation offered 
her by life alone in the woods. He wants Allie to have the 
best of both worlds—a meaningful and integrated existence— 
and for the first time in any of his novels he finds a means 
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of making this possible. The vehicle through which Allie is 
able to find both meaning and integration is none other than 
Will Barrett, whom we last saw chasing after Sutter Vaught's 
Edsel in the New Mexico desert at the conclusion of The Last 
Gentleman. 
When we first see Will Barrett after all these years, 
he is, not surprisingly, "more funked out and nuttier than 
ever" (180). Even though he went on after The Last Gentleman 
to become a very successful man by society's standards— 
making a name for himself on Wall Street, marrying a 
millionaire who died and left him a fortune, and retiring in 
his forties to play golf and enjoy the finer things in life 
—he nonetheless cannot feel himself to be a part of the 
society by whose standards he carved out an enviable life 
for himself. Like Allie and so many other of Percy's 
characters, Will feels alienated from this society. This 
alienation manifests itself in a sort of free-floating 
depression, which he spends a good portion of the novel 
trying to figure out. As with Tom More, and Lancelot, and 
Allie, Will Barrett's alienation and subsequent depression 
inevitably lead to a question that is by now very familiar 
in Percy's work: who is crazier, society, or the individual 
who feels alienated from this society? In The Second Coming. 
Will ponders this question again and again. Looking around 
himself at the "farcical" lives that most people live, he 
speculates: 
189 
Was he crazy or was it rather the case that other 
people went to any length to disguise from themselves 
that their lives were farcical? He couldn't decide. 
What is one to make of such a person? 
To begin with: though it was probably the case 
that he was ill and that it was his illness— 
depression—which made the world seem farcical, it is 
impossible to prove the case. 
On the one hand, he was depressed. 
On the other hand, the world is in fact farcical. 
(4) 
Statistically speaking, he realizes that his attitude toward 
society certainly places him in the minority. But what if 
the majority is really deluded rather than happy, as it 
appears to be, and in fact believes itself to be? Isn't it 
true that "Most Romans played as usual while Rome fell about 
their ears"?: 
If one person is depressed for every ninety-nine 
who are not or who say they are not, who is to say that 
the depressed person is right and the ninety-nine 
wrong, that they are deceiveing themselves? Even if 
this were true, what good would it do to undeceive the 
ninety-nine who have diverted themselves with a busy 
round of work and play and so imagine themselves happy. 
The argument is abstract and useless. (5) 
A large part of Will's problem with society revolves 
around modern, or more accurately post-modern, Christianity. 
It is not surprising that Christianity should figure 
significantly in his problem with society, living as he does 
in "the most Christian nation in the world, the U.S.A., in 
the most Christian part of that nation, the South, in the 
most Christian state in the South, North Carolina, in the 
most Christian town in North Carolina" (13). He finds the 
190 
lives of these Christians to be virtually meaningless and 
their company to be unbearable. Unfortunately, their non-
Christian counterparts, few though they may be, are not any 
better off. In a letter to Sutter Vaught, in which he 
describes his plan to conclusively prove or disprove God's 
existence, Will sums up the situation in terms very 
reminiscent of Lancelot's description of the unacceptable 
world in which he lived: 
So much for you. My quarrel with the others can be 
sximmed up as a growing disgust with two classes of 
people. These two classes between them exhaust the 
class of people in general. That is to say, there are 
only two classes of people, the believers and the 
unbelievers. The only difficulty is deciding which is 
the more feckless. 
My belated discovery of the bankruptcy of both 
classes has made it possible for me to take action. 
Better late than never. (188) 
A similar misanthropic conclusion led Lancelot to murder and 
a plot for a Third Revolution. The more mild-mannered Will 
takes to a cave in solitary pursuit of God. In both cases, 
however, the result of this rejection of society is a 
profound physical and spiritual isolation from the world of 
humankind. When the narration of Lancelot finally runs out, 
the mad/sane patient/narrator Lance remained isolated from 
his fellow man. Unlike Will, however, Lance did not have 
Allie's greenhouse to fall into. 
From Allie's point of view, Will is just another member 
of that speech act community from which her abnormal verbal 
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behavior isolates her. He dresses like the others, plays 
golf like the others, and is wealthier than most of the 
others. Externally at least, he is a rule-abiding citizen of 
the normative community that Allie observes from the 
outside. Will's superficial integration with the community 
is very important, because it will ultimately provide an 
alienated character, Allie, with a means of becoming 
reintegrated with the community, while at the same time 
rejecting those aspects of it that caused her to flee in the 
first place. His alienation from the community, on a much 
deeper level, is of course also very important, for it will 
allow him to view her and her language independently of the 
purely conventional normative structures that cause the rest 
of the community to see her as an outcast. Like the 
"earthling" in Percy's essay "The Delta Factor," who is 
"sufficiently detached, marooned, bemused, wounded, crazy, 
one-eyed, and lucky enough to become a Martian for a second 
and catch a glimpse of [language]" (MB 29), Will is just 
enough of an outsider to actually listen to Allie without 
automatically assessing her verbal behavior as either normal 
or abnormal, terms which have absolutely no meaning beyond 
the confines of the normative speech act community. 
Like Allie, Will's fundamental alienation from the 
speech act community shows up in his verbal behavior, a fact 
that does not go unnoticed by the other members of the 
community. In fact, he is just as capable as Allie of 
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violating the Cooperative Principle. For instance, while he 
is playing golf with his doctor/friend Vance Battle, Vance 
expresses some concern for Will's health. When Will asks him 
the reasons for his concern, Vance immediately zeroes in on 
Will's abnormal verbal behavior—his violations of the 
Cooperative Principle: 
"You haven't been with us for some time,1* 
"Us?" 
"Us. Your family, your friends." 
"How's that?" 
"You don't say anything. And what you do say is 
strange." 
"Such as?" 
"You asked me if I remembered a movie actor named 
Ross Alexander. I said no. You let it go at that. Then 
you asked me if Groucho Marx was dead. Then you asked 
me if the tendency to suicide is inherited. Do you 
remember?" 
"Yes. You didn't answer." 
"I didn't know. Are you feeling depressed?" (10) 
In his review of Will's abnormal verbal behavior, Vance 
points out two distinct violations of the Cooperative 
Principle. His silence with his family and friends ('"You 
don't say anything"') violates the maxim of Quantity, and 
his mention of Ross Alexander, Groucho Marx, and suicide, 
independently of any context to which these subjects would 
have relevance, violates the maxim of Relation. After Will 
ends the conversation by suggesting that they just putt out 
and and head on, he violates the maxim of Relation yet 
again: 
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"No, wait." Again he went into one of his spells, 
a "petty-mall trance" his doctor friend called them. 
They were sitting in the cart. He sat perfectly still 
for perhaps five seconds, which was long enough for the 
doctor to smile uneasily, then frown and lean over the 
seat to touch him. 
"What is it, Will?" 
"I just realized a strange thing." 
"What's that?" 
"There are no Jews up here." 
"Jews?" 
"I've been living here for two years and have 
never seen a Jew. Arabs, but no Jews. When I used to 
come up here in the summer years ago, there used to be 
Jews here. Isn't that strange?" 
"I hadn't thought about it. Hm." Dr. Vance knitted 
his brow and pretended to think but his eyes never 
left the other's face. "Interesting! Maybe they've all 
gone to Washington, ha ha." (11) 
When confronted with Will's irrelevant remarks about the 
Jews, Vance tries to provide a context by accepting the 
remarks as a joke. The Principle of Charity kicks in and 
Vance seeks about for a way to make Will's speech conform to 
normative guidelines. Will will not be stopped, however, and 
turns his violation of the maxim of Relation into a 
violation of the maxim of Quality by suggesting that the 
Jews are leaving North Carolina, a suggestion which the 
narrator explains is patently absurd ("Needless to say, the 
Jews were and are not leaving North Carolina"). This 
undeniably abnormal verbal behavior makes Vance very 
uncomfortable: "*Is that so?' Vance's eyes strayed to his 
wristwatch. He pretended to brush off a fly" (12). During 
this exchange Will has done nothing to reassure Vance about 
his mental health, nor to make him rethink his suggestion 
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that Will come by his office for a check-up. Will's eagle 
putt on eighteen, however, shifts the attention elsewhere, 
and the subject is dropped. 
Verbal exchanges such as this one clearly indicate that 
Will's emotional and spiritual alienation from his community 
include a linguistic component as well. His depression, his 
intolerance for the bankruptcy of the modern world, and his 
occasional violations of the Cooperative Principle, place 
him at the metaphysical fringes of the speech act community. 
Allie lives out here as well, but the more extreme nature of 
her violations, combined with her fundamental powerlessness 
in the face of a speech act community that has so much to 
gain from interpreting these violations as symptomatic of 
mental illness, add a literal physical isolation to this 
metaphorical one. First in the mental hospital, and then in 
the greenhouse in the woods, Allie lives apart from society, 
and content to be apart from it. Then one day while playing 
golf, Will slices "out-of-bounds" (i.e. outside the area 
marked off and agreed upon by the community as a place where 
the rules of golf will be observed), and finds himself face 
to face with Allie. 
In this first encounter between Will and Allie, Allie's 
verbal behavior is, true to form, markedly unconventional. 
She hands Will the two balls he knocked out of bounds, one 
of which broke a window in the greenhouse, and he offers her 
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a dollar for retrieving them. Instead of taking the money, 
however, she speaks: 
"This one woke me up." 
"What?" 
"Hogan woke me up." 
"Hogan woke you up?" 
"It broke my window." She nodded toward the 
greenhouse. 
"Which one?" 
"Not those. At the end of my house, where I was 
sleeping. The surprise of it was instigating to me." 
"Okay okay. Will five dollars do it?" He fumbled 
in his pocket. (75) 
Allie violates the maxim of Manner here with her ambiguous 
reference to Hogan (the name stamped on the golf ball) and 
her obscure use of "instigating" as an adjective. Will, 
however, significantly ignores the strangeness of her speech 
and tries to extract the message embedded in it. Even though 
he misinterprets the meaning of her utterance, his response 
to it is untainted by any hint of normative judgement. He 
simply accepts her remark as an attempt to communicate, and 
tries to reciprocate. 
Now on the surface, Will's refusal to acknowledge 
Allie's violations of the Cooperative Principle might seem 
to result from the Principle of Charity—Will is simply 
interpreting her speech in such a manner as to make it 
conform to the Cooperative Principle. His subsequent 
reflections on her language, however, clearly show this not 
to be the case. He is in fact quite aware of the 
unconventionality of her speech: 
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"It was peculiar. I was lying in my house in the 
sun reading this book." She had taken a book from the 
deep pocket of the jacket and handed it to him, as if 
to prove—prove what?—and as he examined it, a rained-
on-dried-out 1922 Captain Blood, he was thinking not 
about Captain Blood but about the oddness of the girl. 
There was something odd about her speech and, now that 
he looked at her, about her. For one thing, she spoke 
slowly and carefully as if she were reading the words 
on his face. The sentence "I was lying in my house" was 
strange. "The surprise of it was instigating." (75-6) 
Will perceives the strangeness of Allie's speech. According 
to the terms of the Principle of Charity, an addressee will 
go out of his way to do just the opposite; he will interpret 
the utterance, no matter how strange it may sound, as 
conforming to the Cooperative Principle. As a full-fledged 
member of the speech act community, the average addressee is 
more concerned with upholding the rules of cooperative 
verbal behavior than he is with understanding what a given 
individual is actually saying. He is preeminently concerned 
with preserving form, even if content must be sacrificed. 
Will's mental acknowledgement of the "oddness" of Allie's 
speech indicates that something far more significant, and 
meaningful, than the Principle of Charity is at work here. 
As the conversation proceeds, Will speculates on the 
nature and origin of her verbal unconventionality: 
"I was lying in my house in the sun reading that 
book. Then plink, tinkle, the glass breaks and this 
little ball rolls up and touches me. I felt concealed 
and revealed." Her voice was flat and measured. She 
sounded like a wolf child who had learned to speak from 
old Victrola records. Her lips trembled slightly, not 
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quite smiling, her eyes not quite meeting his yet 
attentive, sweeping his face like a blind person's. 
Oh well. She was one of the thousands who blow in 
and out every summer like the blackbirds, nest where 
they can, in flocks or alone. Sleep in the woods. At 
least she had found a greenhouse. (76) 
He eventually concludes, mistakenly, that drugs must be the 
cause of her unusual speech: "Oh well. She was on something 
and couldn't focus her eyes" (77). Unlike the disinterested 
townspeople of Linwood, however, whose exercise of the 
Principle of Charity causes them to deny the 
unconventionality of her speech, and the self-interested 
group composed of Dr. Duk and Allie's parents, who recognize 
the unconventionality of her speech, but cannot see anything 
beyond it, Will both acknowledges the uniqueness of Allie's 
speech, and accepts it as meaningful communication. By 
denying, on the one hand, the uniqueness of Allie's speech, 
and denying, on the other, the existence of anything beyond 
this uniqueness, the townspeople of Linwood, and Dr. Duk and 
Allie's parents essentially deny Allie's true self. She 
does, in fact, speak unconventionally, but she also has 
meaningful thoughts which she communicates through her 
unconventional speech. Both of these are essential parts to 
a single whole—Allie Hunicutt Huger. Hill's nonjudgemental, 
yet non-denying, approach to Allie's language, then, 
exhibits nothing less significant than a respect for, and an 
acceptance of, Allie's very selfhood. 
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The extent to which Will heeds what Allie has to say is 
evident in the fact that she is able to anger him during 
this first conversation. She asks him: 
"Are You—?" 
"What?" He cocked the club for a short chip shot 
and hung fire. 
"Are you still climbing on your anger?".... 
"Angry? No, I'm not angry. What did you mean by 
still angry?" 
"I mean over there." She pointed to the chesnut 
fall. "Where you were standing." 
She had been watching him. 
"Why did you think I was angry?" 
"You were holding your golf stick in the thicket. 
I wanted to give you back your little golf balls but I 
was instigated by fear. I thought you were going to hit 
someone. Or shoot." 
"You were watching me." 
"Yes." 
He looked down at his hands gripping the club. He 
became aware that he was nodding. 
"You look angry again." 
"I didn't know anyone was watching me." 
"Why did that make you angry? I wasn't spying or 
denying. I was afraid." (76-77) 
In spite of a couple of violations of the maxim of Manner by 
Allie here, Will follows the substance rather than the style 
of what she is saying to him, and is angered by her accurate 
assessment of his mental state while she was watching him. 
He feels exposed or vulnerable to her in a way that Dr. Duk 
or Allie's parents never could feel. For them, the 
violations would mask the very accurate observations 
expressed in the midst of these violations. Will's 
acknowledgement of Allie's perceptiveness and his self-
conscious anger at being the object of it indicate that, 
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even though she is as yet a stranger, he values her opinion, 
where Or. Duk and Allie's parents do not even recognize that 
she has one. After this exchange, the conversation ends and 
Will wanders back toward the golf course, but the groundwork 
has already been laid for an eventual union between these 
two alienated characters that is unlike anything we have 
seen in Percy's fiction. 
Their next encounter builds upon this groundwork and 
establishes the unique compatibility between Will and Allie 
that will eventually turn into love. Will actually seeks 
Allie out this time, to deliver some avocados and olive oil, 
and to see if he can help her in any way. Allie's end of the 
conversation is, of course, strewn with violations of the 
Cooperative Principle, but Will shows a remarkable intuitive 
feel for her verbal behavior—an ability to understand 
exactly what she is trying to communicate with her unusual 
language. The conversation begins with a brief exchange 
about the dog that has taken up with Allie. As Will 
approaches the greenhouse, the dog rushes toward him to 
attack. Allie yells at the dog to get him to stop, but not 
before noticing in Will a sort of mental dislocation that is 
quite familiar to her as her own customary mental state: 
Perhaps she had opened her mouth to say something 
or perhaps she had moved, but before she could do 
anything else and just as the man's hand touched the 
house the dog charged. The man had time to turn, it 
seemed to her slowly, the sunlight striking a different 
plane of his forehead, and held out his hand palm down 
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to the dog. Too slowly it seemed to her: was this too 
part of his studied Northern nonchalance? No, because 
even now his eyes could not or would not focus on the 
dog. He didn't care whether the dog bit him or notl 
It was not courage, not even inattention but 
rather, she saw, a kind of indifference yet a curiosity 
with it. Would the dog attack? Would tooth enter flesh? 
If it did, would it matter? (107) 
This little episode has two important functions. First, it 
shows Allie's intuitive, almost unconscious recognition of a 
kindred spirit (she cannot focus her eyes, and neither can 
he). Second, it shows in Will a habitual passively receptive 
state of mind—an "indifference yet a curiosity with it"— 
that will be of crucial importance in his verbal 
relationship with Allie. This state of mind accounts for his 
ability to understand her language. 
The dog halts a split second before sinking his teeth 
into Will's hand, and Allie initiates the conversation with 
a violation of the maxim of Manner: 11 *Did he stop because of 
my saying or because of your not saying?' asked the girl." 
Now Dr. Duk or Allie's parents would be compelled to 
disambiguate Allie's ambiguous use of the gerund "saying" 
(i.e. "because of my command for the dog to stop, or your 
calm silence, which indicated a lack of fear on your part"). 
Will, however, simply accepts it as a valid form of 
communication, and goes on to more important matters: "I'm 
not sure. Probably because of your saying. Would you give me 
a drink of water. I've had a long walk." Throughout the 
conversation that ensues, Will continues to exhibit this 
curious indifference, and as a result is actually able to 
communicate with Allie—to exchange information and ideas— 
as no one else in the novel is capable of doing. 
The conversation between Will and Allie here is rather 
long, but must be viewed at some length in order for the 
crucial pattern of mutual understanding between the two 
characters to be fully apparent. After his encounter with 
the dog, Will follows Allie into the greenhouse: 
"It still smells like a greenhouse. Once I was in 
Cincinnati. I liked the smell of a greenhouse there so 
much I worked in it for six months." 
"Doing which and how and was it for a 
consideration? How much?" she asked, eyes widening with 
interest. "Would you—" She stopped. Would he what? 
"Work for you?" he said. "How much do you pay?" 
"Never mind." She gave him the Clorox bottle. He 
drank a long time. 
"Thank you. Is this where you have to get your 
water?" 
"Yes. How thirsty. It's been a long time." 
"Since what? Since seeing anybody thirsty?" 
"Something—something is up front but not all the 
way." 
"You mean you're having difficulty remembering 
things and that you almost remembered something?" 
"Yes, that's—" 
"I had that once. In my case it was a question of 
not wanting to remember. In fact, I remembered 
something here in this spot that I hadn't thought of 
for years." 
"Was it for a gladness or the same old Sunday 
coming down?" 
"No, it wasn't the same old Sunday coming down. I 
can't say it was a happy memory but I was glad I 
remembered. I feel much better. You will too. Thank you 
for the water." 
"You are—Are you?" 
"I brought you something." 
"What?" She noticed the brown bag. "Oh, I don't 
need. I am fine. Though I was in the hospital for—it 
is the time I can't remember." 
"I know." 
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"I was somewhat suspended above me but I am 
getting down to me." 
"Good." 
She was about to say something but she saw in his 
eyes that he had drifted away. 
They stood in silence. It was not for her like a 
silence with another person, a silence in which 
something horrid takes root and grows. What if nobody 
says anything, what then? Sometimes she thought she had 
gone crazy rather than have to talk to people. Which 
was worse, their talk or their silences? Perhaps there 
was no unease with him because he managed to be both 
there and not there as one required. Is it possible to 
stand next to a stranger at a bus stop and know that he 
is a friend? Was he someone she had known well and 
forgotten? (107-9) 
A few important features of the conversation up to this 
point need to be pointed out here. As he did in their 
previous chance encounter, Will here simply accepts Allie's 
speech acts, strange though they may sound, as legitimate 
attempts at communication, and responds accordingly. Rather 
than tuning in to her violations of the Cooperative 
Principle (as we can easily imagine him doing in his Last 
Gentleman days) and assessing her mental condition on the 
basis of these violations, Will passes beyond them and 
concentrates on the substance of what she is saying. His 
lack of concern for what Allie's violations indicate about 
her mental health is evident in his willingness to interrupt 
her with comments about himself ("Yes, that's—"/"I had that 
once.") If he did not believe in the presence of a sound 
mind behind that unusual speech, he would never make such 
private personal disclosures about himself. When one is 
speaking with a madman, or with a person whom one considers 
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to be mad, one humors him or her with polite formalities, 
giving the appearance of assent and concern, rather than 
wasting substantive information on a mind that is too 
twisted to heed it. In other words, Will's eagerness to tell 
Allie about himself indicates his acknowledgement and 
acceptance of her as a person rather than as a patient, 
which is doubly significant, because Will by now knows from 
Kitty that Allie has been a patient in, and escaped from, a 
mental hospital. In his conversation with Allie, Will holds 
the fact of her hospitalization, as well as the normative 
structures of society which are largely responsible for this 
hospitalization, in abeyance, and lets her start off with a 
clean slate. 
The comfortable silence into which the conversation 
lapses, "not like a silence with another person," further 
illustrates Will's capacity for holding the rules of the 
speech act community in abeyance. With other members of the 
speech act community, when the actual talking stops, the 
Cooperative Principle is still in effect, demanding that 
someone say something before an inappropriate amount of time 
passes (maxim of Quantity). To Will, however, such rules 
have no intrinsic importance, being as they are merely an 
artificial fabrication of that community from which he feels 
alienated, and a silence is merely silence—a cessation in a 
dialogue that can be resumed, or not, whenever either party 
feels moved to do so. 
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After a few moments of this silence, it is Allie who 
decides to resume the conversation: 
"Are you—?" 
"Am I what?" 
"Are you my—?" 
"Am I your what?" 
For a moment she wondered if she had considered 
saying something crazy like "Are you my lover?" Or "Are 
you my father?" 
She sighed. "You said the bag." 
"What? Oh yes. I brought this for you." He gave 
her the bag. 
She opened it. "Avocadoes? I think. And—what? A 
little square can of—" She read: "Plagniol." 
He watched her. 
"What a consideration! But more than a 
consideration. The communication is climbing to the 
exchange level and above. And the Plagna is not 
bologna." (109) 
Will's reflections on this latter extended violation of the 
maxim of Manner once again illustrate that he is not deaf to 
the unconventionality of her speech. He does not, like the 
townspeople of Linwood, try to hear her utterances in such a 
way that the form of her speech accords with the Cooperative 
Principle. He acknowledges the strangeness, but does not go 
to the opposite extreme, like Dr. Duk and Allie's parents, 
and conclude that this strangeness means that she is crazy. 
Instead, he approaches her language with the assumption that 
she is actually saying something meaningful, albeit in her 
own way, and that he can understand her if he just listens 
closely enough: 
Gazing at her, he almost smiled. In her odd words 
he seemed to hear echoes of other voices in other 
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years. One hundred years ago Judge Kemp might have said 
on this very spot: "How considerate of you!" with the 
same exclamatory lilt. But there was another voice, 
something new and not quite formed. Did she mean that 
his consideration (being considerate) was more than 
just a consideration (a small amount), more than 
exchange (market value of the plagnioll, which was 
after all baloney? (109) 
The conversation continues in the same vein, she 
speaking strangely, he responding to her meaning and 
understanding more and more as the conversation proceeds. 
She asks him why the avocadoes are "here," to which he 
responds: 
"Why did I bring them? I thought you might like 
them. For another thing—" 
"Yes?" 
"They are the most nourishing of all vegetables." 
"What is entailed with you?" 
"Nothing. Why?" 
"You seem somewhat pale and in travail. Is the 
abomination at home or in the hemispheres?" 
"I don't know. Maybe both. You mean my brain. I 
don't feel well, to tell the truth." (110) 
Before he leaves, Allie asks Will how it is that he seems to 
know so much about her: 
"Do you have my dossier?" 
"Your what? Oh, you mean how do I know about you?" 
"You look like you know about me." 
"I know something about you." 
Her eyes fell. Forehead muscles pushed her 
eyebrows down into a shelf. Then he had come from her 
parents. 
"Then the word came from the bloard." 
"Bloard?" He didn't know what she meant. From the 
board? the broad? blood? blood kin? bloody broad? All 
these? 
206 
What she meant was board and bored, meeting of her 
father's board which was boring because it bored into 
you. (Ill) 
This particular exchange indicates somewhat the kind of 
thought processes on Will's part that make him capable of 
understanding Allie. He approaches A1lie's language, as he 
does everything else, with a "kind of indifference yet a 
curiosity with it." This "indifference," which can be 
likened to Keats' Negative Capability, is far more creative 
an approach to Allie's language than is that of either the 
townspeople of Linwood or Dr. Duk and Allie's parents, for 
it proceeds independently of the sorts of personal biases 
that prevent these two other groups from grasping the actual 
meaning of her speech. When Will is confronted with an 
ambiguous utterance such as "bloard," he not only scans his 
mental dictionary for possible conventional matches with the 
different elements of the utterance, but is also willing to 
accept the possibility that more than just one of these 
matches might very well hold true for the utterance. In 
other words, Allie may very well mean by "bloard" not just 
"board" or "blood" or "blood kin," but rather "All these." 
While everyone else is compelled by convention to 
disambiguate such an utterance, Will accepts the fact that 
Allie's ambiguous speech is actually intentional, and thus 
not subject to disambiguation. When she says something like 
"The Board or Aurora bora," she does not mean either "Boring 
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or beautiful," as Dr. Duk assumes ("I think beautiful"), but 
rather both of these, or even more for that matter. When she 
says "Wraing," she does not mean either right or wrong, but 
rather both right and wrong. And, when she says "bloard" she 
does not mean any one thing, but rather several things at 
the same time ("board and bored, meeting of her father's 
board which was boring because it bored into you"). Will's 
ability to refrain from disambiguation, then, makes it 
possible for him to understand her language in a way that no 
one else can. In fact, it enables him to understand her 
language more clearly than he understands the more 
conventional language of the majority of the speech act 
community. 
For instance, during a conversation with Jack Curl, to 
whom "trendiness is next to godliness" (Kisor 196), Will 
listens to Jack explain his plan for putting Will's widow's 
fortune into a trust to be used for "love and faith 
communities" and the like. When he asks the Reverend who 
will administer the trust, Jack replies that it can be 
himself, or Will's daughter Leslie, or the two of them 
together: "Take your pick. Then we'll run it up the flagpole 
and sees who salutes it," to which Will responds simply, 
"What does that mean?" (309). The expression "run it up the 
flagpole and see who salutes it," quite representative of 
the cliche-ridden language of the speech act community, is 
far more conventional than most of Allie's utterances, yet 
208 
Will cannot discern the meaning of it, while he has little 
trouble understanding Allie. The problem with Jack Curl's 
language, as with the language of the speech act communities 
in all of Percy's fiction, is that it is gffi conventional 
that it has ceased to have any but a purely formal meaning. 
It is all shell and no substance; it is bankrupt. 
We have, of course, already seen bankrupt language in 
great abundance throughout Percy's fiction. We have also 
seen people who were aware of this bankruptcy, and who lived 
lives of alienation from the speech act community rather 
than traffic in this bankrupt language. We have not, 
however, seen anything like Allie's language before. So very 
unconventional is it that it can more appropriately be 
described as anti-conventional. Through Allie's numerous 
violations of the Cooperative Principle, Percy constructs a 
solid lingustic alternative to the bankrupt language that 
his protagonists have been fighting ever since The 
Moviegoer. It is the kind of language that Lancelot dreamed, 
in vain, of creating for his New Order. It is a vehicle for 
expressing all those meaningful things that were "impossible 
to say" in Percy's other novels. 
Unfortunately, there is one drawback to A1lie's new 
language. As we have seen, violations of the Cooperative 
Principle are viewed by the speech act community as 
behavioral deviations, and often interpreted as symptomatic 
of mental illness. Allie's verbal behavior clearly violates 
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the Cooperative Principle (as it must if it is to provide an 
alternative to the norm), and this chronic state of 
violation is interpreted by the speech act community as 
indicating severe mental illness; her bizarre utterances are 
clearly the ravings of a madwoman. As fresh and meaningful 
as Allie's language may strike the reader, her perceived 
madness would result in an alienation as profound as that of 
any other Percy protagonist, without the introduction of a 
second party who can see her language for what it really is. 
Without Will Barrett in her life, Allie would be no more 
than a lone voice crying in Percy's fictional wilderness, 
and Percy would be no closer to solving the bankruptcy/ 
silence paradox than he was in Lancelot. Will Barrett does 
enter her life, however, and by the end of this, their 
second, conversation, the seeds are sown for the love affair 
that will make The Second Coming "the first unalienated 
novel since War and Peace." Will's intuitive understanding 
of Allie's language, evident in their first meeting and more 
or less fully developed in the second, is, unbeknownst to 
Will, romance in its embryonic stage. Or, as Allen describes 
the understanding that Will exhibits in these early 
meetings: "Will's ear for Allie's poetry is the beginning of 
their love affair" (143). 
Before this relationship of mutual understanding can 
blossom into actual love, however, Will has a few personal 
demons that he must confront and exorcise. Recall that he 
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began the novel feeling depressed, and alienated as well, 
since his depression put him in a small minority of the 
happy Christian speech act community of western North 
Carolina. His depression eventually manifests itself in a 
suicidal obsession with proving, once and for all, the 
existence or non-existence of God. Now, Will comes by his 
suicidal tendencies naturally, for his father had killed 
himself when Will was a boy, and had in fact tried to take 
Will with him, so that he would not have to grow up and 
discover the same unbearable facts of life that for him had 
made suicide preferable to living. Will, who is very much 
his father's son, is offended by the waste of his father's 
death. He is therefore determined to make his own suicide 
count; he is going to use it to prove or disprove God's 
existence. To this end, he collects enough sleeping pills to 
keep him unconscious for several days, writes Sutter Vaught 
a long and rather tedious explanation of what he intends to 
do, and crawls deep into a cave, positioning himself 
comfortably in a remote corner to wait for God to make his 
presence known. If God fails to show, Will will die, just as 
his father did, but his death will prove beyond the shadow 
of a doubt God's non-existence. 
In typical Percy fashion, of course, no such simple 
conclusion ensues from the experiment. Will develops a 
toothache after several days, tries to climb out of the 
cave, falls as a result of hunger-induced weakness and 
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injures himself rather badly, gets lost, struggles toward a 
dim source of light (which is actually an air vent leading 
into Allie's greenhouse), pushes through the vegetation 
covering the vent, and falls onto a potting table inside the 
greenhouse. This egress into Allie's greenhouse, a bit over-
obvious in its obstetrical imagery (he struggles through a 
narrow channel toward a small opening covered with tangled 
vines, and pops out "smeared head to toe with a whitish 
grease" 233), is Will's rebirth—his "second coming." 
Allie's traumatic stay in the mental hospital, with its 
repeated electroshock treatments, has served something of 
the same function for her, so it is as a new Adam and Eve 
that the two come together, and their previously established 
mutual understanding is free to blossom into love. 
Throughout Will's recuperation in the greenhouse, Will 
and Allie build their relationship on the foundation already 
laid in their first two encounters. The progress of the 
relationship is marked linguistically by a further deepening 
of mutual understanding; Will follows Allie's speech with 
even less difficulty than before. When he explains to her 
that Judge Kemp [the man who built the greenhouse] backed 
the greenhouse up against the cave vent through which Will 
fell, so that he could take advantage of the cave's constant 
sixty degree temperature, Allie responds: 
"So the natural air-conditioning [the vent from 
the cave] was for fruition." 
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"Yes," he said, closing his eyes. "He made a lot 
of money." (228) 
Allie's understanding of Will deepens as well during this 
period. As she nurses him back to health, she examines the 
very strong feelings she has for Will, speculating that they 
might just be what other people call "love," although she is 
as distrustful of such overused terms as Will is. She knows 
there is something there, just as he does, but the two never 
actually discuss their relationship as a relationship until 
they are lying naked together on his cot. He has had one of 
his "spells" outside on the trail, and she has stripped both 
of their clothes off and twined her naked body around his to 
warm him up. As they lie here on the cot, their physical 
nakedness is accompanied by a linguistic nakedness, and 
their words intertwine just as their bodies do. She becomes 
aroused by the physical contact with Will's body, but 
discovers that his words have a similar palpable effect on 
her : 
When he began to talk she found that she could not 
hear his words for listening to the way he said them. 
She cast about for his drift. Was he saying the words 
for the words themselves, for what they meant, or for 
what they could do to her? There was something about 
the way he talked that reminded her of her own 
rehearsed sentences. Was she a jury he was addressing? 
Though he hardly touched her, his words seemed to flow 
across all parts of her body. Were they meant to? A 
pleasure she had never known before bloomed deep in her 
body. Was this a way of making love? 
He was using words like "my shameful secret of 
success as a lawyer," "phony," "radar," "our new 
language," "this gift of yours and mine," "ours" (this 
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was her favorite), "being above things," "not being 
able to get back down to things," (!),"how to reenter 
the world" (?), "by God?" "by her?" (!!!!!), "your 
forgetting and my remembering".... (262) 
Despite the deep mutual feelings evident between them at 
this point, Will and Allie cannot physically consummate 
their relationship until Will takes care of some things back 
in the speech act community. Neither can they linguistically 
consummate this relationship, by verbally declaring their 
love for one another. Both of these things will take place 
in time, but for now Will must leave. As he bids Allie 
farewell, a comment by Will linguistically marks the 
progression that has occurred since their first meeting: 
"Why do you sound so tired?" 
"Me? It is not an interesting subject. At least 
not to me. The subject is closed, if not disclosed," he 
said, smiling. (266) 
The ambiguous wordplay here is typical of Allie. Will's 
adoption of her speech patterns illustrates the depths of 
his understanding of her mind. No longer is he merely 
understanding her language, and then responding to it in his 
own, but he is now capable of actually speaking her 
language. This is the same sort of scenario dreamed of by 
Lancelot for his future life with the New Woman Anna, but 
here it is actually realized. 
As far as they have come in their relationship by this 
point, and as promising as their future seems, Will and 
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Allie are not quite out of danger just yet. The speech act 
community will make one final assault on the unacceptable 
deviance of these two of its members. Kitty intensifies her 
efforts to have Allie declared legally incompetent and 
institutionalized for the rest of her life, and Jack Curl 
and Leslie arrange to have Will live out his days in one of 
Jack's love and faith communities (i.e. rest homes) where 
his "Hausmann's Syndrome" can be kept under control. 
Incidentally, his entire fortune will go into the Peabody 
Trust, which will be supervised by Jack and Leslie. The 
self-interest involved in both of these cases is obvious. 
After a brief round of treatments at St. Mark's 
convalescent center, during which his delusions about Jews 
and such disappear and his golf game returns to normal, Will 
realizes that his feelings for Allie have absolutely nothing 
to do with his illness. So, faced with a choice between 
living a "healthy" life, punctuated by Kojak and the Morning 
Movie and devoid of Allie, or a "sick" life, in which he 
might have delusions but he would also have Allie, he takes 
his chances and escapes from the hospital. 
When he returns to Allie, he finds that she has lost a 
little weight during his absence, but is otherwise fine. Her 
verbal response at seeing him again is characteristically 
unconventional; it also illustrates once again the 
linguistic loophole with which Percy dodges the necessity 
for disambiguation: 
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"It's you Irregardless of who," she said. 
He laughed. "Irregardless of who what?" 
"Of who I thought you were." 
"Who did you think I was?" 
"That you were an Atlantean but taller, yet I also 
knew you by the glancing way, you know, of your face 
here." She touched her temple. 
"Atlantean or Atlantan?" 
"Both. Atlantan businesswise with your suit, as I 
once saw Sarge come down the bullet in the Hyatt with 
attache case and suit like that. But Atlantean also 
because of the way you came through the woods like you 
were coming from elsewhere not there." (326-7) 
Here, we once again see a violation of the maxim of Manner 
that is clearly intentional and thus cannot be construed as 
evidence of mental illness. When Allie utters an ambiguous 
word like "Atlantean," or "bloard" or "wraing," she means 
both or all of its possible interpretations. Through such 
intentional violations, then, Allie is able to say far more 
with a given number of words than are those members of the 
speech act community who slavishly adhere to the Cooperative 
Principle. It is this reinvigoration of language, this 
return to what Percy has called "the first Edenic world of 
the sign user" (LC 90) that will make such worn-out words as 
love and marriage meaningful once again. 
Within the context of Will's and Allie's "new 
language," however, such words must not be uttered 
prematurely. There must first be created a solid objective 
correlative for them to designate. Will kisses Allie, and 
together they attempt to articulate their feelings for one 
another: 
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"Is it possible that there is such a life?" 
"As what?" 
"As a life of smiling ease with someone else and 
the sweetness for you deep in me and play and frolic 
and dear sweet love the livelong day, even at four 
o'clock in the afternoon turning the old yellow green-
glade lonesomeness into a being with you at ease not a 
being with you at unease?" 
"Yes, it's possible." 
"Could such a thing be? What a miracle, and we 
haven't even mentioned the night." 
"No, we haven't." 
"Imagine ten hours of darkness every night." 
"Yes, imagine." 
"What will we do?" 
"Whatever you like." 
"Then you are fond of me?" 
"Yes." 
"Let us not speak of love yet. I'm not sure of the 
word." 
"No, we won't speak of love, though I feel that in 
the future we might." (328-9) 
For all of their suspicion of the word "love," it is 
abundantly clear that Will and Allie do love each other by 
this point. They also need each other, and the precise 
nature of the need is central to Percy's "unalienated" 
conclusion to the novel: 
"Something else is also clear to me." 
"Over and beyond." 
"Yes, over and beyond. It is this. We need each 
other for different things." 
"What is the manifestation of the difference?" 
"I need you for hoisting and you need me for 
interpretation." 
"Say what?" 
"I fall down from time to time and you are very 
good at hoisting. It would be pleasant to have you 
around to give me a hand," he said. 
"The pleasure would be mine. In short, I'll do it. 
I am so happy about your pH." 
"By the same token, I remember everything and you 
forget most things. I'll be your memory. Then too, your 
language is somewhat unusual. But I understand it. In 
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fact, it means more than other people's. Thus, I could 
both remember for you and interpret for you." 
"Our lapses are not due to synapses." 
"No, they are as they should be." 
"The implication of your consideration is that 
people think I'm crazy." 
"That is correct. Moreover, for this very reason 
they are coming for you this very afternoon." (329-30) 
Will here articulates both the unique value of Allie's 
unconventional language, and the realization that this 
unconventionality is likely to continue to get her into 
trouble with the speech act community. For even though we, 
the readers, and Will Barrett sense the superiority of 
Allie's language to that of the speech act community, the 
community itself will never sense anything but its 
difference, and will thus regard its speaker as different, 
hence crazy, if Will does not interpret for her. Will's 
acknowledgement of Allie's need for an interpreter paves the 
way for the ultimate reintegration of this new Adam and Eve 
with post-lapsarian society at large. Their new life will 
not be like that envisioned by Lancelot—a sort of 
institutionalized alienation in which people either live 
within the New Order or die outside it. Will and Allie will 
enjoy a fellowship with the speech act community, flawed and 
bankrupt though it may be, and their new language will 
presumably allow them to escape its more pernicious 
influences. They will thus have the best of both worlds. The 
social element of their future life together is evident in 
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Will's response to Allie's suggestion that they live in the 
cave where Will conducted his cosmic experiment: 
He laughed. "No. We don't have to go in the cave. 
The cave is over and done with. We can live up here. 
How would you like to begin your life?" 
"It is time. How would you like to begin yours?" 
"I would like to." (331) 
Life together in the cave, idyllic though it may be, would 
still involve alienation from society at large. 
As a first step toward an acceptable reintegration with 
society, Will decides to resume practicing the law, although 
not at the materialistic corporate level where he was so 
successful in his old life. He visits his lawyer/friend 
Slocum and, after verifying Allie's legal rights protecting 
her from further involuntary hospitalization, he offers his 
services as a clerk while he is studying for the North 
Carolina bar. Having thus taken steps toward reintegration 
with society, Will has removed the last barrier standing 
between him and his life with Allie. He returns to the hotel 
where he has left her and they finally consummate their 
relationship: 
When she came against him from the side, it was 
with the effect of flying up to him from below like a 
little cave bat and clinging to him with every part of 
her. 
They were lying on their sides facing each other. 
"Come here," he said. 
"I'm here." 
"Now." 
"Yes." 
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There was an angle but It did not make trouble. 
Entering her was like coming home. 
"Oh my," she said. 
"Yes." 
"That's you for true." (339) 
Having finally consummated their love relationship, though 
not yet uttering the word "love," Will and Allie speak of 
their future together. With his two lovers lying abed, 
twined in each other's arms, Percy attempts to demonstrate a 
spiritual/linguistic consummation to match the physical one. 
To this end, he will have them converse in their new, 
revivified language—to engage in a verbal intercourse that 
is every bit as satisfying as their physical lovemaking. 
Unfortunately, Percy is not altogether successful at this, 
for at the very moment of their greatest intimacy, and 
presumably of their greatest freedom from the stultifying 
conventions of the speech act community, they slip into a 
sort of adolescent love chatter that is largely devoid of 
the very freshness that it is supposed to epitomize: 
"I'll tell you what let's do," he said. 
"What?" 
Let's get a house and live in it." 
"Okay. Can we make love like that much of the 
time?" 
"As much as you like." 
"For true?" 
"For true. Would you like to marry?" 
"Uh, to marry might be to miscarry." 
"Not necessarily. I'll practice law. You grow 
things in your greenhouse. We can meet after work. We 
can walk the Long Trail or go to the beach on your 
island. Then go to bed irregardless." (341) 
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Having supposedly rejuvenated language to the degree 
that some of the old worn-out words actually mean something 
once again, Will and Allie are now prepared to approach two 
of the most worn-out words of all: marriage and love. After 
admitting to Allie that "marriage in these times seems to be 
a troubled, often fatal, arrangement," Will proposes to her 
on the hope that together they might "not only survive it 
but revive it" (343). And finally, six pages from the end of 
the novel, they tackle the most troubling word of all; they 
actually "speak of love" as they hoped they one day might 
do: 
"Oh, I think you have something for me." 
"Yes." 
"What?" 
"Love. I love you," he said. I love you now and 
until the day I die...." 
"Tell me the single truth, not two or more 
separate truths, unless separate truths are subtruths 
of the single truths. Is there one truth or several 
separate truths?" 
"Both." 
"How both?" 
"The single truth is I love you. The several 
subtruths are: I love your dearest heart. I also love 
your dear ass, which is the loveliest in all of 
Carolina. I want your ass, it and no other, and you for 
the rest of my life, you and no other. I also love to 
see you by firelight. I will always come to see you at 
four o'clock every afternoon if only to sit with you if 
it does not please you to make love—" 
"It pleases me. How about now?" 
"—because I love to sit by you and watch your 
eyes, which see everything exactly as it is. And to 
watch the line of your cheek. These are separate truths 
but are also subtruths of the single truth, I love 
you." (355) 
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There is a certain sense of propriety, and even 
inevitability, about Will's declaration of "loveN here. 
Certainly nowhere else in Percy's fiction up to this point 
would such a declaration have been possible. Will and Allie, 
and Percy, have worked very hard to pave the way for such a 
declaration, and have in a very real way earned the right to 
utter it. It is just unfortunate that when the climactic 
moment arrives, Percy does not handle it more effectively 
than he does. Will's and Allie's dialogue in the latter 
portions of the novel becomes progressively trite and at 
times just plain silly, sounding in places like a 
combination of Hemingway and a very bad romance novelist. 
This difficulty that Percy has in preserving to the end 
of the novel the initial freshness of Will's and Allie's 
dialogue, while certainly distracting and even 
disappointing, does not seriously mar the novel as a whole; 
nor does it in any way nullify the "happy ending" of the 
novel. If anything, this semiotically problematic ending 
simply validates what Percy has been saying all along about 
the uneasy alliance between language and meaning in the 
postmodern world. It also serves as a warning to Will and 
Allie to be suspicious of too complete an integration with 
the speech act community, and to avoid overusing those words 
that they have just now earned the right to use. 
Despite the linguistic problems with the novel's 
ending, The Second Coming does mark a definite advance, both 
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thematically and semiotically, over Percy's previous work. 
The two lovers, Will and Allie, are unambiguously happy at 
the novel's end, and it is through language, specifically 
Allie's all-out assault on the Cooperative Principle, that 
this happiness has been made possible. As for Allie's 
recreation of language automatically rendering "possible" 
all of those concepts that have been "impossible to say" 
since The Moviegoer, however, no such optimistic claim can 
reasonably be made for The Second Coming. About the most 
that can be claimed for it is that it renders such profound 
concepts as that represented by the word "love" merely 
"improbable to say," and in the semiotic wasteland portrayed 
throughout Percy's fiction, this is no small claim. It is, 
in fact, about the best that we can hope for. 
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CHAPTER V 
CENTURY OF DEATH: 
THE THANATOS SYNDROME 
Having effectively exhausted the fictional 
possibilities of manipulating his characters' verbal 
behavior within the parameters outlined in "Toward a Triadic 
Theory of Meaning," and achieved to his satisfaction the 
"refreshment" of language he has sought throughout his 
writing career, Percy shifts his attention from the 
spiritual/psychological implications of this or that 
character's verbal behavior within the human community at 
large to the much broader questions of whether or not this 
or that character actually belongs to the human community. 
From the beginning of his writing career, all of Percy's 
explorations of language, both fictional and expository, 
have been based upon the assumption that language itself is 
what distinguishes man from the lower animals—is what makes 
humankind "human." Man is, after all, most appropriately 
defined as "Homo loquens, man the talker" (MS 17). If, then, 
man loses this innate capacity for language, barring of 
course organic dysfunction in the speech producing area of 
the brain, does he not cease to qualify as a human being? 
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This question lies at the semiotic center of Percy's final 
novel The Thanatos Syndrome. 
Despite its importance to the semiotic component of 
this book, this question does not receive nearly the amount 
of attention that other semiotic questions, say that of a 
speaker's sanity or insanity, receive in Percy's other 
novels. If The Second Coming is Percy's "most densely 
semiotic novel," The Thanatos Syndrome would have to be 
considered his least densely semiotic novel. In this 
suspenseful tale of conspiracy and intrigue, character takes 
a back seat to plot (Hobson Understanding... 151), and the 
linguist in Percy gives way to the novelist, which makes for 
much easier reading than do the theory-laden narratives of 
some of his other novels. The semiotic question at hand, 
then, while certainly not unimportant, is important only as 
it relates to the conspiracy plot of the novel. In other 
words, while The Second Coming is in a very real way "about" 
language, The Thanatos Syndrome is about a scientific 
conspiracy that, among other things, robs its victims of 
their distinctly human capacity for language. 
The title of this last of Percy's novels refers to the 
death-filled century that is now coming to a close—a one 
hundred year period in which "God agreed to let the Great 
Prince Satan have his way with men" (365). During this 
century, Satan has been very successful at getting his work 
done here on earth. Satan can take little direct credit for 
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this great success, however, for nan has done most of the 
work for him. As Father Smith explains to Tom More toward 
the end of the novel, quoting the words of the Virgin Mary 
as she spoke to six Yugoslavian boys during a recent 
apparition: 
How did he do it? No great evil scenes, no demons—he's 
too smart for that. All he had to do was leave us 
alone. We did it. Reason warred with faith. Science 
triumphed. The upshot? One hundred million dead. (365) 
As in this novel's precursor, Love in the Ruins, science is 
portrayed here as Satan's great tool for wreaking his havoc 
upon earth, because science, for all the benefits it has 
brought mankind as a whole, is based upon a very dangerous 
premise—namely, that its ultimate goal is "the greatest 
good, the highest quality of life for the greatest number" 
(346). This premise, benign though it may be in theory, in 
practice too often justifies a denial of the worth and 
rights of the individual as a necessary means to its worthy 
end. This destructive tendency of science is most succinctly 
articulated by Father Smith, first to Tom More and then 
later to a group of "local notables" gathered to celebrate 
the reopening of the hospice of which he is to be in charge. 
On both occasions he asks his auditors, "Do you know where 
tenderness leads?" and then answers his own question, 
"Tenderness leads to the gas chamber" (360), referring of 
course to the most notorious instance of scientific 
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Benthamism in the twentieth century, the Nazi persecution of 
the Jews. The benevolence of science toward mankind as a 
whole all too often leads to the destruction of the 
individual man. An age such as ours in which Reason and its 
handmaiden science triumph over emotion and faith inevitably 
ends in a massive cultural drift toward death, or a Thanatos 
Syndrome. It is this syndrome onto which Tom More stumbles 
at the beginning of this novel that is named for it. 
The Thanatos Syndrome has of course manifested itself 
in a variety of ways throughout the twentieth century. In 
The Thanatos Syndrome, it takes the form of Project Blue 
Boy, hatched in the minds of the scientists over at Fedville 
as a solution to a wide array of social ills. In this 
project, Heavy Sodium from the Grand Mer nuclear plant is 
covertly being released into the water supply of Feliciana 
Parish. The subjects of this experiment in social 
engineering are participating without their consent or 
knowledge, but so great are the potential benefits of this 
project for society at large that these insignificant civil 
rights violations can be simply overlooked; in other words, 
the worthy end justifies not so worthy means. The project is 
likened by its proponents to a "magic wand" that can 
virtually eliminate crime in an affected area, and greatly 
improve the intelligence of its residents in the process. 
Bob Comeaux, co-director of Project Blue Boy, reels off some 
of the impressive statistics to Tom More, in an effort to 
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make this potential trouble maker a part of the Fedville 
team: 
"What would you say if I gave you a magic wand you 
could wave over there"—he nods over his shoulder 
toward Baton Rouge and New Orleans—"and overnight you 
could reduce crime in the streets by eighty-five 
percent?" 
I wait, knowing there is more. 
"Child abuse by eighty-seven percent?" 
"You mean you've done it by—" 
He waves me off. "We've done it—the numbers will 
be out next month—but let me finish. Teenage suicide 
by ninety-five percent. Ninety-five percent Tom." 
"Yes?" 
"Teenage pregnancy by eighty-five percent." 
"Yes?" 
"And here's some bad news for us shrinks." He 
winks at me. "Hospital admissions for depression, 
chemical dependence, anxiety reduced by seventy-nine 
percent." 
"Yes?" 
"And get this." He leans close. "AIDS by seventy-
six percent." (191) 
To this impressive list of statistics, Bob adds a couple 
more noteworthy items: 
"New item: LSU has not lost a football game in three 
years, has not had a point scored against them, and get 
this, old Tom, has not given up a single first down 
this season. As you well know, nobody talks in 
Louisiana about anything else." A final poke. "News 
item, Tom—not as well known but quite as significant: 
L.S.U. engineering students no longer use calculators. 
They're as obsolete as slide rules. They've got their 
own built-in calculators." (155) 
These and more societal benefits result from the addition of 
minute quantities of Heavy Sodium to the community water 
source—a process that is every bit as simple as the 
addition of fluoride to the water, which, by the way, was 
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also implemented "without the permission or knowledge of the 
treated" (194). 
Given these undeniably beneficial results of Project 
Blue Boy, what possible objection could anyone bring against 
it? Or, why would a Tom More risk his freedom and even his 
life to expose the project with the intention of putting an 
end to it? The drawbacks of Project Blue Boy have to do with 
the way in which its astounding results are produced, for it 
actually reaches into the brains of its subjects in order to 
alter their behavior patterns. Bob Comeaux explains the 
process to Tom: 
"The hypothesis, Tom, says Bob, speaking slowly, 
"is that at least a segment of the human neocortex and 
of consciousness itself is not only an aberration of 
evolution but also is the scourge and curse of life on 
this earth, the source of wars, insanities, 
perversions—in short, those very pathologies which are 
peculiar to Homo sapiens. As Vonnegut put it"—his arm 
is on the back of the seat; I feel his pointy, jokey 
finger sticking into my shoulder—"the only trouble 
with Homo sapiens is that parts of our brains are too 
fucking big. What do you say to that?" 
I don't say anything. He has gone elegaic. We're 
in the golden woods of old Vienna. 
"Homo sapiens sapiens," he murmurs, lilting." Or 
Homo sap sap." Reviving, he pokes me again. "We're not 
zapping the big brain, Tom. To put it in your terms, 
what we're doing is cooling the superego which, as you 
of all people know, can make you pretty miserable, and 
strengthening the ego by increasing endorphine 
production. No drugs, Tom—except our own—we're 
talking natural highs. Energies are freed up instead of 
being inhibited." (195) 
One rather obvious drawback to the way in which the process 
is carried out involves the violation of the civil rights of 
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the program's subjects. As Tom More points out: "You're 
assaulting the cortex of an individual without the knowledge 
or consent of the assaultee" (193). Another less readily 
apparent, but far more insidious drawback involves the 
rather intangible question of the "selfhood" of the test 
subjects. In addition to ridding these subjects of the 
"pathologies which are peculiar to Homo sapiens," might not 
the project also be ridding them of other, less negative, 
features which are peculiar to Homo sapiens—in short, of 
all those features that distinguish man from other animals? 
This is precisely the question that occurs to Dr. More 
as he begins to notice that many of his patients have lost 
all of the anxiety and depression that brought them to him 
in the first place, but seem to have lost something else in 
the bargain: 
Then are they, my patients, not better rather than 
worse? The answer is unclear. They're not on 
medication. They are not hurting, they are not worrying 
the same old bone, but there is something missing, not 
merely the old terrors, but a sense in each of her—her 
what? her self? (21) 
Indeed, the self is exactly what is missing in each of these 
cases, and as Dr. More will quickly discover, it is Blue Boy 
that took it away. 
Comparing cases to determine what sort of syndrome, if 
any, he is dealing with, Dr. More notes some similarities in 
"signs and symptoms." These similarities include: change of 
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personality, change in sexuality, language behavior, context 
loss, and idiot-savant response (69). Among the most 
significant of these shared symptoms are the changes in 
language behavior: 
Change from ordinary talk in more or less complete 
sentences—"I feel awful today," *'1 am plain and simply 
terrified," "The truth is, Doc, I can't stand that 
woman"—to two- or three-word fragments—"Feel good," 
"Come by me," "Over here," "Donna like Doc"— 
reminiscent of the early fragmentary telepathic 
sentences of a three-year-old, or perhaps the two-word 
chimp utterances described by primatologists—"Tickle 
Washoe," "More bananas." (69) 
This change in language behavior proves to be common to all 
subjects exposed to the Heavy Sodium, and provides More with 
his most conclusive evidence that nothing less pernicious 
than a loss of self is the end result of Project Blue Boy. 
Along with their fears and anxieties, typically human 
traits, the subjects of Blue Boy lose their capacity for 
language, another typically human trait. They thus cease to 
be any more "human" than is a chimp that has learned that a 
given stimulus on its part (e.g. making the sign "banana") 
will produce a desirable response from its environment (e.g. 
the appearance of an actual piece of fruit). 
When Tom accuses Bob Comeaux and his colleagues at 
Fedville of "zapping" the test subjects and "regressing them 
to lower primates," Bob dismisses the accusation as absurd 
on the basis that "these same test subjects have an average 
twenty percent increase in I.Q.—plus an almost total memory 
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recall which makes you and me look like dummies. We ain't 
talking chimps, Tom" (192). So incredible, in fact, is the 
memory recall of the test subjects that their thought 
processes are more like those of a computer than of a human 
brain. Tom has already noticed the impressive recall of his 
Heavy Sodium-poisoned patients, and he has also noticed a 
down side to their computer-like brain functions. One of his 
patients recently complained to him about a co-worker of 
hers who was out to get her. She called the co-worker "Fat 
Alice," and when Dr. More talked to the woman's supervisor 
about this Alice, he found out that she was not a person but 
a "rather low-grade robot which vacuums the floor and 
monitors the room air for particles" (79). Even though Fat 
Alice was programmed to "speak," she was a long way from 
being human, but for some reason this patient seemed not to 
be able to make the distinction: "My impression: though Fat 
Alice was programmed to * speak,' Ella couldn't tell that she 
was not human. She was responding to Fat Alice's speech like 
another robot" (151). This patient was no more able to 
distinguish a "speaking" computer from a speaking human 
being than a computer would be. Thus she, like Blue Boy's 
other test subjects, has paid a high price for her 
superhuman recall and computational skills. It is true that 
these test subjects now "think" like computers. For all 
their many amazing and useful functions, however, computers 
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are not human beings, and neither are the unwitting subjects 
of Project Blue Boy. 
Thus, the Utopia envisioned by the scientists over at 
Fedville has the one major flaw that it is achieved at the 
expense of its citizens' humanity. Though they lose their 
uniquely human fears, anxieties, and agressions, they must 
become as animals to do so. And though they gain the ability 
to recall any bit of information that has ever entered their 
brains, and to figure out complex mathematical equations 
without the aid of a calculator, they must become as 
machines to do so. Whether one views them as subhuman or as 
superhuman, the implication is the same in either case—the 
subjects are no longer human. It is this truth that Dr. 
More, with the help of his cousin/colleague/lover Dr. Lucy 
Lipscomb, brings to light just in time to prevent the 
program from being implemented on a national scale. 
Project Blue Boy is, in the final analysis, just 
another scheme that would improve the lot of mankind in 
general at the expense of the individual man. The humanistic 
"tenderness" that motivates its creators is fundamentally no 
different from that which motivated the Nazis in their 
scheme to purify society of its unclean members. It is the 
same sort of tenderness that, as Father Smith points out, 
inevitably "leads to the gas chamber"—to genocide. The 
Nazis, however, only killed the Jews; this latest scheme is 
targeted at every man, woman, and child in America, 
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regardless of race or creed. And while it is true that 
Project Blue Boy's victims would not cease to "live," 
according to a strictly organic definition of life, they 
would cease to live as human beings. The end result of 
Project Blue Boy then, were it to be carried out to the 
extent envisioned by its creators, would be nothing less 
catastrophic than a national genocide of the self. 
Tom More's discovery of the true diabolical nature of 
this governmental conspiracy, and his successful efforts to 
expose and dismantle it before it can get beyond the 
experimental stage, are assisted by clues hidden in the 
verbal behavior of its victims. The subjects' verbal 
behavior is not the only clue to their loss of self, nor is 
it even the most prominent, as for instance Allie's verbal 
behavior is the most prominent clue that she is "different" 
from other people. The subjects' verbal behavior is merely 
one symptom among many symptoms. The consideration of 
language as a behavior, then, is far less important to the 
thematic concerns of this novel than it is of Percy's other 
novels, particularly The Second Coming. Furthermore, what 
importance it does have is of such a general nature as not 
to be readily explicable within the parameters set forth in 
"Toward a Triadic Theory of Meaning." In terms of postulate 
1.52 ("A signal is received by an organism in an 
environment. A sentence is received and uttered in a 
world"). we can say that Project Blue Boy reduces human 
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beings in a world to organisms in an environment, but beyond 
this most general of assertions, the parameters have very 
little help to offer us. The reason for the overall 
irrelevance of the parameters to the linguistic concerns of 
the novel is quite simple. These parameters are designed to 
describe, or elucidate, language behavior, and what we are 
dealing with in the victims of Project Blue Boy simply does 
not qualify as "language," any more than do the two-word 
utterances of a trained chimp such as Washoe. And this is 
precisely the point Percy is trying to make. The capacity 
for language use is virtually synonymous with "humanity." 
Project Blue Boy robs its subjects of this capacity. 
Therefore, it robs them of their humanity. And this is 
pretty nearly the extent of the semiotic theme of The 
Thanatos Syndrome. 
The inability of this last of Percy's novels to support 
any but the most superficial semiotic reading certainly does 
not reflect negatively upon its overall importance within 
the Percy canon. It is a well-constructed novel, much easier 
to read in fact than most of his other novels, and addresses 
issues that are every bit as philosophically and 
theologically profound as those addressed in his other 
novels. It is just not as semiotically self-conscious as 
some of his other novels. And after the densely semiotic The 
Second Coming, a shift in primary focus on Percy's part is 
certainly understandable. Having in his penultimate novel 
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taken his semiotic concerns as far as they were capable of 
being taken in a work of fiction, Percy uses this last novel 
to address more directly the very general question that has 
lurked in the heart of every one of his novels: Why is it 
that the human condition in the twentieth century, for all 
its physical advantages over preceding eras, is in a very 
fundamental way inferior to that of any other age in which 
man has lived? Percy's answer to this question involves, but 
transcends, the semiotic questions that have occupied so 
much of his attention up to this point. The Thanatos 
Syndrome, hatched in the mind of Satan and sanctioned by God 
himself, is a century-long cultural love affair with, and 
drift toward, death. This syndrome is at the root of 
virtually all of the problems that we think of as peculiar 
to "modern" existence, including those with language. The 
twentieth century, the century of death, however, is rapidly 
drawing to a close, and in his last novel Percy invites us 
to speculate on mankind's chances of, first, surviving to 
the end of this century, and then carving out a meaningful 
existence for himself in the century to come. Whatever may 
be the numerous variables involved in man's physical 
survival to the year 2000 and beyond, the relative 
meaningfulness or meaninglessness of his existence will 
largely be contingent upon a single factor: what he does 
with the magic prism through which he views his world, and 
his world views him in return—language. 
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CONCLUSION 
On several occasions throughout his career, Percy 
indicated that he considered his work in semiotics to be 
fundamentally more important than his fiction (e.g Lawson 
and Kramer 221, Abadi-Nagy 54). This opinion, while 
understandable (Percy was publishing essays on language 
theory long before he published his first novel), could not 
be farther from the truth. For all the time and effort he 
devoted to linguistic theory, he accomplished very little in 
this field that could be considered original. Percy 
contributed to linguistics primarily by synthesizing already 
existing ideas, and presenting them in a coherent, fairly 
accessible form, although even some of his syntheses are 
flawed by oversimplification or inaccuracy. 
Regardless of how he viewed his own career, then, we 
cannot objectively agree with his summation of it. Percy's 
fiction is far and away more important than his linguistic 
work, and will undoubtedly outlast it—it is what he will be 
remembered for. Insignificant and unhailed as Percy may be 
in the highly specialized field of linguistics, however, 
Percy has the advantage over his peers of a second medium, 
in addition to expository prose, through which to present 
and even work out his theories on language. His linguistic 
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interests really come to life in his fiction rather than his 
essays. Certainly his novels are about more than just 
linguistics, but they are far richer for their creator's 
abiding interest in language. 
Percy's linguistic interests, evident to some degree in 
all of his novels, contribute in a variety of ways to the 
development of their more overt thematic concerns. One of 
the more interesting aspects of this symbiotic relationship 
between linguistics and fiction is what Percy does with the 
language behavior of his characters, which he uses both to 
illustrate and embody important characteristics of the 
characters and the world in which they live, and to actually 
work out linguistic problems that have in many cases eluded 
solution in his essays on language. Percy's thematic use of 
his characters' language behavior, along with his awareness 
of their language as a behavior, becomes more pronounced 
with each succeeding novel. This finally reaches a climax in 
The Second Coming, where he uses Allison Huger's highly 
unconventional language to resolve a dilemma that has 
troubled him from the beginning of his fictional career: 
Given the "worn-out" condition of language in the postmodern 
world, and the consequent incapacity of this language to 
communicate meaningful concepts such as "religion" and 
"love," how can a person experience such meaningful, though 
inarticulable, concepts without withdrawing into silent 
isolation from his fellow man? 
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Percy's growing awareness of the fictional 
possibilities inherent in his characters' verbal behavior, 
and the solution to the articulability dilemma that this 
awareness makes possible, can be traced with the aid of 
Peirce-Percyan semiotic theory, particularly as it is 
distilled into the "loose list of postulates" in "Toward a 
Triadic Theory of Meaning." By viewing the characters' 
verbal behavior in light of these postulates, we can, first, 
absolve Percy of the frequently levelled charge of willful 
and needless ambiguity in the endings of his first four 
novels. Given the worn out state of the medium he was 
dealing with, he ended them as unambiguously as he in good 
conscience could. We can also follow Percy as he gropes 
toward his resolution of the dilemma of articulability. In 
The Moviegoer, he throws up his hands and declares simply: 
"It is impossible to say." He does not show much more hope 
in The Last Gentleman, in which signs of meaning impinge 
upon Will Barrett from all sides but are invisible to him 
because of his inability to penetrate the veil of language 
in which these signs are embedded. In his next two novels, 
Love in the Ruins and Lancelot, however, he discovers the 
glimmer of a solution in the relationship between the 
normative dimension of language and the way in which a 
community views the adherence or nonadherence of its members 
to the norms. Finally, in The Second Coming. Percy realizes 
the full thematic potentialities of this relationship. He 
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uses the linguistic deviance, that in Love in the Ruins and 
Lancelot served only to isolate speakers from their speech 
act communities, to bring about a spiritual and even social 
rebirth—a second coming. Through Allie's "crazy" language, 
one man and one woman are taken back to what Percy has 
called "the first edenic world of the sign user," and in 
this new Eden they can live and love and, even more 
importantly, speak of love. So completely does The Second 
Coming resolve Percy's language dilemma, at least to the 
extent that it is capable of being resolved in the bankrupt 
postmodern world, that in his final novel The Thanatos 
Syndrome. he simply leaves it behind, and in fact abandons 
language itself as a primary thematic concern, using it only 
to illustrate a much larger point. 
A major thematic interest of Percy's can thus be traced 
through his fiction with the aid of his linguistic theory, 
and, likewise, a major linguistic interest can be 
illuminated through an analysis of his more overt thematic 
concerns. So, while it is difficult to agree with Percy's 
belief in the superiority of his linguistic work over his 
fiction, it it is even more difficult to imagine what his 
fiction would have been like had he not engaged in his 
linguistic work. As with few other writers, save his icons 
Sartre, Camus, and Marcel, Percy's novels combine ideas and 
concrete details—theory and plot line—in a way that 
enriches each for the other's presence. This combination in 
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his work finally makes Percy both an important linguist and 
an important novelist, where without it he might be neither. 
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